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Abstract 
 
This study examines the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in developing 
countries. Based on deduction from the relevant theoretical and empirical literature, the 
study tests the following hypotheses regarding the impact of fiscal deficits on economic 
growth. First, fiscal deficits have significant positive or negative impact on economic growth 
in developing countries. Second, the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth depends 
on the size of deficits as a percentage of GDP – that is, there is a non-linear relationship 
between fiscal deficits and economic growth. Third, the impact of fiscal deficits on 
economic growth depends on the ways in which deficits are financed. Fourth, the impact of 
fiscal deficits on economic growth depends on what deficit financing is used for. The study 
also examines whether there are any significant regional differences in terms of the 
relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth in developing countries.  
 
The study uses panel data for thirty-one developing countries covering the period 1972-
2001, which is analysed based on the econometric estimation of a dynamic growth model 
using the Arellano and Bond (1991) generalised method of moments (GMM) technique. 
Overall, the results suggest the following. First, fiscal deficits per se have no any significant 
positive or negative impact on economic growth. Second, by contrast, when the deficit is 
substituted by domestic and foreign financing, we find that both domestic and foreign 
financing of fiscal deficits exerts a negative and statistically significant impact on economic 
growth with a lag. Third, we find that both categories of economic classification of 
government expenditure, namely, capital and current expenditure, have no significant 
impact on economic growth. When government expenditure is disaggregated on the basis 
of a functional classification, the results suggest that spending on education, defence and 
economic services have positive but insignificant impact on growth, while spending on 
health and general public services have positive and significant impact. Fourth, in terms of 
regional differences with regard to the estimated relationships, the study finds that, while 
there are some regional differences between the four different regions represented in our 
sample of thirty-one developing countries -  namely, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa – these differences 
are not statistically significant.   
 
On the basis of these findings, the study concludes that fiscal deficits per se are not 
necessarily good or bad for economic growth in developing countries; how the deficits are 
financed and what they are used for matters. In addition, the study concludes that there 
are no statistically significant regional differences in terms of the relationship between 
fiscal deficits and economic growth in developing countries.  
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Over the past few decades, fiscal deficits have been at the forefront of 
macroeconomic reforms in both developed and developing countries. In developing 
countries, in particular, governments have been urged to reduce fiscal deficits as 
one of the measures to lead them out of the economic malaise many have 
experienced such as unsustainable levels of public debt, high inflation, balance of 
payments problems, poor investment and low economic growth. In fact, 
international development agencies, such as the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and donor countries have required many 
governments in developing countries to reduce the size of fiscal deficits as one of 
the pre-conditions for obtaining development aid and other forms of economic 
assistance (Tarp, 1993; Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel, 1994; Nelson and Singh, 1994; 
Jha, 2003).  
 
On the other hand, however, debate remains about the effect of fiscal deficits on 
economic performance. Since the Keynesian revolution in macroeconomics, many 
economists and policy makers have argued that deficit spending can be used as one 
of the effective measures to promote economic growth and employment (Chrystal 
and Thornton, 1988). This view of deficit spending is based on the well-known 
Keynesian premise that the market economy left to itself will not always be able to 
sustain aggregate demand at a level consistent with full employment.  Keynesian 
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economists have particularly argued for the need to use government budget 
deficits as one of the corrective measures to fight poor economic growth and high 
levels of unemployment in industrialised countries during economic downturns.  In 
the context of developing countries, too, some economists and policymakers have 
argued that deficit spending would be an effective economic policy tool to promote 
economic growth and employment given the large amount of unemployed and 
underemployed human and other economic resources that exist in most of these 
countries (Nelson and Singh, 1994). Indeed, as Nelson and Singh further argue, if 
used wisely, such fiscal policy action would help developing countries to invest in 
much-needed infrastructure and other development projects.   
   
However, the Keynesian view of deficit spending policy has been challenged over 
the years by two other theoretical viewpoints. The first is the Neo-classical 
viewpoint in which it is argued that deficit spending has little or no effect on 
employment and economic growth, and that it primarily results in a re-distribution 
of resources from the private sector to the public sector through the so-called 
crowding-out effect. Proponents of this viewpoint also warn of the potentially 
harmful macroeconomic effects of running high levels of public sector debt caused 
by deficit spending policy (Chrystal and Thornton, 1988; Bernheim, 1989).  
 
The second viewpoint that has challenged the Keynesian analysis of fiscal deficits is 
the so-called Ricardian theory (also known as the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis) 
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which argues that deficit spending policy has no real economic effects.1 According 
to this theory, government debt generated through borrowing to finance deficit 
spending will in the long run be paid-off by future tax increases, and far-seeing 
taxpayers, who also care enough about their future prosperity and the prosperity of 
future generations, would foresee this tax increase and therefore adjust their 
present consumption and savings accordingly (Bernheim, 1989).2 This means that 
the stimulative effects of deficit spending policy on aggregate demand will be offset 
by a shift away from current consumption and in to current savings, thus leaving 
net aggregate demand unchanged. Consequently, with no change in aggregate 
demand, there will be no real economic effects - that is, deficit spending policy will 
have no effect on output and other macroeconomic variables (Barro, 1989; 
Bernheim, 1989; Fischer and Easterly, 1990; Saleh, 2003). 
 
 
1.2 Research Problem 
Despite the ongoing pressure by the international development agencies and donor 
countries on developing countries to reduce the size of budget deficits and the 
debate on the effect of fiscal deficits on economic performance, there is still a lack 
of detailed empirical investigation on the effect of fiscal deficits on economic 
performance in developing countries.  As Nelson and Singh (1994) argue, literature 
                                                 
1 The Ricardian theory was originally introduced by David Ricardo and later developed by the 
American economist Robert Barro. 
2 This Ricardian analysis of deficit spending policy is based on a number of assumptions such as (1) 
consumers/taxpayers are rational and farsighted; (2) successive generations of consumers are linked 
by altruistically motivated transfers; (3) all taxes are non-distortionary – among others (Bernheim, 
1989, p. 63) 
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shows that most of the existing empirical studies on this topic have focused much 
on the developed countries, particularly the United States.3  This study, therefore, 
aims to contribute in filling an important existing gap in the empirical literature on 
the impact of fiscal deficits on economic performance in developing countries. In 
doing this, the study particularly examines the specific case of the impact of fiscal 
deficits on economic growth.  
 
In addition, a critical analysis of the few existing empirical studies on the impact of 
fiscal deficits on economic growth shows that there a lack of thorough empirical 
investigation on this specific issue; for, most of these studies have only considered 
the impact of fiscal deficits per se on economic growth. Yet, the theoretical 
literature (as discussed later in Chapter Three) suggests that the impact of fiscal 
deficits on growth depends on other factors such as the level of fiscal deficits (as a 
percentage of GDP or GNP), the ways in which fiscal deficits are financed, and what 
deficit financing is used for in an economy. This study also contributes to the 
literature on the specific issue of deficit-economic growth connection by 
considering all these factors. 
 
Our study is unique in the following ways. First, as argued above, while most of the 
existing empirical studies on the impact of fiscal deficits on growth have only 
considered the impact of fiscal deficits per se on economic growth, our study goes 
further than this and considers other factors which theory suggests may be 
important in determining the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. These 
                                                 
3 These studies have empirically examined the effects of fiscal deficits on interest rates, inflation, 
  savings, investment, and employment or output/national income growth. 
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factors include the size of fiscal deficits as a ratio of GDP, how the deficit is financed 
and what deficit financing is used for.  
 
Second, following recent developments in econometric methodology, we employ a 
Generalised Method of moments (GMM) in estimating the impact of fiscal deficits 
on economic growth.  This estimation technique produces more reliable coefficient 
estimates for dynamic models like ours and controls for the potential endogeneity 
problem associated with growth model estimation. These issues can be difficult to 
deal with when using ordinary least square (OLS) technique and other estimation 
techniques which have been employed in earlier studies. Finally, several existing 
studies on the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in developing countries - 
such as Nelson and Singh (1994) and Adam and Bevan (2005) - provide results and 
draw conclusions based on large sets of countries from different regions of the 
developing world. Economic characteristics of countries from different regions of 
the developing world are, however, different and hence may make the results and 
policy conclusions based on the analysis of data pooled in this way potentially 
misleading. We take account of this issue in our study and check whether there are 
any significant regional differences in the sample of developing countries 
considered in this study before we discuss our results and draw any conclusions.  
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1.3 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this study are three-fold:  
 
(1) To empirically examine the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in 
developing countries;  
 
(2)  To examine whether there are any significant regional differences in terms of 
the relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth in developing 
countries; and 
 
(3) To discuss the policy implications of the findings in relation to the first two 
research objectives. 
 
1.4 Research Hypotheses 
Based on deduction from the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the 
relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth (see discussion in Chapter 
Three), this study tests the following four research hypotheses: 
 
(1) Fiscal deficits have a significant positive or negative impact on economic 
growth in developing countries;  
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(2) The impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth depends on the size of 
deficits as a percentage of GDP – that is, there is a non-linear relationship 
between fiscal deficits and economic growth; 
 
(3) The impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth depends on the ways in 
which deficits are financed; and  
 
(4) The impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth depends on what deficit 
financing is used for. 
 
1.5 Methodology  
There are two main approaches to social science research; deductive approach and 
inductive approach. The deductive approach to research begins from a more 
general theory about the topic of interest to a more specific hypothesis. The 
hypothesis is then tested using observations or data analysis in order to confirm or 
falsify the original theory. On the other hand, the inductive approach starts with 
specific observations or data analysis and ends up with developing a general 
conclusion or theory (May, 2001; Robson, 2002; Blaikie, 2003; Bryman, 2004; 
Saunders and Lewis, 2012). Our study follows the former approach; based on the 
deductions from relevant literature on fiscal deficits and economic growth, we 
establish some key research hypotheses on the relationship between deficits and 
growth. We then formulate the theoretical and empirical model on the relationship 
between fiscal deficits and economic growth. Finally, we estimate this model to test 
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the established hypotheses on the relationship between fiscal deficits and 
economic growth in developing countries. However, it should be noted that our 
study’s aim is not to falsify the economic theory on the deficit-economic growth 
connection in the context of developing countries we consider in this study. We will 
confirm the theory if the results support or confirm it. However, if the results are 
not in favour of the theory then, instead of falsifying it, we will examine the 
possible causes of these results and their implications in terms of economic policy.4 
 
The study can also be classified as quantitative in nature; for, it seeks to estimate 
empirically the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. On this basis, the study 
uses quantitative data on economic growth, fiscal deficits and other control 
variables considered in our empirical model. As far as data collection is concerned, 
the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics and the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators served as the main sources of data.  
 
In terms of data analysis, the study employs econometric analysis of panel data to 
estimate the relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth. The choice 
of panel data study was mainly influenced by a number of important advantages 
this type of study has over the conventional time-series or cross-sectional studies. 
First, the use of panel data normally allows a researcher to get a larger number of 
data points (larger data set), more informative data and degrees of freedom as 
compared to time-series or cross-sectional data sets. This is especially important in 
a study like ours, given the problem of data availability on a number of variables 
                                                 
4 See Appendix A for the detailed discussion of the philosophical approach of our study. 
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considered in our empirical model. As is well documented in the literature, data for 
many economic variables, especially fiscal variables, are not consistently available 
for many developing countries, thus making it difficult to get a reasonably large and 
good time-series or cross-sectional data set to use in the empirical part of the study. 
Using panel data, however, can help to minimise this problem. Second, while time-
series and cross-sectional studies are likely to suffer from the omitted variable bias 
problem, using panel data analysis can help to control for this. Third, the panel data 
approach gives more variability and less collinearity among the explanatory 
variables – hence providing more efficient econometric estimates. Finally, the use 
of the panel data framework allows one to control for the likely endogeneity of one 
or more explanatory variables, and measurement errors by using lags of the 
regressors as instruments where needed (Judson and Owen, 1996; Hsiao, 1986, 
2003; Bond et al., 2001; Wansbeek, 2001; Baltagi, 2008 - among others). 
 
It is worth noting, however, that a number of econometric issues may arise when a 
panel data framework is used in economic growth studies like ours. For instance, 
there may be two-way causality between some of the explanatory variables and 
economic growth (independent variable). In addition, there may be some outlying 
observations resulting from the differences in economic characteristics and 
performances of countries included in the panel.  Furthermore, for a dynamic 
growth model like the one we are estimating in this study, the unobserved country-
specific factors will be most likely correlated with the lagged dependent variable 
(Hsiao, 1986, 2003; Kiviet, 1995; Bond et al., 2001; Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Baldacci, 2003; among others). To control for these problems, we estimate our 
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model using the Arellano and Bond (1991) generalised method of moments (GMM) 
estimation technique. As Arellano and Bond (1991) and other studies have 
demonstrated, this estimation technique controls for all these issues and produces 
more consistent and efficient econometric results than other estimators – such as 
ordinary least square (OLS), fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE) estimation 
techniques.   
 
The detailed methodological framework followed in undertaking this study is 
discussed later in Chapter Four. 
 
1.6 Thesis structure 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, 
Chapter Two presents some key issues related to fiscal deficits. It includes 
definitions and measurements of fiscal deficits, discussion of the alternative ways of 
deficit financing, and discussion of the general macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
deficits. Chapter Three presents a critical review of the existing literature on the 
impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. This includes both the theoretical and 
empirical literature. Chapter Four discusses the methodological framework used in 
carrying out this study. It presents discussion of the theoretical model employed in 
carrying out the study - based on which the empirical model used to estimate the 
impact of fiscal deficits on economics growth is built, outlines the empirical model 
and estimation strategy used in the study, discusses data and data sources, and 
discusses the econometric methods used in data analysis. Chapter Five presents a 
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descriptive analysis of data on the major variables included in our empirical model. 
In doing this, the chapter presents the analysis of the trends in fiscal deficits, 
economic growth and other control variables. It also examines whether there exist 
any significant differences in the trends of these variables between different 
regions of the developing world considered in our study. Chapter Six presents the 
econometric analysis of the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in 
developing countries using data from a sample of thirty-one countries. Chapter 
Seven discusses the policy implications of our empirical results on the impact of 
fiscal deficits and other policy variables on economic growth in developing 
countries. Finally, Chapter Eight presents a summary and conclusions of the study. 
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Chapter Two 
FISCAL DEFICITS: DEFINITION, MEASURES AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE 
MACROECONOMY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Public finance literature shows that there are a number of different definitions and 
measures of fiscal deficit. The existence of alternative definitions and measures of 
the fiscal deficit raises the question as to which is the appropriate measure of the 
fiscal deficit in assessing fiscal stance, sustainability and the effects of fiscal deficits 
(or fiscal policy in general) on the macroeconomy.  Various studies (such as Easterly 
et al., 1994; Jacobs et al., 2002; Jacobs, 2002; among others) show that the choice 
between the alternative definitions and measures of the deficit depends mainly on 
the purpose it is intended for (or in other words, the type of analysis one wants to 
undertake in a particular study). It follows, therefore, that it is important that the 
differences between the alternative definitions and measures of deficit, together 
with their analytical and policy-motivated foundations, are well understood before 
one chooses a particular measure of the fiscal deficit to use in the assessment of 
the impact of fiscal deficits on economic performance. On this basis, therefore, this 
chapter is devoted to the discussion of the alternative definitions and measures of 
fiscal deficits and the ways fiscal deficits are financed, before we proceed with the 
analysis of the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in developing countries 
(which is the main focus of this study) in the subsequent chapters. The chapter also 
discusses briefly the available alternative ways of covering fiscal deficits and 
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presents an overview of the likely effects of fiscal deficits on the macroeconomic 
performance.  
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Following this introductory section, section 2.2 
presents some definitions of the fiscal deficit. Section 2.3 discusses the alternative 
ways of financing fiscal deficits. Section 2.4 discusses the alternative measures of 
fiscal deficits. Section 2.5 presents an overview of the effects of fiscal deficits on the 
macroeconomy. Finally, section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2 Definition of Fiscal Deficit 
Public finance literature shows that there are numerous definitions of fiscal deficit, 
depending on how the deficit is measured. However, the widely accepted definition, 
and the one we will use in this study, is that fiscal deficit is the excess of 
government expenditure over government revenue receipts taken in from taxes, 
fees and charges levied by government authorities (Hyman, 1996). A fiscal deficit 
generally suggests an expansionary fiscal stance. Contrary to this is the fiscal or 
budget surplus, which may be an indication of contractionary fiscal stance.   
 
Fiscal deficit can be measured on a cash basis or an accrual basis. In the first case, 
the deficit measures the excess of total government cash outlays over total 
government cash revenues. On the other hand, in the second case, the deficit 
measures the excess of accrued spending over income (Agenor and Montiel, 1999; 
Jacobs et al., 2002).  
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According to public finance literature and practices by governments and institutions 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, fiscal deficits (or 
fiscal balance in general) have been commonly reported for three different scopes 
(sizes or coverage) of government worldwide. These are: (i) budgetary central 
government; (ii) consolidated central government; and, (iii) consolidated general 
government (Blejer and Cheasty, 1991; Buiter, 1997; Legeida, 2000; Agenor, 2004; 
and, IMF – various issues). 
 
Budgetary central government fiscal balance (deficit/surplus) is the narrowest 
measure of fiscal stance as far as the coverage of the public sector is concerned. 
This includes the deficit of the “central government” component of government 
only; i.e., budgetary central government deficit equals the difference between 
budgetary central government revenues and expenditures.  This is expressed as 
follows: 
 
Budgetary central government budget balance = budgetary central government 
revenue – budgetary central government expenditures 
 
Where, central government includes all units representing the territorial jurisdiction 
of the central authority throughout a country (IMF, various issues). 
 
Consolidated central government fiscal balance (deficit/surplus) includes deficits for 
budgetary central government, social security funds and extra-budgetary 
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funds/accounts5. According to the IMF manuals on Government Finance Statistics 
(various issues), the consolidated central government budget balance equals the 
following fiscal stance: 
 
Consolidated central government budget balance = central government budget 
balance + social security funds balance + extra-budgetary accounts balance 
 
Finally, the consolidated general government fiscal balance (deficit/surplus) 
includes the total of deficits for central, state and local governments, and for any 
supranational authorities operating in a country, excluding all identifiable 
transactions between different levels of government. This can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
Consolidated general government budget balance = central government budget 
balance + total state governments budget balance + total local governments budget 
balance + total budget balance (deficit/surplus) of supranational authorities – 
identifiable transactions between different levels of government 
 
Where, central government is as defined above. State (or provincial, or regional) 
governments are defined as governments that exercise authority independent of 
central government in specific sections of a country’s territory (encompassing a 
number of smaller localities). Local governments consist of government units that 
exercise an independent authority in the various urban and/or rural jurisdictions of 
                                                 
5 Note, extra-budgetary funds are funds associated with institutions or units outside the budget that 
raise money through the imposition of tax or compulsory levies, or are created with some charitable 
purpose, and which deals with provision of non-marketable goods or services (IMF Manuals of GFS, 
various issues; Legeida, 2000) 
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a country’s territory. Supranational authorities consist of the international 
governmental organisations (also known as intergovernmental organisations), other 
than their headquarters units, operating in a country. 
 
Critical analysis of the above-discussed scopes of budget stance measures shows 
that the consolidated measures of fiscal stance (consolidated general government 
or consolidated central government) represent the most accurate measures of the 
fiscal position of the country, and as such these measures should be used 
(whenever available) in assessing fiscal sustainability and the economic effects of 
fiscal deficits or surplus. This is because the unconsolidated measures of fiscal 
stance do not encompass the fiscal content of institutions such as public enterprises, 
the central bank, and the public financial institutions, which in practice carry out 
government-like transactions that can be relevant when measuring the impact of 
fiscal deficit. On this basis, therefore, our study use only the consolidated general 
government measure of fiscal variables in the empirical analysis part. 
 
2.3 Means of Financing Fiscal Deficits 
When government spending exceeds revenues, the resulting budget deficit must be 
financed in one way or another in order for the government to meet its financial 
obligations. Following Sachs and Larrain, 1993; Weiss, 1995; and Agenor, 2004, 
various ways of financing government budget deficit can be explained using the 
government budget constraint. This is as expressed in equation 2.1 below: 
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Where; g tp
g
tp DD )1()(   is government debt (both domestic and foreign) held by the 
public, and others are as defined above. 
 
Equation 2.2 implies in essence that there are four ways of financing a government 
budget deficit (Sachs and Larrain, 1993; Tarp, 1993; Weiss, 1995; Agenor, 2004):  
(1) borrowing from the central bank (also known as monetization of the deficit) 
(2) increasing the level of domestic debt  
(3) increasing the level of foreign debt 
(4) running down foreign exchange reserves 
 
Bringing all these ways of financing fiscal deficit together, we obtain: 
 
Fiscal Deficit = (Borrowing from the central bank + Domestic Borrowing + External 
Borrowing + Foreign Reserve Use) 
 
These ways of financing fiscal deficits have been discussed in details by (Fischer and 
Easterly, 1990; Tarp, 1993; Weiss, 1995; Piontkivsky et al., 2001; among others). 
Borrowing from the central bank occurs when the central bank finances the budget 
deficit by directly lending the funds needed by the government to meet its 
expenditures or indirectly by purchasing government debt at the time of its 
issuance or later through open market operations (Weiss, 1995; Piontkivsky et al., 
2001). Domestic borrowing can be exercised voluntarily or on a compulsory basis. 
In the economies where capital markets are well developed, it can be possible for 
governments to finance the deficit by issuing bonds that are voluntarily purchased 
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by the private sector. Elsewhere, different forms of compulsory purchase of 
government debt can be used: these include setting reserve requirements for 
financial institutions operating in the domestic economy, introduction of 
compulsory purchase of government bonds by commercial banks, and 
accumulation of arrears of government payments on debts to the private sector 
(Fischer and Easterly, 1990; Weiss, 1995). Foreign borrowing involves increase in 
the government’s holding of foreign debt. As noted in Weiss (1995), this means of 
deficit financing is, however, only useful in economies that are creditworthy.  Finally, 
financing of a fiscal deficit by running down foreign exchange reserves usually 
occurs by the central bank first purchasing government debt on the primary or 
secondary market (or simply granting a loan to the government) thereby injecting 
additional reserves to the economy and then trading available foreign exchange 
reserves for domestic currency (Sargent and Wallace, 1981; Ouanes and Thakur, 
1997; Piontkivsky et al., 2001).  
 
2.4 Measures of Fiscal Deficits 
Economic literature shows that various measures of fiscal deficits have been used in 
assessing fiscal stance and the effects of fiscal deficits on economic performance. 
These measures can be grouped into the following two main categories (Blejer and 
Cheasty 1993; Jacobs, 2002; Jacobs et al., 2002): 
 
 The conventional (also called accounting) measures of the fiscal deficit. This 
is the measure of the fiscal deficit that governments normally report in their 
budgets; and, 
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 Refinements of the conventional measure of the fiscal deficit (also called 
special-purpose deficit measures). These are special-purpose deficit 
measures that attempt to isolate from the conventional deficit the 
components that are relevant for assessment of specific fiscal stance or 
impact of various budgetary transactions. 
 
These measures of the fiscal deficit are discussed in more detail below. 
 
2.4.1 Conventional Measures of the Fiscal Deficit 
 
The conventional measure of the fiscal deficit generally measures the amount of 
resources utilised by the government in a given fiscal period, usually a year, that 
need to be financed after total revenue has been deducted from total expenditure 
(Blejer and Cheasty, 1991, 1993; Jacobs et al., 2002; among others).  It is thus 
defined as the difference between total budgetary expenditures and total 
budgetary revenues of the government that needs to be covered by some forms of 
deficit financing. According to Jacobs (2002, pp. 5-6), citing Tanzi et al. (1988), the 
conventional measure of the budget deficit (or the budget balance in general) was 
originally developed in an attempt to provide, among other things, a measure of 
the government’s contribution to aggregate demand in the economy and the lack 
of equilibrium in the current account of the balance of payments, or to measure the 
crowding-out of the private sector.  
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According to the IMF’s Manuals on Government Finance Statistics (various issues), 
the conventional budget balance (deficit/surplus) is measured as follows: 
 
Conventional Fiscal Balance = ((Government expenditure + Net lending) - 
(Government’s total revenue receipts)) 
 
Where; Net lending equals lending minus repayments, and government’s revenue 
receipts include both tax and non-tax revenue receipts. 
 
Analysis shows that governments worldwide usually report their deficits using the 
above IMF measure of conventional fiscal deficits. However, the economic 
literature shows that several variants of the conventional measure of the deficit 
exist. According to Blejer and Cheasty (1991, p.1646), there are two main 
areas/causes of variance:   
 
 the distinction between the budgetary items that determine the fiscal deficit 
(revenues and expenditures) on the one hand and the items that finance it 
on the other, and 
 
 specification of the time period at which the resource use is measured (cash 
deficit or accrual deficit) 
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(1) The distinction between the items that determine the deficit (revenues and 
expenditures) and the items that finance it  
 
There are two main criteria used to distinguish between the items that determine 
the deficit (revenue and expenditure) and the items that finance it: the government 
debt criterion and the public sector policy criterion. In the first case, transactions are 
considered as deficit-determining, and are therefore classified as either revenue or 
expenditure, when they do not create or change a liability for the government, and 
those that change the level of government liability are considered as deficit 
financing. In the second case, transactions are considered deficit-determining, and 
are therefore classified as either revenue or expenditure, instead of deficit 
financing, when they are used to pursue policy goals rather than being part of 
public sector liquidity management (Blejer and Cheasty, 1991, pp. 1646-1649). 
 
These two criteria for distinguishing between the items that determine the deficit 
(revenue and expenditure) and the items that finance it can lead to significant 
discrepancies in the sizes of the conventional deficit reported using the two criteria. 
According to Blejer and Cheasty (1991, p.1647), at least three types of transactions 
can cause discrepancies in the two criteria: budgetary net lending; external grants; 
and, debt service.  
 
 Budgetary net lending - Unlike other government expenditures, government 
lending to the private sector may involve liability management, and for this 
reason, under the government debt criterion, should be classified as deficit-
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financing type of transactions. However, it is also possible that a significant 
proportion of government lending to the private sector may be composed 
by the mix of direct capital infusion and of government credit programmes 
undertaken in order to pursue certain policies goals (for example, to supply 
credit to some selected sectors of the economy). Given the subsidy element 
of this transaction and the possibility that part of the government lending to 
the private sector may not be paid back, “net lending” cannot be defined as 
pure deficit financing, and the public policy criterion would then classify it as 
part of government expenditure - and hence classified as deficit-
determining.   
 
 External grant - External grants represent, in essence, government financing 
without any liability. It follows therefore that grants will be treated as one of 
the components of government revenue, and therefore a deficit-
determining transaction, in the government debt criterion.  However, under 
the public policy criterion, grant aid would be included in the other forms of 
foreign financing, and thus classified as deficit financing.  
 
 Debt service - In some countries, levels of public debt may already be too 
high and unsustainable to the extent that amortised debt may not be easily 
and voluntarily re-invested in new government bonds. In such a situation, 
replacement financing for amortisation could require a policy effort by the 
government similar to that of generating extra tax revenue. Hence, in this 
situation, in contrast to the government debt criterion, which considers 
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debt amortisation as deficit financing, the public policy criterion would 
consider debt amortisation as a deficit determining transaction.  
 
Indeed, these divergences in classification of the above three transactions can lead 
to significant discrepancies in the size of conventional budget balance estimated 
using the government debt criterion and the public policy criterion. According to the 
IMF’s Government Finance statistics (IMF’s GFS) manuals of 1986 and 2001, IMF 
followed the former methodology in compiling and reporting data on fiscal policy 
variables until 2001 when it switched to the later methodology of compiling and 
reporting data (Appendix C summarises these methodological differences between 
the 1986 GFS system and 2001 GFS system). As discussed later in the methodology 
chapter, this study use fiscal data which were compiled in accordance to the 
government debt criterion (1986 GFS system). 
 
(2) Specification of the time at which the resource use is measured (Cash and 
accrued deficits) 
 
Another main source of variation between the conventional deficit measures is the 
specification of the time at which resource use is measured (that is, the choice 
between cash deficit and accrual deficit approaches). As discussed earlier, cash 
deficit captures the budget balance of only government expenditures for which 
cash has been disbursed and only actual cash revenues received during a specific 
single budget period. On the other hand, accrual deficit captures the actual net 
resource flows in government transactions – that is, it captures the consequences 
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of government’s fiscal policy decisions - during the budget period, regardless of 
whether or not transactions have actually been paid for (Blejer and Cheasty, 1991; 
Jacobs, 2002; Jacobs et al., 2002). This is another main area of differences between 
the IMF’s GFS data compiled and reported in accordance to the 1986 GFS system 
(the data we have used in this study) in which cash basis is used in constructing 
fiscal variables, and the data compiled and reported in accordance to the 2001 GFS 
system in which countries are encouraged to report fiscal data on accrual basis.6 
 
Such differences in specification of the time at which resource use is measured 
result in significant differences between the size of the fiscal deficit calculated on a 
cash and accrual basis. In practice, however, it is difficult to follow either the purely 
cash or purely accrual approach, and countries usually report deficits which lie 
somewhere between the complete cash and complete accrual deficit measures. As 
noted in Blejer and Cheasty (1991, pp. 1649-1650), for instance, even for countries 
which have opted for a Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (i.e., cash deficit), 
interest payments are usually measured as they accrue, rather than when they are 
actually paid. On the other hand, government revenues are usually reported on 
cash or quasi-cash basis.  Hence, in the light of such problems associated with the 
measurement of the conventional deficit on purely cash or accrual basis, the cash 
and accrual accounting approaches have been reconciled on the basis of arrears 
that led to the measurement of the deficit on a commitment basis. This practice has 
resulted in the following measurement of conventional fiscal deficit/balance 
(Legeida, 2000): 
                                                 
6See Appendix C for more details on these methodological differences between the 1986 GFS system 
and 2001 GFS system.  
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Fiscal Deficit on commitment basis = Revenue receipts – Non-interest government 
expenditures – Scheduled interest payment = Commitment budget deficit = (-) 
Deficit financing = New external borrowing – Scheduled external debt amortisation 
+ Change in arrears + Net domestic borrowing 
  
To sum up on the conventional measure of the budget deficit, this is generally 
regarded as the financing gap during a fiscal year after the government’s total 
revenue (including tax and non-tax revenue) has been deducted from total 
government expenditure. Analysis shows that this is the main measure of the fiscal 
deficit that governments worldwide usually report in their budgets. In addition, 
analysis of the literature shows that, given its easy and wide availability, the 
conventional measure of the fiscal deficit has been the most widely used measure 
of the deficit in the studies on fiscal sustainability and the effects of fiscal deficits on 
economic performance (Blejer and Cheasty, 1991; Jacobs et al., 2002). 
 
2.4.2 Special – Purpose Deficit Measures 
As pointed out earlier, there exist some special-purpose measures of the fiscal 
deficit other than the conventional measure. According to the literature, these 
measures have been developed by economists and policymakers in an attempt to 
isolate from the conventional deficit measure the magnitudes that are more 
relevant for assessment of specific fiscal stance or economic impact of various 
budgetary transactions.  Some of the main types of special-purpose deficit 
measures that have been widely calculated include: i) primary deficit; ii) current 
deficit; iii) domestic and foreign deficits; iv) deficit that measures the contribution 
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of different elements of government transactions to aggregate demand; v) 
operational deficit; and vi) full-employment and cyclically adjusted deficits (Blejer 
and Cheasty, 1991, 1993; Weiss, 1995; Legeida, 2000; Jacobs, 2002; Jacobs et al., 
2002).  These measures should not be looked at as either good or bad, as each of 
the measure reveals only a specific aspect of the government fiscal stance and can 
be useful depending on the purpose they are intended for.  Hence, understanding 
what all these measures reveal, together with their analytical and economic 
rationale, can be useful.  
 
i. The primary deficit  
The conventional deficit measures the difference between government outlays and 
income, where outlays include interest payments on the stock of public debt. This 
measure, therefore, is influenced by the size of previous deficits. In order to remove 
the effects of the previous deficits on the budget, economists calculate the primary 
deficit (also called “non-interest deficit”) by omitting interest payments from the 
budget. Thus, the primary deficit equals the following fiscal stance:  
 
Primary deficit = Conventional deficit – Interest payments  
 
The primary deficit, therefore, measures the impact of the discretionary 
government budget (Barth et al., 1989).  It seems that the main economic rationale 
for estimating the primary deficit is to remove the interest payments (which are the 
result of past decisions) from the budget in order to get a more accurate picture of 
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the government’s current fiscal policy. In that way, one of the uses of the primary 
deficit could be the assessment of the success or failure of the government’s 
current policies in moving the economy towards a sustainable funding path. 
 
ii. The current deficit 
Unlike the conventional deficit measures, which include both current and capital 
transactions in their calculations, the current deficit measure considers only the 
difference between current revenues and expenditures. This gives the following 
fiscal stance:  
 
Current fiscal balance = Total current revenues – Total current expenditures 
 
The current deficit can be useful to economists and policymakers in assessment of 
whether the government can finance its consumption expenditures from its 
revenues (IMF, 1995). Moreover, it can be argued that, if separate and conceptually 
correct current and capital accounts were maintained, the deficit on current 
account would be the “true deficit”. This is because, unlike the current account, for 
the capital account, any excess of outlays over revenues does not cause any 
changes to the net asset position of the government as the new debt is matched by 
a new government asset (Boskin, 1982).   
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iii. The domestic and foreign Deficits 
Some economists have argued that the conventional measure of the deficit can be 
somewhat misleading when the public sector has sizeable trade or capital flows to 
and from the rest of the world. As noted in Blejer and Cheasty (1991, pp. 1652-
1653), for instance, expenditure on domestic goods that is fully financed by 
external grants increases aggregate demand without any offsetting withdrawals. In 
addition, government imports financed by domestic taxes reduce aggregate 
demand by the full amount of the import bill – a scenario where government 
expenditure may have contractionary rather than expansionary effects. It follows, 
therefore, that the overall deficit could well be zero in each of the above two 
examples, though each implies an opposite domestic impact. To isolate the effects 
of the government and the external sector on aggregate demand in an open 
economy, therefore, the domestic deficit and the foreign (or external) deficit have 
been calculated separately by economists.  
 
The domestic deficit (or, domestic budget balance in general) is measured by 
including in the calculation only those budgetary transactions taking place within 
the domestic economy and excluding those that directly influence the balance of 
payments. This equals the following fiscal stance: 
 
Domestic balance = Conventional deficit – external balance   
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On the other hand, the foreign deficit (or “foreign/external budget balance” in 
general) is measured by including in the calculations only those budgetary 
transactions that are directly connected with the foreign sector.   
 
iv. Deficit that measures the contribution of different elements of government 
transactions on aggregate demand 
 
It is argued that different elements of government transactions (expenditures and 
revenues) generate different net increases to, and withdrawals from, aggregate 
demand. As a result, economists have sometimes attempted to isolate in the fiscal 
deficit measure the contribution by the government to aggregate demand (Blejer 
and Cheasty, 1991). The most commonly used deficit measures of the contribution 
of different government transactions to aggregate demand separates the 
exhaustive expenditure (spending on goods and services) from spending on 
transfers.  In this case, for example, the deficit measure that considers only the 
exhaustive expenditure is measured as: 
  
Budget balance = conventional fiscal deficit - government spending on transfers 
 
The main economic rationale of estimating deficit measures that separate 
exhaustive expenditures and transfers is that the impact of these two categories of 
government expenditure on aggregate demand will be different.  For instance, tax-
financed transfers such as pension and unemployment benefits merely redistribute 
resources from one part of the private sector to another in the economy. In 
addition, in terms of their impact on aggregate demand, tax-financed transfers are 
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similar to negative taxes rather than to government’s expenditure on goods and 
services. Analysis also shows that the inclusion of transfers in government spending 
may at times overestimate the government’s contribution to aggregate demand 
due to the time lags in the actual spending of transfers. As noted in Blejer and 
Cheasty (1991, p.1652), this problem may especially occur in economies where 
there are different levels of government. In this case, for example, a transfer from 
one level of the government to another – say, from the central government to the 
local government level, may not increase aggregate demand until the year or years 
after it was recorded in the budget of the central government. Clearly, including 
such a transfer in the current year’s government spending will overestimate the 
government’s contribution to aggregate demand.  
 
v. The operational deficit 
 
Fluctuations in inflation can significantly change the size of the government budget 
deficit, and when this happens, the conventional measure of the budget deficit may 
not give a true picture of the impact of government activity on aggregate demand 
(Weiss, 1995). According to economic theory, fluctuation in inflation affects the 
government budget in many ways. For instance, it causes distortionary effects on 
real revenues collected by the government. In addition, inflation affects the real 
value of government assets and liabilities (Tanzi, 1977; Blejer and Cheasty, 1991). 
One important implication of these effects of inflation on the government budget is 
that inflation may reduce the real value of the outstanding public sector debt, while 
at the same time compensating holders of the government debt for such a 
reduction in their real assets through higher nominal interest rates. This implies 
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that some of the government’s interest payments on its debt will in reality be part 
of the amortisation of that government debt in an inflationary situation. It follows 
therefore that, if the inflationary component of interest payments is not removed 
from the interest bill, the size of the government budget deficit will be over-stated 
by the size of the amortisation component included in the total outstanding 
government debt (Blejer and Cheasty, 1991, p. 1655-1656; Weiss, 1995, p. 34).  
 
To remove the inflation-induced component of interest payments from the fiscal 
deficit calculation, economists have suggested the use of the operational deficit. 
This is simply measured as follows: 
  
Operational deficit = primary deficit + real interest payments 
 
According to Blejer and Cheasty (1991) and Weiss (1995), the main economic 
rationale in the calculation of the operational deficit is to remove the inflation 
component of interest payments from the deficit on the basis that this is simply 
similar to amortisation payments, which do not represent any new income to 
recipients and the economy in general.  
 
vi. The full-employment and cyclically adjusted deficits 
Economists have also attempted to calculate deficit measures that remove the 
effects of fluctuations in economic activity on the budget (Agenor, 2004). There are 
two main types of these measures: the high or full-employment deficit (also known 
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as high-employment deficit or structural deficit) and the cyclically adjusted deficit 
(also known as trend deficit). These deficit measures have been surveyed in Blinder 
and Solow (1974), De Leeuw and Holloway (1982, 1983, 1985), and Heller et al. 
(1986). 
 
The full-employment deficit measures the deficit at some arbitrarily defined full 
employment or potential output level of economic activity (De Leeuw and Holloway, 
1982; Dornbusch et al., 2001).  This measure was developed by economists in the 
belief that “a small surplus in the full employment budget would ensure a high level 
of national saving while permitting built-in fiscal stabilizers to damp cyclical 
fluctuations” (Blejer and Cheasty, 1991, pp. 1653-1654, citing De Leeuw and 
Holloway, 1983, p. 27).  
  
The full-employment deficit measure, however, suffers from the limitation that 
using it could result in the expansion of the public debt since, on average, 
economies usually operate below full-employment level, so that, on average, 
government expenditure would exceed government revenue.  To address this 
limitation of the high-employment deficit measure, economists developed the 
cyclically adjusted deficit (or trend deficit) to provide a budget balance rule that 
would maintain a constant level of public liabilities in budget preparations (Blejer 
and Cheasty, 1991).  
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Calculation of the cyclically adjusted budget balance (deficit or surplus) involves the 
following steps (De Leeuw and Holloway, 1985, p.232; Blejer and Cheasty, 1991, 
p.1654): 
 
1) Choosing a reference trend for GDP/GNP that is free from short-
run fluctuations, 
 
2) Determining the responsiveness of government transactions 
(expenditures and revenues) to short-run fluctuations in 
GDP/GNP, 
 
3) Applying the responsiveness of expenditures and revenues to any 
gaps between trend GDP/GNP and actual GDP/GNP, and 
 
4) Finally, adding the expenditures and receipts “gross-ups” 
obtained in step 3 to the actual budget to obtain a cyclically 
adjusted budget balance.   
 
 
A comparison between the cyclically adjusted deficit and the full employment 
deficit shows that they both measure the budget deficit that would occur if the 
economy were at full employment. However, these measures differ on the GDP or 
GNP reference trends that are used in their calculation: a cyclically adjusted deficit 
is constructed using a GDP or GNP that is free from short-run fluctuations as the 
reference trend, while a full employment deficit is constructed using potential 
output as the GDP or GNP reference trend. 
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Analysis shows that these special-purpose deficit measures can be very useful, 
some even more useful than the conventional measure of the deficit, for analysing 
fiscal stance (Agenor, 2004) and the effects of fiscal deficits on other 
macroeconomic variables (such as aggregate demand, inflation, balance of 
payments, economic growth, etc.). However, the problem is that most of these are 
difficult to calculate, and for this reason not easily available, especially for the case 
of developing countries. In fact, most governments worldwide only report the 
conventional budget balance (deficit or surplus) in their budgets. This has made this 
measure the more widely used measure of the fiscal deficit in assessment of fiscal 
stance, sustainability and the effects of fiscal deficits on economic performance. 
 
2.5 Effect of Fiscal Deficits on the Macroeconomy – An Overview 
The relationship between fiscal deficits and other macroeconomic variables 
represents one of the most widely debated issues in economics.7  Since the 
Keynesian revolution in macroeconomics, many economists and policymakers (the 
so-called Keynesians) have argued that deficit spending could be used as one of the 
effective measures to achieve two of the stated national economic objectives: a 
high rate of economic growth and full employment.  In particular, these economists 
and policymakers believe that deficit spending would be required to promote 
economic growth and fight unemployment during periods of recession, or when the 
economy is operating far below its full capacity. Keynesians believe that economies 
can benefit from deficit spending policy during economic recession because of the 
                                                 
7 We briefly discuss this here because understanding of these macroeconomic relationships can help 
to explain some of the transmission mechanisms through which fiscal deficits affects economic 
growth. 
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reduction in lost output and employment and because this policy would help the 
economy to achieve a higher rate of growth. In their viewpoint, Keynesians see no 
need to balance the budget during periods of recession. Instead, they believe in the 
notion of a cyclically balanced budget that, on average, the budget should be in 
balance over the business cycle – in surplus during periods of boom and in deficit 
during periods of recession. The Keynesian view of deficit spending is generally 
based on the premise that the market economy left to itself will not always be able 
to sustain aggregate demand at a level consistent with full employment (Chrystal 
and Thornton, 1988; Bernheim, 1989; Fischer and Easterly, 1990).  
 
However, the Keynesian analysis of the economic effects of fiscal deficits has been 
challenged increasingly over the years. A large number of economists (the so-called 
Neo-classical economists) now believe that deficit spending policy has little or no 
effect on employment and output - especially in the long run - and that it primarily 
leads to a transfer of resources, and therefore the re-distribution of output, from 
the private sector to the public sector (Chrystal and Thornton, 1988; Bernheim, 
1989). In addition, support for this viewpoint has also shown a growing concern 
about the potentially negative effects on both the real and the financial sides of the 
economy of the ways in which the deficits are financed. Monetisation of the deficit 
can lead to inefficiencies in financial markets and cause inflation. Domestic 
borrowing may lead to an increase in real interest rates, and hence crowd-out the 
private sector. Excessive use of foreign borrowing can result in excessive foreign 
debt – hence making the country’s access to international capital markets harder 
and increasing the probability of the government’s default on its foreign debt 
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obligations. Finally, the use of foreign reserves - especially when used excessively 
and for the long term - can lead to speculative pressure on the exchange rate, 
thereby causing exchange rate depreciation and capital flight, thus leading to 
balance of payments crises (Chrystal and Thornton, 1988; Fischer and Easterly, 
1990; Weiss, 1995; Ouanes and Thakur, 1997; Shojai, 1999; Piontkivsky et al., 2001; 
Agenor, 2004). Indeed, all these macroeconomic problems can in turn lead to 
detrimental effects on economic growth. 
 
In addition, the Keynesian view of fiscal deficits has also been challenged by the so-
called Ricardian economists. According to the Ricardians, deficit spending is 
irrelevant in the determination of macroeconomic performance since public and 
private spending are perfect substitutes (Barro, 1974). In the Ricardians view, far-
seeing consumers recognise that government debt generated through borrowing to 
finance fiscal deficits will eventually be paid-off by future tax increases, the present 
value of which is exactly equal to the present value of the reduction in taxes 
(Fischer and Easterly, 1990, p. 129). These consumers, who also care enough about 
their future prosperity and the prosperity of future generations, would therefore 
foresee this future tax increase when the government pursues deficit spending 
policy and adjust their present consumption accordingly. This means that 
consumers will not simply take a deficit-financed increase in government spending 
as a lucky windfall, but will save part of their proceeds in anticipation of the future 
tax burden. As a result, consumers will not raise their demand for goods and 
services, thus leaving aggregate demand, output, interest rates and prices stable. In 
this situation, therefore, the Ricardians see deficit spending policy as a matter of 
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indifference with no real economic effects (Barro, 1974, 1989; Bernheim, 1989; 
Fischer and Easterly, 1990). 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the meaning of the fiscal deficit and other related issues 
that need to be understood before any meaningful analysis of the impact of fiscal 
deficit on economic performance could be made. In terms of its meaning, fiscal 
deficit generally suggests an expansionary fiscal policy and reflects the financing 
gap resulting from government outlays exceeding revenue receipts - hence the 
definition of the fiscal deficit that we will operationise in this study. According to 
economic literature, and practices by governments and institutions such as the 
World Bank and the IMF, fiscal deficits are usually estimated for three different 
scopes of government: central government; consolidated central government; and, 
consolidated general government. However, analysis shows that, of these three 
scopes used in estimating public sector deficits, the deficit measures for the 
consolidated general or central governments would be the most appropriate 
measures of the fiscal position of the government; for, these represents the more 
accurate size of the public sector.  
 
The Chapter has also discussed the ways in which the fiscal deficit can be financed. 
On this, we have seen that there are four main ways of financing the budget deficit 
- borrowing from the central bank (also called monetisation of the deficit), domestic 
borrowing, external borrowing, and running down the foreign exchange reserves.  
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Borrowing from the central bank occurs when the central bank finances the budget 
deficit by directly lending the funds needed by the government to meet its 
expenditures or indirectly by purchasing government debt at the time of its 
issuance or later through open market operations. Domestic borrowing can be 
exercised voluntarily when the government issues bonds that are voluntarily 
purchased by the private sector or on a compulsory basis when some forms of 
compulsory purchase of the government debt (such as setting the reserve 
requirements for financial institutions operating in the domestic economy, 
introduction of compulsory purchase of government bonds by commercial banks, 
and accumulation of arrears of government payments on debts to the private 
sector) by the private sector are used. Foreign borrowing involves increase in the 
government’s holding of foreign debt. Finally, running down foreign exchange 
reserves usually involves the central bank first purchasing the government debt on 
the primary or secondary market (or simply granting a loan to the government) 
thereby injecting additional reserves to the economy and then trading available 
foreign exchange reserves for domestic currency. 
 
In addition, the discussion in this chapter has looked at the different measures of 
the fiscal deficit. These can be grouped into two main categories, namely the 
variants of the conventional measure of the fiscal deficit and the refinements of the 
conventional measures of the deficit. The first category simply measures the 
difference between total government outlays and revenue receipts during a given 
fiscal period, usually a year. On the other hand, the second category includes the 
special-purpose deficit measures that attempt to isolate from the conventional 
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deficits the magnitudes that are more relevant for assessment of a specific fiscal 
stance or the impact of various budgetary transactions.  The main types of special-
purpose deficit measures include the primary deficit, the current deficit, the 
domestic and foreign deficits, deficit that measures the contribution of different 
elements of government transactions on aggregate demand, the operational deficit, 
and the full-employment and cyclically adjusted deficits. 
 
Finally, the chapter has presented an overview of the effects of fiscal deficits on 
macroeconomic performance. We have seen that the effects of fiscal deficits on the 
economy are not precisely known, and this is reflected by the ongoing debate on 
this issue. Some economists, the so-called Keynesians, point out the positive effects 
of deficit spending policy in terms its role in promoting economic growth and 
employment. Others, the so-called Neo-classical economists, argue that deficit 
spending has little or no effect on employment and output, and that it primarily 
results in a re-distribution of resources and output from the private sector to the 
public sector. These economists also point out the potentially negative effects of 
the means of covering the fiscal deficits that monetisation of the deficit can be 
inflationary, domestic borrowing can cause the crowding-out of the private sector, 
foreign borrowing can result in foreign debt crises, and running-down the foreign 
exchange reserve can cause capital flight and balance of payments problems.  Then 
again, other economists, the so-called Ricardians, believe that fiscal deficits have no 
real impact on other macroeconomic variables and are therefore irrelevant in the 
determination of economic performance.  
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Having discussed these important issues related to fiscal deficits, the next chapter 
turns to the review of theoretical and empirical literature that particularly focuses 
on the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth – which is the main topic of our 
interest in this study.   
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Chapter Three 
 
THE IMPACT OF FISCAL DEFICITS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF 
LITERATURE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
We have seen in the previous chapter that there are three main schools of thought 
concerning the impact of fiscal deficits on economic performance – Keynesian, Neo-
classical and Ricardian. According to the literature, these schools of thought also 
offer three distinct theoretical perspectives on the specific issue of the deficit-
growth connection. In the first perspective, Keynesians argue that deficit spending 
can have a significant positive impact on economic growth. According to 
Keynesians, deficit spending could be a useful economic policy tool in promoting 
economic growth during periods of recessions or when the economy is generally 
operating far below full-employment. In the Keynesians’ view, such a policy can 
benefit societies during economic recession because of the reduction in lost output 
and employment and because this policy would help economies to achieve a higher 
rate of economic growth (Chrystal and Thornton, 1988; Bernheim, 1989; Fischer 
and Easterly, 1990). In the second perspective, Neo-classical economists believe 
that deficit spending policy has little or no impact on economic growth and that it 
primarily leads to crowding out of private investment and/or net exports. Neo-
classical economists also warn of the potential macroeconomic imbalances (such as 
inflation, balance of payments problems and debt crises) caused by different ways 
of financing deficits and their consequences on economic growth (Chrystal and 
Thornton, 1988; Bernheim, 1989; Fischer and Easterly, 1990). Finally, in the third 
43 
 
perspective, Ricardian economists believe that fiscal deficits have no impact on 
economic growth. In the Ricardian’s view, fiscal deficits have no real economic 
effects - that is, deficits are irrelevant in the determination of macroeconomic 
performance, including economic growth (Barro, 1974, 1989; Bernheim, 1989; 
Fischer and Easterly, 1990). 
 
It is interesting to note that one can find evidence in support of each of the above 
three theoretical positions on the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. 
Some empirical studies find that fiscal deficits have a positive and significant impact 
on economic growth. Some find that deficits have a negative and statistically 
significant impact on economic growth. Then again, other studies find that fiscal 
deficits have little or no impact on economic growth. 
 
This chapter presents a critical review of the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature on the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. To do this, the 
chapter is structured as follows. After this introductory section, Section 3.2 
examines the theoretical literature on the impact of fiscal deficits on economic 
growth. This looks at the main arguments put forward in each of the schools of 
thought on the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth and their implications, 
and examines which of these schools of thought offers the most relevant insights 
on this issue.  Section 3.3 reviews the existing empirical literature on the impact of 
fiscal deficits on economic growth. Section 3.4 discusses the potential policy 
implications of the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in the context of 
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developing countries, and therefore on our study, of some of the key issues raised 
in the reviewed theoretical and empirical literature. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
 3.2 Theoretical Literature 
As pointed out earlier, literature shows that there are three distinct theoretical 
perspectives concerning the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth – 
Keynesian, Neo-classical and Ricardian. The differences between these perspectives 
are mainly derived from the assumptions on which each perspective is based, 
which, in turn, have implications for the economic growth impact of fiscal deficits. 
These are discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.2.1 The Keynesian Perspective 
In the Keynesian perspective, a significant percentage of the population is thought 
to be either myopic or liquidity constrained and consumers are assumed to have 
very high marginal propensities to consume out of their current disposable 
incomes. This implies that aggregate consumption is very sensitive to changes in 
disposable income. In this situation, therefore, deficit spending (through increased 
government spending or tax reduction) has an immediate and significant impact on 
aggregate demand, and therefore national income. In addition, if the economy is 
initially operating in the short run and some economic resources are unemployed 
or underemployed, this increase in national income generates the second round 
effects of the well-known Keynesian multiplier, hence increasing the national 
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income even further. It follows therefore that, in the Keynesian viewpoint, 
appropriately timed deficits (i.e., deficit spending when some economic resources 
are unemployed or underemployed) will have a significant positive impact on 
output and economic growth (Bernheim, 1989).   
 
In the simplest Keynesian analysis of the impact of fiscal deficits on output, 
increasing the deficit by £1 would cause output to increase by the inverse of the 
marginal propensity to save (Bernheim, 1989).  However, in the standard IS-LM 
analysis of monetary economies, one would expect that this increase in output 
caused by an increase in the deficit (expansionary fiscal policy) would raise the 
demand for money, which would in turn affect the money side of the economy and 
partially offset the Keynesian multiplier effect. To explain this further, if we assume 
that the money supply in the economy is fixed (that is, fiscal deficits are bond-
financed), interest rates would rise as a result of an increase in the demand for 
money, thereby causing interest rate sensitive components of aggregate demand, 
particularly private investment and/or net exports to be crowded out to some 
extent. This crowding out would in turn partially offset the Keynesian multiplier 
effect of expansionary fiscal policy and therefore reduce the original increase in 
output.   
 
There are two mechanisms through which the crowding out occurs under the 
Keynesian analysis. First, in a closed economy, a switch from tax to deficit finance 
(using bonds) raises domestic real interest rates and crowds out private investment. 
Second, in a small open economy with internationally mobile capital, net exports 
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rather than domestic investment are crowded out. In this case, bond-financed 
deficits place upward pressure on domestic interest rates, thus leading to higher 
capital inflows and therefore an appreciation of the domestic currency. This in turn 
reduces net exports. Thus, in a small open economy, government deficits would 
most likely crowd out net exports rather than domestic investment. However, it 
should be noted that in a large open economy, both of the above mechanisms are 
likely to be operative (Yellen, 1989). 
 
Regardless of the mechanism by which crowding out occurs, the Keynesian model 
allows for only a small measure of crowding out. This is because the increase in 
aggregate demand raises income, and with the rise in income, the level of saving 
rises. This expansion in saving, in turn, makes it possible to finance a larger budget 
deficit without adversely displacing private investment or affecting net exports. 
 
The Keynesian mechanism on how bond-financed deficits influences output is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 below. 
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Figure 3.1: The impact of bond-financed deficits on output 
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Figure 3.1(a) shows the impact of bond-financed deficit on output in the standard 
IS-LM model. From the initial starting equilibrium point in the economy, point 1E , 
deficit spending increases the level of aggregate demand, shifting the IS  curve 
substantially from 1IS  to 2IS . At unchanged interest rates, the equilibrium income 
would rise by the full size of the multiplier )( BD times the increase in budget 
deficit )( BD , thus moving the economy from equilibrium point 1E  to point 3E . This 
would imply a rise in output/income from 1Y  to 3Y . But, from the money demand 
effect discussed above, this increase in output/income will be followed by a rise in 
the demand for money. Since the money supply is fixed (given our assumption that 
the deficits are bond-financed), the interest rate rises from 1r  to 2r  where the 
money market comes back to equilibrium, thus causing a fall in interest sensitive 
components of aggregate demand - private investment and/or net exports - and 
partially offsetting the Keynesian multiplier effect. As a result, output falls back to 
level 2Y . 
 
An increase in aggregate demand following deficit spending policy (or expansionary 
fiscal policy) is indicated by a rightward shift of aggregate demand (AD) curve from 
AD1 to AD2 at unchanged price level P1 in Figure 3.1(b). However, note also that, as 
the figure shows, the aggregate supply (AS) curve will also shift leftward from AS1 to 
AS2 because the interest rate (r) has increased from r1 to r2. The net result is an 
increase in price from P1 to P2 and an increase in output from Y1 to Y2*.8  
                                                 
8 It is worth noting that, given the connection between IS-LM curves and the AD curve, the 
equilibrium level of output in part (a) cannot be different from that in part (b) in the case of the 
standard IS-LM and AS-AD models (Jha, 2003, p. 45). 
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The above analysis assumes the standard AS-AD model. However, note that the 
aggregate supply curve for a standard developing country is likely to be relatively 
flat for the following two reasons: one, nominal wages tend to be rigid in 
developing countries, accompanied by an excess supply of labour; and two, 
existence of idle capacity in these countries suggests that there are no significantly 
diminishing marginal returns for labour in the relevant range of production (Porter 
and Ranney, 1982, p. 753). The implication of this quite flat aggregate supply curve 
and sensitive aggregate demand to changes in disposable income (as discussed 
earlier) is that expansionary fiscal policy will have a very significant impact on 
output and an insignificant impact on the price level for a standard developing 
country. 
 
Furthermore, the above analysis has assumed that fiscal deficits are bond financed. 
As we have seen, this form of deficit financing is associated with a rise in interest 
rate, which in turn results in the some crowding out of private investment and/or 
net exports. However, if some economic resources are initially unemployed or 
underemployed, and there is a possibility for output to increase, the interest rate 
may not rise at all, and there may not be any crowding out problems when 
monetary authorities can accommodate the fiscal expansion (Dornbusch, Fischer, 
and Startz, 2001). Monetary policy is accommodating when, in the course of 
expansionary fiscal policy, the money supply is also increased in order to prevent 
interest rates from increasing. Monetary policy accommodation is also referred to 
as monetizing fiscal deficits, meaning that the government or central bank prints 
money to buy bonds with which the government pays for its deficits. In effect, 
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when monetizing fiscal deficits, the government prints money to finance its 
spending while avoiding competing with the private sector for the available 
financial resources in the economy, so that there is no crowding out of private 
investment. The impact on output of monetary accommodation of fiscal expansion 
is illustrated in Figure 3.2 below.  
 
When monetary policy accommodates a fiscal expansion, both the IS curve and the 
LM  curve shift to the right from IS1 to IS2 and LM1 and LM2, respectively, as Figure 
3.2(a) shows. This results in a rightward shift in the aggregate demand curve from 
AD1 to AD2 as illustrated in panel (b) of Figure 3.2. If the monetary authorities can 
fully accommodate fiscal expansion then interest rate and aggregate supply need 
not change, hence allowing the full multiplier effect. In the standard AS-AD model, 
this increases output significantly to output level Y2* in Figure 3.2. This means that, 
when some of the economic resources are unemployed or underemployed, there is 
a possibility that deficit spending financed by an increase in money supply can 
result in a large impact on output.  
 
Thus, following the above assessment of the impact of fiscal deficits on output and 
economic growth when deficits are either bond-financed or accommodated by 
monetary policy, we argue that, while both results in a net increase in national 
output, and therefore growth, it is monetised deficits that will most likely have a 
more significant impact on output and growth. 
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Figure 3.2: Monetary accommodation of fiscal expansion and its impact on output 
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Analysis of the Keynesian framework as discussed above suggests that expansionary 
fiscal policy mainly affects the economy’s transitional growth rate while the steady-
state growth rate remains unaffected – that is, it affects the level of output and 
output growth in the short-run rather than the long-run growth rate (Kneller et al., 
1999; Odedokun, 2001; Agenor, 2004; Benos, 2009).  
 
However, recent developments in public-policy endogenous growth models of 
Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995, 2004), Cashin (1995), Devarajan 
et al. (1996); Mendoza et al. (1997) - among others, have provided/explained 
mechanisms by which fiscal policy can affect both the level of output and output 
growth in the short-run and the long-run growth rate of the economy (Devarajan et 
al., 1996; Kneller et al., 1999; Odedokun, 2001; Agenor, 2004; Benos, 2009).9  
 
Literature on these public-policy endogenous growth models generally classifies 
fiscal policy into the following broad categories: (a) distortionary taxation, which 
affects the investment decisions of private agents, hence distorting the long-run 
growth rate of the economy; (b) non-distortionary taxation, which does not affect 
the investment (or saving) decisions of private agents (following the assumed 
nature of private agents’ utility function, and hence has no effect on the long-run 
growth rate; (c) productive expenditures, that affect economic growth directly by 
increasing the economy’s capital stock (e.g. public investment in infrastructure) or 
                                                 
9 This is in contrast to the neoclassical growth models of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) which 
established that the steady-state economic growth rate (or the economy’s long-run growth rate) can 
only be determined by the exogenous factors of physical capital accumulation, population (or labour 
force) growth and technological progress, while policies such as fiscal policy can only affect the 
transitional path towards this steady-state (Kneller et al., 1999; Odedokun, 2001). 
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indirectly by raising the marginal productivity of private capital (e.g. spending on 
education, health, and other services that contribute to the accumulation of human 
capital); and, (d) unproductive expenditures that, though increasing household 
utility, do not affect the marginal product of private capital, and hence economic 
growth (Barro, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Turnovsky and Fisher, 
1995; Kneller et al., 1999; Agenor, 2004; Adam and Bevan, 2005; Benos, 2009).  
 
Predictions from these endogenous growth models are that, an increase in 
productive expenditure financed by non-distortionary taxes will be growth 
promoting, whilst the growth-effect is ambiguous if distortionary taxation is used to 
finance this increase in productive spending. On the other hand, an increase in 
unproductive expenditure financed by non-distortionary taxes will be neutral for 
economic growth, whereas the effect on economic growth will be negative if 
distortionary taxation is used to finance this increase in unproductive spending 
(Barro, 1990; Turnovsky and Fisher, 1995; Kneller et al., 1999; Agenor, 2004; Adam 
and Bevan, 2005; Benos, 2009).  
 
However, the theoretical literature on this topic fails to clearly identify exactly 
which taxes and public expenditures are distortionary/non-distortionary and 
productive/unproductive, respectively, and instead different studies only attempt 
to hypothesise ‘potential’ candidates for these categories of tax and expenditure 
based on the assumptions made, and leave the empirical evidence to determine 
these. For example, in allocating public spending to productive/unproductive 
categories based on an economic classification, Devarajan et al. (1996, p. 320) 
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treats capital expenditure (which is considered to complement private sector 
production) as productive, whereas government consumption expenditure (much of 
which is considered to enter the household’s utility function) as non-productive. 
Following the same criteria for economic classification of public expenditure as 
Devarajan et al. (1996)10  but with slightly different components, Ghosh and 
Gregorios (2009) consider capital expenditure plus consumption spending on 
education and health as productive and government consumption spending less the 
amounts spent on education and health is considered as non-productive.11 In 
another study, Kneller et al. (1999, pp. 176-178) consider the functional 
classification of public expenditure and hypothesize that public expenditures with 
substantial physical and human capital component such as spending on transport 
and communication, general public services, education, health, and housing are 
productive expenditures, while social security and welfare expenditure and 
expenditure on recreation, culture and religion are non-productive expenditures 
(see Appendix B for more detailed theoretical aggregation of functional 
classification of taxes and public expenditure by Kneller et al. (1999)). Then, 
contrary to the above studies (Devarajan et al., 1996; Kneller et al., 1999; Ghosh 
and Gregorios, 2009) which imposes a theoretical classification of government 
expenditure (and taxes) a priori, Benos (2009) argue that theoretical literature is 
not clear about the classification of various functional categories of government 
                                                 
10 That expenditure that enters the production function is considered productive and expenditure 
that enters the utility function is treated as non-productive. 
11 In an earlier study, Barro (1991) considered government consumption less the amounts spent on 
education and defence as a proxy for public spending that enters into the household utility function 
and public investment plus the amount spent on education and defence as a proxy for government 
expenditure that enters the production function. The treatment of defence spending as productive 
in this study is based on the assumption that it helps to protect property rights (Barro 1991; Ghosh 
and Gregoriou, 2009, p. 10). 
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spending, and thus simply mention them leaving the estimation results to 
determine which of these government spending categories are productive and 
unproductive (see Appendix C for theoretical functional classification of fiscal policy 
instruments by Benos, 2009).12  
 
In another attempt to distinguish between productive and unproductive 
government expenditures, Chu et al. (1995) categorise these two types of spending 
based on the ‘efficiency’ of the public sector in using its resources in production or 
procurement and for administration.13 They argue that the following two conditions 
are essential for government spending to be productive: First, public expenditure 
programmes or projects must be cost-effective; that is, they should be designed  
and implemented to provide given levels of output or achieve specific objectives at 
the lowest possible cost. As Chu et al. (1995) argue, for this condition to be satisfied 
“the public sector must use human and other resources fully and effectively; that is, 
it must not waste any economic resources (Chu et al., 1995, p. 4). Second, for 
government expenditures to be productive, the mix of outputs should be 
appropriate or optimal; that is, the government should not produce too much of 
one good and too little of another. 
                                                 
12 As pointed out/ demonstrated by Benos (2009), and based on the above survey of literature on 
the distinction between productive and unproductive government spending, we argue that the 
theoretical literature is indeed not very clear about the classification of different types of 
government expenditure into productive and unproductive spending and that it is better to leave 
the empirical estimations to determine which categories of government expenditure are productive 
and unproductive. 
 
13 It is worth noting that Chu’s et al., (1995) analysis here is based on the assumption that public 
sector activities involve direct production of public goods (e.g. economic stabilisation, judicial 
services, national defence etc.) and provision of public goods that are produced by private sector 
(i.e. procures from private sector). Public sector provision through private sector production, for 
example, can be contracting out the running of prisons to the private sector, purchase of military 
equipment from the private sector, etc. (Chu et al., 1995, pp. 3-4).    
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Chu et al. (1995) use the above definition of productive public expenditures to 
conceptualize unproductive government expenditures as those that are associated 
with wastage of resources and an inappropriate mix of public sector output. As Chu 
et al. (1995) further argue unproductive government expenditures can be caused by 
various factors including inadequate checks and balances in the political and 
budgetary processes, lack of a well-trained civil service and corruption among 
others. One example of unproductive government expenditure based on the Chu et 
al. (1995) definition of unproductive expenditures would be generalised subsidies 
or benefits that target the whole population, including those in the middle and 
upper class income groups. These subsidies, may enhance political support and 
election prospects for the government in power, but are an inefficient or 
unproductive way of supporting the poor. It follows therefore that, replacing these 
generalised subsidies or benefits with those that target the poor would improve the 
efficiency of the public sector spending (providing that these subsidies or benefits 
do not have a strong adverse effect on the incentive to work). Other examples of 
unproductive expenditure based on this definition would include spending on 
“white elephant” projects 14 , spending on vastly underutilised infrastructure 
requiring large operating costs, spending that finances large and ineffective 
bureaucracies, and government transfers to loss-making public enterprises that 
reward certain political groups or benefit particular regions at the expense of the 
wider population (Krueger, 1990; Nelson and Singh, 1994; Chu et al., 1995).  
  
                                                 
14 These can be defined as large and expensive prestigious projects that do not serve useful 
economic or social objectives. 
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Analysis of the above categorisation of productive and unproductive government 
expenditures by Chu et al. (1995) shows that even seemingly productive 
expenditures as defined in the endogenous growth literature cited above could 
become unproductive if used inefficiently when they are associated with wastage of 
resources or if the mix of output is not appropriate. In fact, in their empirical study, 
Devarajan et al. (1996) distinguish between productive and unproductive 
government expenditures based on output elasticities and confirm that seemingly 
productive expenditures could become unproductive if used in excess. 
 
However, analysis also shows that assessing government expenditures based on the 
definition provided by Chu et al. (1995) may not be that straightforward due to a 
number of practical difficulties involved. For example, it is difficult to measure or 
value public sector output, especially for public goods such as national security or 
the output of justice system, health and education services. This assessment is even 
further complicated by the fact that many public sector operations (programmes or 
projects) serve more than one objective (for example, transport infrastructure 
serving both economic and defence objectives) and/or can have economic 
implications which are not directly related to their main objectives. Moreover, 
identifying an appropriate mix of public sector outputs in most cases is very difficult 
and requires value judgements (Chu et al., 1995, p. 7).  
 
Given this debate and the practical difficulties involved in distinguishing between 
productive and unproductive government expenditures, it appears that, while the 
above theoretical/analytical classification between these two types of spending 
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provides some clue as to the likely growth effects of these types of spending, the 
issue of identifying productive and unproductive spending is ultimately an empirical 
one.  
 
Much empirical work has been done to distinguish between productive and non-
productive government expenditure (e.g., Landau, 1983; Aschauer, 1989; Barro, 
1989, 1990, 1991; Easterly and Rebello, 1993; Nelson and Singh, 1994; Barro, 1995; 
Devarajan et al., 1996; Kneller et al., 1999; Odedokun, 2001; Ghosh and Gregoriou, 
2006; Benos, 2009). It is worth-noting that this empirical literature reveals the 
following two features: one, following the lack of clarity in the theoretical literature 
on the classification between productive versus unproductive, most of these 
studies (e.g., Devarajan et al., 1996; Miller and Russek, 1997; Ghosh and Gregoriou, 
2006; Benos, 2009) refrain from a priori classification of expenditure into 
productive and non-productive and leave the data/estimation results to determine 
which components of government expenditure are productive and which ones are 
unproductive;  and two, as pointed out by Adedokun (2001, p. 3) there is still a lack 
of unanimity in the empirical findings – for, the results often conflict with one 
another. However, despite this lack of unanimity in the empirical results, there is a 
general consensus among many of these empirical studies that public spending on 
transport and communication investment, human capital enhancing activities such 
as education and health, and spending on research and development are more 
likely to be productive, and therefore growth enhancing (Aschauer, 1989; Easterly 
and Rebello, 1993; Nelson and Singh, 1994; Barro, 1995; Sach and Warner, 1997; 
Gallup et al., 1998; Prunera, 2000), whereas certain elements of government 
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consumption expenditure are most likely to be negatively associated with growth, 
and are therefore non-productive (Landau, 1983; Barro, 1989). 
 
One important implication of the above-discussed theoretical predictions and 
empirical findings from public-policy endogenous growth studies is that the impact 
of deficit spending policy on economic growth may depend on what the deficit 
financing is used for. That is, running deficits to finance productive expenditure or 
something that is going to increase the economy’s productive capacity could have a 
significant positive impact on growth, while deficit financing on non-productive 
expenditure or wrongly conceived and counterproductive projects and wasteful 
government spending (such as financing large bureaucracies) could be deleterious 
to growth (Nelson and Singh, 1994; Prunera, 2000). 
 
To summarise on the main implications of the Keynesian analysis of fiscal deficits, 
under the assumptions that a significant fraction of the population is either myopic 
or liquidity constrained and that individuals have very high marginal propensities to 
consume out of their current disposable incomes (so that aggregate consumption is 
very sensitive to changes in disposable income), Keynesians believe that 
appropriately timed fiscal deficits can have a significant positive impact on output, 
and therefore economic growth.  The Keynesians’ view, however, seems to only 
explain the impact of deficit spending on the level of output and growth during the 
transition to the steady-state and not the long-run or steady-state economic 
growth rate. However, more recent developments in the public-policy endogenous 
growth theory addresses this limitation of the Keynesian analysis by explaining 
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channels through which, if well used, fiscal deficits can influence both the growth 
rate during the transition and the long-run growth rate by affecting the productivity 
of investment. The Keynesian and endogenous growth framework, therefore, 
suggests that appropriately timed and used deficits can have   positive and 
significant impact on economic growth. 
 
3.2.2 The Neo-Classical Perspective 
In another viewpoint, Neo-classical economists believe that deficit spending has 
little or no effect on output and employment, especially in the long-run, and that it 
primarily results in the crowding out of domestic private investment or net exports. 
 
The Neo-classical analysis of fiscal deficits is based on the assumptions that 
individuals are farsighted and plan consumption over their own life cycles, and that 
markets clear in all periods (that is, economic resources are fully employed). Under 
these conditions, deficit spending raises total lifetime consumption of farsighted 
individuals by shifting taxes to future generations, and since economic resources 
are fully employed, increased consumption necessarily implies reduction in savings.  
Consequently, domestic interest rates must increase until the monetary side of the 
economy is brought back into balance.  In this situation, therefore, fiscal deficits 
have little or no impact on output (and therefore economic growth) and primarily 
result in crowding out problems (Chrystal and Thornton, 1988; Bernheim, 1989; 
Prunera, 2000). 
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There are three different mechanisms by which crowding out can occur under the 
Neo-classical framework. First, in a closed economy, a switch from tax to deficit 
finance raises real interest rates and crowds out private investment. Second, in a 
small open economy with internationally mobile capital, net exports rather than 
domestic investment are crowded out. Deficits place upward pressure on interest 
rates, which induces an inflow of foreign funds. With flexible exchange rates, an 
influx of capital causes the exchange rate and therefore domestic currency to 
appreciate, which in turn diminishes the competitiveness of domestic products in 
the world markets. As argued earlier, however, in a large open economy, both 
mechanisms are likely to be operative. Finally, with full employment conditions, an 
increase in aggregate demand leads to an increase in the price level (moving 
upward along the supply curve). This increase in price level reduces real balances, 
thus shifting equilibrium in the money market to a lower level. Consequently, 
interest rates rise until the initial increase in aggregate demand is fully crowded 
out. Note that, this third form of crowding out is not expected to occur under the 
Keynesian model.  This is because output in this model is assumed to be below the 
full-employment level, which means that, when fiscal expansion increases 
aggregate demand, firms can increase the level of output by hiring more workers, 
and thus it is possible that prices can remain constant (Dornbusch, Fischer and 
Startz, 2001, p. 253). 
 
As we have seen in the discussion above, the central argument in the Neo-classical 
analysis is that fiscal deficits merely result in the crowding out of the interest-
sensitive components of aggregate demand (particularly, domestic private 
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investment and net exports), which in turn slows down the economic growth.  In 
addition, however, Neo-classical economists have shown concern about the 
potentially harmful macroeconomic effects of ways of financing fiscal deficits as 
discussed in Chapter Two (section 2.2). According to these economists, printing 
money to finance the deficit can result in high rates of inflation when money 
growth is above the level the non-government sector wishes to hold.15 Domestic 
borrowing can cause interest rates to rise and crowd out the private sector. 
External borrowing can end in debt crises. 16 The use of foreign reserves may 
provoke capital flight thus causing balance of payments problems (Eisner, 1989; 
Fischer and Easterly, 1990; Weiss, 1995). Clearly, deficit financing that leads to 
these macroeconomic imbalances (i.e. high interest rates, high inflation, debt crisis, 
and balance of payments problems) can be very detrimental to economic growth. 
 
To summarise the main implications of the Neo-classical viewpoint, based on the 
assumptions that individuals are farsighted and plan their consumption over their 
own lifecycle, Neo-classical economists believe that deficit financing raises total 
lifetime consumption by shifting taxes to subsequent generations. However, based 
on the well-known Neo-classical assumption that economic resources are fully 
employed, this increase in consumption simply causes interest rates to rise, thus 
causing crowding out of the domestic private sector or net exports. In this situation, 
therefore, deficits will have little or no impact on output and economic growth. 
                                                 
15As discussed earlier, inflation reduces real money balances (real money supply). This reduction in 
real money, in turn, causes interest rates to rise, thus reducing expenditures in interest-sensitive 
sectors of the economy.    
16 The experience of “debt crisis” of the 1980s, which forced many countries to reschedule their debt 
obligations, illustrates the danger of excessive reliance on external borrowing in financing budget 
deficits (Fischer and Easterly, 1990; Weiss, 1995). 
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Neo-classical analysis imply that the economy cannot experience sustained 
economic growth – i.e., it can experience economic growth only until it reaches the 
steady-state point (the economy’s long-run growth rate). However, note that, as 
discussed earlier, recent development in the endogenous growth theory have 
shown that economies can experience sustained growth, and that there are 
channels  (e.g. spending in the areas which increases the productive capacity of the 
economy such as public investment in infrastructure, spending on human capital 
development, and spending on research and development) through which fiscal 
policy can affect the long-run growth (Barro, 1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 
2004; Kneller et al., 1999; Odedokun, 2001).   
 
3.2.3 The Ricardian Perspective 
The discussion so far has considered the models in which it is believed that fiscal 
deficits do have effects on the macroeconomy. In contrast, the Ricardian model 
(also called the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis) argues that fiscal deficits are 
irrelevant in the determination of macroeconomic performance – that is, they leave 
all macroeconomic variables, including output and economic growth unchanged 
(Barro, 1974, 1989; Chrystal and Thornton, 1988; Bernheim, 1989).  
 
Under the Ricardian model, successive generations are linked through voluntary 
and altruistically motivated resource transfers. This assumption has important 
implications that families are seen as dynastic units (that is, each family is thought 
of as a single, infinite-living agent), and that consumption is determined as a 
64 
 
function of dynastic resources. Based on these assumptions, Ricardians argue that 
any increase in the government debt generated through borrowing to finance 
deficit spending will be considered as an increase in the personal liabilities of the 
general public through implied future taxation. Thus, when fiscal deficits are 
increased, the rational and far-seeing consumers, who also care enough about their 
future prosperity and the prosperity of future generations, will decrease their 
current consumption expenditure by the same amount in order to increase savings 
to cover the implied future tax burden. Consequently, budget deficits will have no 
real effects on aggregate demand, and therefore on output and economic growth. 
This means that, in the IS-LM framework, the IS curve does not shift following fiscal 
expansion (Barro, 1989; Bernheim, 1989; Fischer and Easterly, 1990). 
 
3.2.4  A Critical Assessment of the above three Theoretical Perspectives on the 
Impact of Fiscal Deficits on Economic Growth 
 
In assessing the above theoretical perspectives on the impact of fiscal deficits on 
economic growth, we argue that the Ricardian perspective is based upon unrealistic 
assumptions, which makes it an unacceptable approximation to reality. In fact, a 
number of studies (such as, Bernheim and Bagwell, 1988; Bernheim, 1987, 1989; 
and, Barro, 1989) have dismissed the Ricardian framework on the grounds that the 
assumptions on which it is based are very unrealistic and difficult to be met in the 
real world. According to the literature, there are at least five main criticisms that 
have been raised against the Ricardian framework and its conclusions. These are 
discussed below. 
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The first and main criticism is that the structure of families assumed in the Ricardian 
analysis is very unrealistic. Ricardian analysis takes each dynastic family to be an 
independent and self-contained unit. However, this is not true; for, propagation of 
the human species usually requires the participation of two unrelated individuals, 
which makes family linkages form more complex networks than assumed in the 
Ricardian analysis. It follows therefore that each individual belongs to many 
dynastic families in which unrelated individuals share common descendants. Hence, 
due to the linkages between families, it is generally difficult to represent any 
particular family or set of families as a single, utility-maximising agent, even when 
the welfare of each individual is assumed to depend only on his or her own 
consumption and the welfare of his or her children (Bernheim, 1989). Bernheim, 
citing, Bernheim and Bagwell (1988) also demonstrates that the central conclusion 
in the Ricardian analysis, which essentially establishes the insensitivity of 
consumption to the distribution of bequests over family members, depends only 
upon the existence of altruistically motivated resource transfers between dynastic 
family members, and not upon a particular structure of the family tree. But then 
the existence of the aforementioned linkages between families gives rise to very 
strong neutrality properties under weaker conditions than those assumed in the 
Ricardian framework. Thus, the existence of linkages between families implies that 
the Ricardian dynastic framework does not provide an acceptable analytical tool for 
studying public policy issues.   
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The second objection against the Ricardian framework has been directed to the two 
Ricardian assumptions regarding inter-generational transfers - that most of the 
individuals either voluntarily make or receive intentional transfers (as opposed to 
accidental transfers, which result from uncertainty about the date of death), and 
that these transfers are purely motivated by altruism. One important objection to 
the Ricardians’ assumption of inter-generational transfers has been that some 
people, especially those without children, are not connected to future generations, 
and hence do not have the bequest motive. Hence, those in this situation should be 
expected to become wealthier when the government substitutes a budget deficit 
for taxes (Tobin and Buiter, 1980; Bernheim, 1989). If this were true, then deficit 
spending policy will have real economic effects. On the altruism assumption, a 
number of studies have suggested that many existing transfers are motivated by 
accidental reasons other than altruism. Studies by Darby (1979), Kotlikoff and 
Lawrence (1981) and Bernheim (1989), for example, find the possibility that many 
bequests are not intentional, but rather accidental (that is, they result from 
uncertainty about the length of individuals’ lives, coupled with the existence of 
incomplete annuity markets). Others suggest alternative motivations for resource 
transfers, including intra-family exchanges, tastes for generosity, or as a strategic 
move whereby parents influence their children to behave properly. Indeed, each of 
these transfers could potentially undo the Ricardian’s framework central 
conclusions.  
 
The third objection is that, contrary to the Ricardians’ assumption, an individual’s 
future taxes and income are uncertain. This uncertainty about an individual’s future 
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taxes (or the complexity in estimating them) implies a high rate of discount in 
capitalising these future liabilities (Feldstein, 1976; Wagner, 1977; Barro, 1989). In 
this situation, therefore, substitution of a budget deficit for current taxes raises net 
wealth since the present value of the expected future taxes becomes less than the 
current tax cut (Barro, 1989, p. 45). Following this, then, fiscal deficits raise 
aggregate consumption and reduce desired aggregate savings. In addition, one may 
argue that, given the fact that in reality individuals are uncertain about future 
income and hence uncertain about whether they will make or receive a transfer, 
then it should be expected that re-distribution of resources between generations 
can have real effects. 
 
The fourth objection is that private capital markets are not perfect as assumed in 
the Ricardian model, but rather imperfect with the typical individual’s real discount 
rate exceeding that of the government. As a number of studies (such as Mundel, 
1971; Dotsey, 1985 – among others) have established, the existence of an imperfect 
private capital market has an important implication for the analysis of public debt. 
This is because, as Dotsey (1985) argues, when consumers are liquidity constrained, 
increase in government debt can have a real effect under imperfect market 
conditions. According to Dotsey, individual consumers cannot always borrow to the 
extent they desire because capital markets may not lend them money based on 
future risky income streams. If this were the case, deficits can have real effects 
since some individuals in the society would like to consume more of their wealth, 
but are constrained to do so. It follows, therefore, that a tax cut now with an 
appropriate increase in the future is like making a loan to the individuals who are 
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liquidity constrained. Since these individuals are constrained, they will increase 
their consumption by at least some portion of the tax cut, and so aggregate 
demand increases.  
 
Finally, the fifth criticism of the Ricardian analysis is the fact that not all taxes are 
lump sum as is implicitly assumed in the Ricardian model. For instance, taxes that 
typically depend on incomes, spending or wealth are clearly not lump sums. The 
existence of non lump sum taxes can indeed lead to economic consequences of 
fiscal deficits that are non-Ricardian. Taking the case of income tax for example, 
government budget deficits change the timing of income taxes, thereby affecting 
people’s incentives to work or produce in different time periods. It follows 
therefore that tax cuts that are covered by variations in deficits will have real 
effects on the economy. 
 
In light of the above criticisms against the key assumptions on which the Ricardian 
framework is based, we argue that this framework is based on unrealistic 
assumptions, and thus its conclusions on the effects of fiscal deficits on 
macroeconomic performance do not offer an acceptable approximation to reality. 
Hence, in our view, it is the Keynesian and Neoclassical frameworks which provide 
the most relevant starting point for an analysis of the impact of fiscal deficits on 
economic performance, including economic growth. 
 
In assessing the Keynesian and Neoclassical perspectives, however, we argue that 
these frameworks consider, and therefore represent, two distinct aspects of fiscal 
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policy. The Keynesian framework concerns the short run when some economic 
resources are unemployed or underemployed. In this situation, expansionary fiscal 
policy will most likely have a significant impact on output and therefore economic 
growth, especially when the economy is operating far below full employment.  On 
the other hand, the Neoclassical framework concerns the long run when an 
economy is taken as operating close to or at the full employment level. 
Expansionary fiscal policy in this case will most likely be dominated by crowding out 
problems, with little or no impact on output and growth.  
 
In fact, the assumptions on which the Keynesian and Neoclassical frameworks are 
based have certain implications for the income and interest elasticities of money 
and investment, and these, in turn, have implications for the slopes of IS and LM 
curves and the effectiveness of fiscal policy. For the Keynesian framework, since a 
significant fraction of the population is thought to be liquidity constrained, the LM 
curve is relatively horizontal, and thus a fiscal expansionary action has a large 
multiplier effect on the equilibrium level of income. There is less change in the 
interest rate associated with expansionary fiscal policy, and thus interest-rate 
sensitive components of aggregate demand (such as private investment and net 
exports) are not adversely cut off. There is therefore less dampening of the effects 
of deficit spending on output. On the other hand, in the Neoclassical framework, 
the LM curve is relatively vertical, and an expansionary fiscal policy has an 
insignificant effect on the equilibrium level of income and increases the interest 
rate significantly. It follows therefore that an expansionary fiscal policy shifts the IS 
curve upwards but has no significant impact on output. With unconstrained 
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consumers, demand for money is insensitive to the interest rate, as a relatively 
vertical LM curve implies, and thus there is a somewhat unique level of income at 
which the money market is in equilibrium.  In the extreme Neoclassical case, where 
the LM is vertical (perfectly inelastic), fiscal expansion cannot change the 
equilibrium level of income and raises only the interest rate. But if fiscal expansion 
does not increase output, there must be an offsetting reduction in private 
spending. In this case, the increase in interest rates crowds out an amount of 
domestic private spending and/or net exports equal to the size of fiscal expansion. 
Thus, there is full crowding out if the LM curve is vertical. Figure 3.3 illustrates the 
above conclusions concerning the efficacy of deficit policy on income when initiated 
at low and high levels of output relative to full employment output.  
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Figure 3.3:  The efficacy of deficit policy at relatively low and high levels of output 
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At low levels of economic activity such as 1Y , the LM  curve is relatively flat. A fiscal 
expansion, which shifts the IS  curve from 1IS  to 2IS  will result in a large multiplier 
effect (from 1Y  to 2Y ) since the money market effects are relatively absent.  In 
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there is no interest- elastic speculative demand as demand for money consists of 
transactions demand only. In this scenario, fiscal expansion will cause a significant 
increase in interest rates (from 3r  to 4r ) which, in turn, will cause large crowding 
out effects. Consequently, the effect of fiscal expansion on output will be very small 
(from 3Y  to 4Y ). Once the economy is at full employment, say fYY 4 , the LM  
curve is perfect inelastic - i.e. interest inelastic – and any fiscal expansion will have 
no any effect on output. As the above figure clearly illustrates, therefore, a given 
fiscal expansion will yield a significant increase in output when the economy has 
high levels of unemployment. In contrast, when the economy is near (or at) full 
employment, fiscal expansion will have little (or no) effect on output, with a large 
increase in the interest rate squeezing out interest sensitive components of 
aggregate demand to nearly or equal the initial fiscal stimulus. 
 
To make the same point somewhat differently, we can illustrate the efficacy of the 
deficit spending policy (expansionary fiscal policy) on output and economic growth 
in the short-run and long-run scenarios using the AS-AD model as figure 3.4 below 
shows. In the short-run (Keynesian case) when the economy operates below full 
employment (Yf), expansionary fiscal policy will most likely have a positive impact 
on output and economic growth. In the extreme case, when the economy operates 
far below full employment, the price level will be little affected and the impact on 
output, and therefore economic growth, will be very significant. In the long-run 
(Neo-classical case) when the economy operates near or at full employment (Yf), 
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expansionary fiscal policy will have very little or no impact on output and therefore 
growth.17  
 
Figure 3.4: The Efficacy of deficit spending policy on Output 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dornbusch et al. (2001) and Mankiw (2007) 
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following this policy change (Mankiw, 2007). 
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not provide relevant analysis of the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth on 
the grounds that it is based on the assumptions which are unrealistic and far from 
the reality. In our view, it is the Keynesian and Neo-Classical frameworks which 
offer the most relevant starting point for an analysis of the impact of fiscal deficits 
on economic growth, but with the two frameworks concerning two distinct aspects 
of fiscal policy of short run and long run, respectively. However, it should be 
emphasised that, although these two frameworks provide some clue about the 
likely effect of fiscal deficits on economic growth, the exact effect of deficit 
spending policy on growth may depend on a number of other factors, as discussed 
earlier, particularly the way the deficits are financed, what deficit financing is used 
for, and the size of deficits. 
 
Further analysis of the literature, however, shows that even the Keynesian and 
Neo-Classical frameworks as discussed above mainly explains the economy’s 
transition growth rate and not the steady-state growth rate – i.e., they explain how 
expansionary fiscal policy affects the level of output and output growth in the 
short-run rather than the long-run growth rate of the economy, with the long-run 
growth rate being able to be explained using endogenous growth models (Barro, 
1990; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995, 2004; Cashin, 1995; Devarajan et al., 
1996; Mendoza et al., 1997; Kneller et al., 1999; Odedokun, 2001; Agenor, 2004; 
Benos, 2009). As discussed earlier, note that these recently developed endogenous 
growth models have provided/explained mechanisms by which expansionary fiscal 
policy can affect both the level of output and output growth both in the short-run 
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and the long-run growth rate of the economy (Devarajan et al., 1996; Kneller et al., 
1999; Odedokun, 2001; Agenor, 2004; Benos, 2009).  
 
It is also worth noting that while the Keynesian and Neo-classical frameworks 
provide the most relevant starting point for an analysis of the likely effect of fiscal 
deficits on economic growth, over the past few decades, some macroeconomists – 
the so-called Structural Macroeconomists such as Lance Taylor and Jose Antonio 
Ocampo - have shown a serious and growing concern on the relevance of the 
traditional Keynesian and Neoclassical analysis of fiscal policy for developing 
countries due to the certain structural constraints that face these countries. The 
structuralist views on these constraints and their implications on a standard 
developing country macroeconomic model have been well discussed by Porter and 
Ranney (1982) and Jha (2003). In fact, following the analysis of these constraints, 
Porter and Ranney (1982) and Jha (2003) argue that while the standard text-book 
IS-LM and AS-AD models (as the ones used in our analysis above) may be 
appropriate for the analysis and macroeconomic policy prescriptions for developed 
countries, applying them in the context of a standard developing country may yield 
non-standard results. Some of these economic constraints and their implications on 
the standard developing country aggregate supply and aggregate demand 
functions, as discussed in Porter and Ranney (1982) and Jha (2003), are briefly 
reviewed below. 
 
Starting with the supply side constraints, aggregate supply of any economy depends 
mainly on the structure of both product and labour markets, the entrepreneurial 
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behavior, and production relationships (Porter and Ranney, 1982, p. 752; Jha, 2003, 
p. 194).  As further argued by Porter and Ranney (1982) and Jha (2003), developing 
countries are perceived by the structuralist economists to be different from 
developed countries in all these factors that affect the aggregate supply. In turn 
these differences, as discussed in Porter and Ranney (1982) and Jha (2003), are 
discussed below. 
 
The structuralist view argue that the developing country product markets are 
generally characterized by oligopolistic rather than competitive behavior. This is 
because; for non-tradables, the small economic size of the developing country 
economies prevents the existence of a sufficient number of firms to ensure 
competitive behavior; and, for tradable goods, governments usually provide to 
domestic firms some forms of protection (e.g. tariff protection, import licensing) 
from foreign competition. The structuralist view also argue that labour markets in 
developing countries are notoriously imperfect, hence leaving the money wage in 
the modern sectors of these economies less responsive (i.e. rigid) to economic 
forces, at least in the short-run, and a significant part of the labour force 
unemployed, underemployed or, in some cases, employed at much lower wage 
rates. All this leads to a general situation of persistent excess supply of labour in 
these countries.   
 
Furthermore, the structuralist economists have the following two views on the 
entrepreneurial behavior in developing countries. First, the assumption of profit 
maximisation is less appropriate in developing countries and that some sort of 
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variable cost markup pricing is more pertinent in these countries. Second, 
entrepreneurs in developing countries generally borrow funds in order to finance 
their variable costs, so that relevant factor prices for profit maximisation or markup 
calculations must include costs associated with interest.  
 
In relation to the production relationships, industrial production in developing 
countries has heavily been dependent on imported materials and intermediate 
inputs for which domestic substitutes are not easily available. Since imported 
materials and intermediate inputs are important element of production cost, so is 
the exchange rate. It follows, therefore, that as the price of foreign exchange goes 
up, assuming other factors remain constant, it would be expected that the price of 
imported inputs will go up and hence supply will fall. Also, the majority view in 
developing-country macro models is that labour inputs, another important variable 
input in production, exhibit diminishing returns according to usual neoclassical 
production function (especially in the industrial sector) in these countries18. Other 
important distinguishing characteristics of production in developing countries is 
that cash borrowing largely finance working capital in these countries. 
Correspondingly, the rate of interest is an important determinant of the cost of 
working capital and, therefore, of aggregate supply.  
 
The implications of these characteristics of the supply side of the economy in 
developing countries is that the standard developing country aggregate supply 
                                                 
18 Note however that this view has been challenged on the basis that where idle capacity 
accompanies surplus labour, there may be a scope for increasing output without diminishing returns 
to labour where foreign exchange can be located to purchasing the needed raw material inputs 
(Porter and Ranney, 1982, p. 753). 
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curve is likely to be quite relatively flat as compared to the standard developed 
country aggregate supply curve (Porter and Ranney, 1982; Jha, 2003). This follows 
the following two aspects of the above discussion; first, nominal wages tend to be 
rigid in developing countries, accompanied by an excess supply of labour; and 
second, existence of idle capacity in developing countries suggest that diminishing 
returns to labour are not significant in these countries.  It follows, therefore, that 
nominal wage rigidity flattens the aggregate supply curve in the usual Keynesian 
fashion; hence an increase in the price level leads to the reduction of real wages 
below the marginal product of labour, thus inducing an increase in employment and 
output. Given this, and if the marginal product of labour curve is quite flat, then the 
expansion of employment and output following an increase in the price level is 
likely to be quite large (Porter and Ranney, 1982). 
 
As far as the demand side of the economy is concerned, the structuralist view is 
that aggregate demand in developing countries is also affected by some 
institutional problems that these countries face. Porter and Ranney (1982) and Jha 
(2003) discuss these institutional problems and their implications on aggregate 
demand by examining the equilibrium in the money market and goods market in 
the economy. 
 
In the case of the monetary side of the economy, the use of money may not be that 
widespread and financial intermediation may not be that varied, complex and 
sophisticated as compared to developed countries (Porter and Ranney, 1982, p. 
754). One other institutional constraint that developing countries have faced, 
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especially in the past, is that government economic policy (e.g. financial repression 
and exchange rate controls) in many developing countries has acted to cause, and 
even in some cases worsen, the underdevelopment of the domestic financial 
sector. This financial underdevelopment of developing countries is reflected by a 
number of financial sector development indicators such as the low ratio of financial 
assets to income, the low number of banks which are also concentrated in urban 
areas, and the prevalent of a large part of investment which is self-financed, among 
others (Porter and Ranney, 1982, p. 754; Jha, 2003, p. 195).19 These constraints 
have at least the following two important implications for monetary policy. First, a 
significant part of the financial activity in developing countries takes place outside 
the control of central bank and direct monetary policy reach. Second, open market 
operations are not very effective. Under these conditions, while the LM curve of the 
standard developing will have the usual upward slope much like the standard LM 
curve and that of developed countries, it will most likely be steeper (Porter and 
Ranney, 1982; Jha, 2003).  
 
In relation to equilibrium in the developing country market for goods market, this 
occurs when domestic output equals the aggregate demand for it. This aggregate 
demand for domestic output consists of the usual four components: real consumer 
spending, business investment, government spending and net exports. According to 
Porter and Ranney (1982) and Jha (2003), developing countries differ from 
                                                 
19 Note however that developing countries have made noticeable progress in addressing these 
constraints following the economic reform agenda since the 1980s and that economic policy 
measures such as financial repression and exchange rate controls are now rarely used (Spratt, 2009) 
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developed countries in each of these components. Some of these differences are as 
discussed below. 
 
Real consumer spending in developing countries depends mainly on real disposable 
income, just as it does in the case of developed countries. However, for developing 
countries there are other two important determinants of consumer spending. First, 
consumption function depends on the functional distribution of income since, as it 
generally argued, the marginal propensity to consume out of wage income is higher 
than the marginal propensity to consume out of capital income (i.e. profits). 
Second, in contrast to developed countries, direct income tax is generally less 
important source of government revenue while indirect tax is a very important 
source of revenue in developing countries. Following these differences, Porter and 
Ranney (1982) and Jha (2003) argue that, aggregate consumption in developing 
countries depends not only positively on real disposable income, but also positively 
on labour share of total income and negatively on income tax rate. 
 
As in developed countries, investment demand in developing countries is assumed 
to depend positively on the desired level of capital stock, which in turn depends 
positively on output. However, the financing of this investment in developing 
countries is very different from developed countries, for business firms in 
developing countries borrow investment funds from both official sources (such as 
commercial banks) and unofficial markets (curb markets). In additional, businesses 
in these countries raise significant part of capital investment through direct lending 
from the government and retained earnings from business profits. Hence the 
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private investment in developing countries is a function of the desired level of 
capital stock (or output) and the cost of borrowing from all these sources of 
investment funds (Porter and Ranney, 1982; Jha, 2003). 
 
In relation to government spending, large part of this is composed of wage 
payments, where the wage paid to public sector employees is kept in line with 
those in the private sector – and vice versa. It follows therefore that any decrease 
in the real wage bill would decrease real government expenditure. Another 
important component of government expenditure in developing countries is public 
investment. As such, government expenditure in developing countries is a positive 
function of both real wage bill and the level of public sector investment (Porter and 
Ranney, 1982; Jha, 2003). 
 
Turning to the net exports component of aggregate demand, most developing 
countries are small relative to the rest of the world, and as such the domestic prices 
of their tradables depend on exogenously determined world prices, subsidies, 
tariffs and exchange rate. Also, because of capacity constraints and, at times, delays 
inherent in initiating or significantly increasing exports the price elasticity of supply 
of most developing countries exports is likely to be small in the short run (Porter 
and Ranney, 1982; Jha, 2003). It is further argued by Porter and Ranney (1982) and 
Jha (2003) that many developing countries imports and domestically produced 
goods are very poor substitutes. For most of the developing countries that have 
successfully pursued import substitution strategy now import largely non-
competitive intermediate inputs, which can be treated as fixed proportion to 
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domestic output. Two other important aspects of the developing countries trade 
sector can be pointed out. First, many developing country governments generate 
significant part of their revenues from the trade sector, with the large part of this 
revenue raised from ad valorem taxes on imports. Second, the trade sector of most 
developing countries is a very important part of national accounts, and thus many 
macroeconomic problems of developing countries seem in most cases to arise from 
a large deficit in the current account of the trade balance (Porter and Ranney, 
1982). 
 
As illustrated in Porter and Ranney (1982) and Jha (2003), taking into account all 
these characteristics of each component of aggregate demand for developing 
countries and incorporating them into the modelling of the equilibrium condition in 
the goods market (i.e. the IS equilibrium) will very likely yield quite steep IS curve 
for developing countries.20 As pointed out by Porter and Ranney (1982, p. 758), 
there are two main reasons for this: first, the low short run interest elasticity of 
investment demand; and second, the high income elasticity of import demand.21  
 
It follows, therefore, that combining the IS and LM curves for developing countries 
discussed above to derive aggregate demand will produce the aggregate demand 
curve that is likely to be much steeper than the standard text-book aggregate 
                                                 
20 For details on this modelling of the IS curve for developing countries based on the structuralist 
views on the components of aggregate demand for these countries please see Porter and Ranney 
(1982, pp. 754-759) and Jha (2003, pp. 195-201).  
21 However, it is worth noting that this prediction contradicts what other studies have argued that 
the IS curve for developing countries may actually not be quite steep sloped for two reasons: first, 
the expected high marginal propensity to consume in these countries and, second, the likely high 
income elasticity of investment demand suggested by some empirical studies on developing 
countries (Behrman and Hanson, 1979; Leff and Sato, 1980).  
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demand schedule. Also, given these IS-LM and AD-AS models predicted for 
developing countries, it seems that applying the standard text-book/advanced 
country macro models and policy prescription for developing countries context may 
yield non-standard results (Porter and Ranney, 1982). 
 
3.3 Empirical Evidence 
It is interesting to note that one can find support for all three main theoretical 
perspectives concerning the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in the 
theoretical literature, political debates and the news media. Whether one thinks of 
deficits as growth enhancing or retarding, or even irrelevant in the determination of 
economic growth therefore depends fundamentally on one’s choice of theoretical 
viewpoint. Given this therefore it is our view that while the selection of appropriate 
paradigm(s), as we have done in the previous section, provides researchers with 
some clue as to the likely effect of fiscal deficits on economic growth, the issue is 
ultimately an empirical one. Hence, this section critically examines the existing 
empirical literature on the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth.  
 
Analysis of the literature shows that two main approaches have dominated in the 
existing empirical studies concerning the impact of fiscal deficits on economic 
growth. The first approach estimates the so-called St. Louis equation. This approach 
was particularly used in the earlier studies on the effectiveness of fiscal and 
monetary policies in determining economic growth. Most of these studies were 
specifically concerned with testing hypotheses relating to the magnitude, speed and 
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reliability of the response of GNP or GDP to changes related to fiscal and monetary 
actions. The second approach analyses the impact of fiscal deficits (or fiscal policy in 
broad terms) based on the estimation of different versions of growth models. 
Following recent developments in growth theory, these studies consider a richer 
menu of explanatory variables that are considered important in explaining 
economic growth. Given its advantages, this second approach has dominated in the 
more recent studies. Taking these in turn, the discussion below considers the 
empirical evidence based on the estimations of these models. 
 
3.3.1 Evidence Based on Estimation of St. Louis Model 
The St. Louis equation is associated with the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
where researchers (e.g. Andersen and Jordan, 1968; Carlson, 1976, 1978; Hafer, 
1982) have extensively investigated the relative effectiveness of fiscal and 
monetary actions on economic activity. The pioneering work using the St. Louis 
equation was the study by Andersen and Jordan (1968) who investigated the 
relative effectiveness of fiscal and monetary actions on economic activity for the 
US. In this study, Andersen and Jordan regressed quarterly changes in nominal GNP 
on current and lagged quarterly changes in money stock and in the various 
measures of fiscal actions: high-employment budget surplus/deficit, high-
employment expenditures, and high-employment receipts, using data from 1952 
through 1968.(22)(23) In addition they used an Almon lag specification on the 
                                                 
22  High-employment budget (surplus/deficit, expenditure, and receipts) measures the budget 
(surplus/deficit, expenditure and, receipts) at some arbitrarily defined high/ full-employment level of 
economic activity (i.e. at potential output) (Dornbusch, Fischer and Startz, 2001; Jacobs, Schoeman, 
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independent variables to incorporate the dynamic effects of time series data used 
in the study. Their results suggested that the overall effect of fiscal actions on GNP 
was relatively small and, exerted no statistically significant and lasting influence, 
while monetary actions caused significant and permanent effects on GNP, during 
the sample period.  
 
However, the results obtained by Andersen and Jordan’s (1968) study have been 
the focus of considerable criticism. Much of this criticism stems from the fact that 
their results were substantially different from the conventional view, based, in part, 
on the results obtained by large econometric models about the effects of fiscal 
actions on economic activity and the time lags these actions take to have an impact 
on economic growth. For example, models that have specifically quantified the 
effect of fiscal actions on the economy based on the Keynesian approach have 
suggested that fiscal actions (whether in the form of a maintained increase in 
expenditure or tax cut) ultimately have an impact on economic activity, with a 
multiplier usually estimated at about 1.5 or more. These models also suggest that 
this impact of fiscal actions on economic activity comes with relatively long time 
lags (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1994). Logically, one would not expect fiscal policy to 
have an immediate effect on the economy; for, it takes time to either gather taxes 
after changes in tax rates or to undertake public spending after announcement of 
changes in the budget. Based on this reasoning, it seems unlikely that the impact of 
                                                                                                                                          
and Heerden, 2002). Proponents of this definition of budget argue that it is this definition that 
provides a better measure of the impact of the budget on the economy than the actual surplus or 
deficit (Carlson, 1977). 
23 See Appendix D for discussion of the specific hypothesis underlying the St. Louis Model estimated 
by Andersen and Jordan (1968). 
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fiscal changes can be traced to particular quarters or even less to months, and so 
the specification of the reasonably long time lags underlying the model appears to 
be important. Indeed, it appears from the literature on this issue that those who 
accept the original St. Louis evidence regarding the relative strength of fiscal and 
monetary actions do not question the importance of fiscal actions; such actions do 
have economic impact over a certain period. However, the size of the steady-state 
multiplier and the lag specification used in model estimations are both 
questionable (Friedman, 1977; Carlson, 1978; Batten and Thornton, 1983).   
 
The St. Louis equation has also been criticized for three other reasons related to its 
specification. First, some critics (such as Modigliani and Ando, 1976; and, Batten 
and Thornton, 1983) are concerned that since the equation is not derived explicitly 
from a structural macroeconomic model, some relevant exogenous, right-hand-side 
variables may be excluded, and, as a result, the equation may be misspecified. 
Second, the fiscal policy measures used in the equation have been severely 
criticized, because the high-employment measures of fiscal policy are not 
appropriate measures of fiscal policy action (De Leeuw and Kalchbrenner, 1969; 
Corrigan, 1970; and, Gramlich, 1971). These critics argue that failure to specify the 
appropriate indicators of fiscal actions may distort their exhibited relative 
importance. Third, other critics argue that the right-hand-side variables are not 
exogenous with respect to nominal income and so the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimate of the parameters may exhibit simultaneous equation bias (De Leeuw and 
Kalchbrenner, 1969; Gordon, 1971; Goldfeld and Blinder, 1972; Elliot, 1975; Carlson 
and Hein, 1980; and, Hafer, 1982). Finally, in another criticism of the St. Louis 
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equation, some authors have argued that the results may be somewhat country-
specific (De Haan and Zelhorst, 1988). 
 
In response to the above criticisms of Andersen and Jordan’s (1968) findings and 
the methodology used, there have been a number of studies which in one way or 
another have re-examined and challenged their findings and methodology. Many of 
these studies have focused on the experience of developed countries, particularly 
the United States. In one of these studies, Carlson (1976) applies the same 
methodology to investigate this issue for the US, but using monthly data, for the 
sample period of 1953 through 1973. This study is an attempt to examine whether 
the findings of the St. Louis equation continue to hold when monthly data are used 
in the estimation. For the purpose of comparison, Carlson (1976) employed the 
specification used by Andersen and Jordan (1968) – that is the study used money, 
narrowly defined as demand deposits plus currency held by the public, as the 
measure of the monetary variable, and high-employment federal budget 
expenditures as the measure of the fiscal variable (Carlson, 1976, pp. 14-15). Note 
however that, following the lack of comprehensive measure of the dollar change in 
nominal GNP (the dependent variable used in the original St. Louis equation) on a 
monthly basis, this study used personal income as a proxy for the GNP on a monthly 
basis.24 The results of this study are consistent with those obtained using quarterly 
data by Andersen and Jordan (1968).  
 
                                                 
24 The rationale underlying this choice was that personal income was the most comprehensive 
measure of aggregate economic activity that was available on a monthly basis (Carlson, 1976, p. 16). 
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Friedman (1977) extends Andersen and Jordan’s (1968) study to cover the period 
from 1953 to 1976. The study regresses nominal GNP against the money stock 
(demand deposits plus currency held by the public) and the high-employment 
equivalent of federal budget expenditures measured in current prices, and all these 
three variables are seasonally adjusted. Two equations are estimated in this study; 
one using the sample period 1953-1969 and the other using sample period 1953-
1976. In contrast with Andersen and Jordan’s results he finds that fiscal actions 
yield a statistically significant and lasting impact on GNP. Hence he concludes that 
“even the St. Louis model now believes in fiscal policy”.  
 
However, Carlson (1978) challenges Friedman (1977), arguing that his results are 
biased because during part of the sample period, the error term in the equation 
displayed heteroscedasticity problem, thus violating one of the basic assumptions 
of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. To solve this problem, Carlson 
(1978) re-estimates the St. Louis equation, regressing dollar change in nominal GNP 
against change in money stock (M1) and change in high-employment expenditure, 
but using the rates-of-change specification rather than arithmetic first difference 
form used in Friedman’s (1977) estimation of the equation.25 For comparison 
purpose, Carlson (1978) follows Friedman’s (1977) approach and estimate two 
equations. In the first equation the sample period 1953-1969 is used while in the 
second equation a longer sample period, 1953-1976, is used. His results diverge 
from Friedman’s and support the original conclusion of the St. Louis equation that 
                                                 
25The rate-of-change specification was also suggested in Andersen and Jordan (1968) as the most 
preferable. However, they opted for the first difference form because it gave essentially the same 
results with that obtained using the rate-of-change form (Andersen and Jordan, 1968; Carlson, 1978, 
p. 17)   
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the overall effect of fiscal action on economic activity is relatively small and not 
statistically significant. 
 
Batten and Thornton (1983; 1984) investigate the robustness of the policy 
conclusions of the St. Louis equation with respect to modifications of lag structure-
specifications. Both studies investigate the lag length and polynomial degree 
specifications of the St. Louis equation to test whether its conclusions about the 
long-run efficacy of fiscal and monetary actions are affected by the lag structure 
employed or the polynomial restrictions imposed in the model estimation. This is a 
response to the criticism of the St. Louis technique that its conclusions may be 
sensitive to the polynomial distributed lag (PDL) estimation technique used (Batten 
and Thornton, 1983). In their study of 1983, Batten and Thornton carry out this 
investigation by employing the Pagano-Hartley t-test model selection criterion for 
selecting the appropriate lag length (structure) and polynomial degree of a general 
polynomial distributed lag model. Then, in their study of 1984, they extend their 
investigation to employ six alternative selection criteria; Pagano-Hartley’s t-test 
(PH), Mallow’s Cp-statistic, Akaike’s Final Prediction Error criterion (FPE), Schwarz 
Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), Geweke and Meese’s Bayesian Estimation 
criterion (BEC), and the Standard F- test. Using quarterly data for the US to estimate 
the St. Louis equation, where the growth rate specification regressing quarter-to-
quarter annual rates of change in nominal GNP against quarter-to-quarter annual 
rates of change in money (defined as M1) and high-employment government 
expenditures for the period 1962 to 1982 is used, both studies provide evidence 
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that the policy conclusions of the St. Louis equation are robust with respect to both 
the specification of its lag structure and the imposition of polynomial restrictions.  
 
In another study, Batten and Hafer (1983) investigate the generality of the St. Louis 
approach by applying it to other countries. The study assesses the relative impact of 
monetary and fiscal actions on economic activity in a cross-country study involving 
six developed countries - Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. The authors argue that the original St. Louis model typically 
estimated for the United States may be misspecified for it excludes some 
exogenous forces that affect nominal GNP. Hence the study adds an export variable 
on the right-hand-side of the equation to account for the relative openness of the 
economies studied.26 Specifically, the study estimates the growth rate form of the 
modified version of the St. Louis equation representing nominal GNP, narrow 
money (M1), government expenditures and merchandise exports. As far as the final 
empirical results are concerned, the study finds that, while fiscal actions were 
significant only in the United Kingdom and France during the sample period, 
monetary actions did have a significant and lasting impact on GNP in all countries 
studied, thereby supporting the position of the finding of the original St. Louis 
equation that fiscal actions have relatively less importance in determining GNP 
growth as compared to monetary actions.  
 
                                                 
26 Indeed, as Batten and Hafer (1983) argue, while the implicit assumption in the St. Louis studies on 
the United States that the domestic economy being analysed is relatively closed to the rest of the 
world may be adequately characterising the US economy, this may not be true for the countries 
whose exports account for the large proportion of their GNP. 
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The studies based on the estimation of the St. Louis equation that we have 
discussed so far have been confined to developed countries. For developing 
countries, studies based on the estimation of the St. Louis equation include a study 
by Hussain (1982) on the relative effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy action 
on economic growth for Pakistan. Based on annual data for the period 1947 
through 1970, this study estimates the St. Louis model using the Koyck lag 
specification on the independent variables. The study finds that fiscal policy actions 
are more effective than monetary policy action in influencing GNP growth. 
However, a later study by Saqib and Yasmin (1987) for Pakistan finds different 
results from Hussain’s (1982) findings. This study regresses GDP on components of 
government expenditures and various measures of money supply (M1 and M2) 
both in nominal and real terms and finds that actually monetary policy actions are 
more effective than fiscal policy actions in Pakistan. However, Saqib and Yasmin’s 
model is questionable, as it is based on the use of annual data without any lags, 
thus ignoring the lag effects of time series data on the fiscal and monetary actions 
used in the investigation.  
 
In another study, Darrat (1984) applies a modified St. Louis type reduced form 
single equation model to test the relative importance of fiscal and monetary actions 
for the period 1950-1981 for five Latin American countries: Brazil, Chile, Mexico, 
Peru and Venezuela. This study makes the following modifications to the original St. 
Louis equation. First, it adds exports as another explanatory variable to account for 
the openness of the economies considered in the study. Second, it uses growth 
rates of the variables included in the empirical model, rather than arithmetic first 
92 
 
differences. Finally, it applies the unconstrained ordinary least squares (rather than 
the Almon lag specification used in earlier studies) in model estimation. The study 
finds interesting results that, contrary to the results found in most of the studies 
based on developed economies, fiscal actions are more effective than monetary 
policy actions in explaining nominal GNP growth in the sample of the developing 
countries considered in the study.  
 
In another study of the St. Louis model for developing countries, Upadhyaya (1991) 
applies a modified St. Louis model reduced form equation, adding the export 
variable as another independent variable in the equation, to analyse the 
effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies in four south Asian developing 
countries - India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. His results are mixed across the 
countries. The results show that only monetary actions are significant in explaining 
changes in nominal GNP in Nepal and Pakistan, while in Sri Lanka neither variable is 
found to be significant. In the case of India, the St. Louis equation is found to be 
inapplicable, as the monetary variable is not exogenous.27 He concludes that the 
effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policy differs from country to country, 
depending upon the nature of the economy of the country in question. Based on his 
tests of the St. Louis equation using data set for India, Upadhyaya also concludes 
that the St. Louis type reduced form single equation method may not be applicable 
in all developing countries. 
 
                                                 
27 This criticism is supported by Ansari (1996) and Synder and Bruce (2001) who point out that this 
St. Louis-type reduced-form equation makes exogeneity assumptions, which places structural 
causality assumptions on the model. 
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Another study applying St. Louis model in relation to developing countries was 
produced by Binue (1994) who examined empirically the relative impact of fiscal 
and monetary policies on economic activity in five African Countries - Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Tanzania – for the period 1965-1990.  Similar to 
Upadhyaya (1991), the author employed a modified St. Louis-type reduced-form 
equation by including exports variable as another independent variable in the 
equation to capture the influence of economic openness on economic activity. The 
study also produced mixed results: monetary policy exerted a greater influence on 
nominal income than fiscal policy in three of the countries, Ghana, Kenya and 
Nigeria; fiscal policy influence was statistically significant in only one country, 
Nigeria; while in two countries, Tanzania and Sierra Leone, neither the fiscal policy 
not the monetary policy was statistically significant in determining nominal income.  
Moreover, Olaloye and Ikhide (1995) used a modified form of the basic St. Louis 
equation to empirically investigate the role of fiscal policy and monetary policy in 
improving the economy from recession in the case of Nigeria using monthly data 
from 1986 to 1991. Their results suggest that fiscal policy is more effective in 
influencing the economy during recession than monetary policy. 
 
The above discussion has presented a review of some of the studies that have 
presented evidence on the impact of fiscal deficits on growth based on the 
estimations of St. Louis equation. However, some economists (e.g. Upadhyaya, 
1991; Ansari, 1996; Synder and Bruce, 2001; Raham, 2005; Cyrus and Elias, 2014; 
among others) have criticised the validity of using St. Louis model on the grounds 
that it is a reduced form of an equation, the policy variables included in the right-
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hand side of the equation such as fiscal and monetary policy variables are not 
strictly exogenous, and that the equation suffers from specification error since it 
omits some relevant variables. As pointed out by Rahman (2005), these issues can 
render the results based on the estimation of St. Louis equation unreliable and 
inconsistent. Moreover, most of the studies that have presented evidence on the 
impact of fiscal deficits (or fiscal policy) on growth based on estimation of St. Louis 
model have been criticized for overlooking the properties of time series data, the 
direction of causality and endogeneity of variables used in these studies (Cyrus and 
Elias, 2014, p. 97). Note that, as Cyrus and Elias (2014) further argue, most of 
macroeconomic variables included in the St. Louis equation are very likely to exhibit 
non-stationarity behavior, and hence they must be differenced to be stationary.  It 
follows, therefore, that regressions based on these macroeconomic variables at 
levels are likely to suffer from spurious regression problem especially if the 
estimated equations are non-cointegrating (Olaloye and Ikhide, 1995; Engle and 
Granger, 1987; Cyrus and Elias, 2014).  
 
Following these criticisms and arguments on the St. Louis-type equation, other 
studies have opted to examine the relative effectiveness of fiscal and monetary 
policy in the context of modern time series econometrics that address most of the 
above criticisms associated with the St. Louis equation. For example, Cosewell and 
Bruce (2001) employ a vector autoregressive (VAR) technique instead of the St. 
Louis-type approach in an attempt to avoid the imposition of a potentially spurious 
a-priori constraint on the endogeneity of the variables considered in the system. 
This approach also helps to avoid a simultaneity bias, and incorporate suitable lags 
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on each series to avoid the problem of omitted variable bias associated with the St. 
Louis equation(Coxwell and Bruce, 2002; Fatima and Iqbal, 2003; Rahman 2005).28 
Other studies use slightly different modern econometric modeling techniques in 
addressing the above problems associated with the St. Louis-type equation. For 
example, Ajisafe and Folorunso (2002) examine the relative effectiveness of 
monetary and fiscal policy in influencing economic growth in Nigeria using 
cointegration and error correction modeling techniques. The study uses annual data 
for the period 1970-1998 and estimates the error correction model (ECM) in which 
GDP growth is used as a measure of economic growth, narrow money supply (M1) 
and broad money supply (M2) are used as proxies of monetary policy, and 
government revenue, government expenditure and budget deficit are used as 
proxies of fiscal policy. The study examined the time series properties of the 
variables considered in the model by conducting a unit root test on each variable 
using Engle and Granger (1987) procedure before the formal model estimation was 
performed using co-integration analysis and error correction model. The final 
results suggest that monetary policy has a more significant impact on economic 
growth than fiscal policy in the case of Nigeria. 
 
In another study using modern econometric techniques, Ali et al. (2008) 
investigates the relative effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy on economic 
growth in the context of South Asian countries using autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) model and error correction model (ECM). The study considers a sample of 
                                                 
28 Several other studies such as Rahman (2005), Hassan (2006), Senbet (2011), and Cyrus & Elias 
(2014) use this approach to assessing the relative effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy on 
influencing economic growth. 
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four countries (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka) and annual time series 
data covering the period from 1990 to 2007. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), broad 
money (M2) and fiscal balance variables are considered in the estimated empirical 
model, and the study finds that money supply variable is significant both in the 
short run and the long run, while fiscal balance is insignificant in both periods. The 
study therefore concludes that monetary policy is a more powerful tool than fiscal 
policy in influencing economic growth in South Asian economies. 
 
In another recent study, Jawaid et al. (2010) examines the comparative effect of 
fiscal and monetary policy on economic growth in the case of Pakistan using annual 
time series data from the period 1981 to 2009. This study uses co-integration 
procedure to estimate a model considering three variables: GDP growth is used as a 
measure of economic growth, money supply is used as a proxy of monetary policy, 
and fiscal balance is used as a proxy of fiscal policy.29 Results suggest that both 
fiscal policy and monetary policy have positive and significant effects on economic 
growth. However, further analysis of the results show that the coefficient for 
monetary policy is much greater than that for fiscal policy, suggesting that 
monetary policy is more effective than fiscal policy. 
 
However, the above three studies (Ajisafe and Folorunso, 2002; Ali et al., 2008; and, 
Jawaid et al., 2010) fail to clearly show whether the data used on the dependent 
variable was nominal GDP or real GDP, hence raising questions on the validity of the 
results if nominal GDP rather than real GDP was used as the dependent variable. 
                                                 
29 Stationarity analysis on each variable is performed using Dickey Fuller (1979) and Phillips Perron 
(1988) tests before checking for the existence of the long run relationship between the variables. 
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3.3.2 Evidence Based on Estimation of Growth Models 
To address the specification bias associated with the St. Louis equation since it 
omits some important variables, as pointed out earlier, some studies have 
empirically examined the impact of fiscal deficits (or fiscal policy in broad terms) on 
economic growth based on the estimation of different versions of growth models 
that consider more variables on the right-hand side of the equation. 
 
Turning to these studies that have presented evidence on the impact of fiscal 
deficits on economic growth based on the growth model estimations, the 
pioneering work based on this approach is associated with Eisner and Pieper (1984, 
1986, 1987, 1988) who conducted a series of studies on the relationship between 
budget deficits and economic growth in the United States and other Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. In their first study 
on this issue, Eisner and Pieper (1984) argue that inflation-corrected budget deficit 
or surplus (real budget deficits or surpluses) measures - and not conventional 
deficit measures - should be used in assessing the impact of fiscal policy on 
aggregate demand. Their choice of the inflation-corrected budget deficit or surplus 
measures is based on the argument that, as we discussed in Chapter Two (Section 
2.4.2), inflation wipes out the real value of government debt, thereby nullifying any 
increase in the public’s perception of its own real wealth, and thus it is necessary to 
correct budget deficits accordingly. Hence, they start their investigation by 
developing measures of the inflation-adjusted high-employment budget 
deficit/surplus, taking into account the effects of changes in interest rates and 
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inflation on high employment budgets, for the United States over the period 1955-
1984. Thereafter, they estimate a simple growth model using real GNP as the 
dependent variable and lagged values of inflation-corrected high-employment 
federal deficit/surplus. Their results strongly support the Keynesian view that fiscal 
deficits have a significant positive impact on economic growth.  
  
In another study, Eisner (1986) uses both inflation-corrected and non inflation-
corrected high-employment budget deficits data for the United States for the 
period 1955–1984 to provide evidence that it is the inflation-corrected 
deficits/surpluses that matter in assessing the influence of fiscal deficits on 
economic activity. This study estimates univariate regressions of percentage 
changes in real GNP on (both inflation-corrected and non inflation corrected) high-
employment budget deficits/surplus and real monetary base. The results support 
Eisner and Pieper’s (1984) findings that fiscal deficits significantly stimulate 
economic growth. In addition, the results suggest that using the inflation-corrected 
deficit measure produces better and more reliable estimates in assessing the 
influence of fiscal deficits (or fiscal policy) on economic activity. 
 
In their later studies, Eisner and Pieper (1987, 1988) employ the same methodology 
to estimate the effect of cyclically and inflation-adjusted budget deficits on real 
GNP growth rates for the United States and other OECD countries. These studies 
also report results which are consistent with those found in the earlier studies 
(Eisner and Pieper, 1984; Eisner, 1886) that fiscal deficits exert a positive and 
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significant effect on economic growth for the United States and many of the other 
OECD countries. 
 
Studies by Eisner and Pieper stimulated subsequent research, much of which 
wanted to challenge their work. For example, in one of the subsequent studies, De 
Haan and Zelhorst (1988) challenge Eisner and Pieper’s (1984, 1986, 1987 and 
1988) studies arguing that they are plagued with some estimation problems which 
make their results unreliable. In particular, they argue that the evidence provided in 
Eisner (1986) is biased due to two major estimation problems. First, they argue that 
the equation estimated by Eisner lacks a longer lag structure beyond the restrictive 
one-year lag. Following this criticism, De Haan and Zelhorst (1988) use Akaike’s 
(1969) final prediction error (FPE) criterion to search for the appropriate lag lengths 
(using a maximum of three-year lag) for both fiscal and monetary variables. Second, 
they argue that Eisner’s regressions used incorrect fiscal and monetary policy 
measures. According to De Haan and Zelhorst, the correct measure of fiscal policy is 
the change in the level of budget deficit (and not the level of budget deficit used by 
Eisner), and the correct indicator of monetary policy is growth rate of base money 
(and not the growth rate of real base money used by Eisner). Thereafter, they re-
estimate Eisner’s (1986) equation with these two modifications, and in the process 
they obtain results which are different from Eisner’s. Their results suggest that real 
deficits had no significant impact on economic growth in the United States during 
the sample period (1955-1984).  
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In another study, Darrat and Suliman (1992) argue that both studies by Eisner 
(1986) by De Haan and Zelhorst (1988) suffer from a number of misspecification 
problems. First, they point out that neither study tested for the stationarity of the 
variables used in their econometric models. Citing Stock and Watson (1989), Darrat 
and Suliman (1992) argue that, if some of the variables are nonstationary, the usual 
test statistics would not exhibit standard distributions, thus leading to misleading 
inferences. Second, they argue that the econometric models estimated in both 
studies are conceptually misspecified, since they do not consider several exogenous 
factors (such as rate of inflation, short-term interest rate, and long-term interest 
rate) that could potentially influence real GNP. Third, they argue that both studies 
ignored any possible feedback from the changes in real GNP to the two policy 
variables (that is, they fail to consider a potential endogeneity issue). According to 
Darrat and Suliman, movements in real GNP could induce significant policy 
responses since high economic growth is among the primary objectives of monetary 
and fiscal policy. Indeed, endogeneity of some or all of the right-hand-side variables 
would yield biased and inconsistent regression estimates.  
 
To address these issues, Darrat and Suliman (1992) perform the following 
procedures on the US data for the period 1955-1984 before they go on to estimate 
a modified version of the growth model estimated in Eisner (1986) and De Haan 
and Zelhorst (1988). First, to avoid bias in the results due to omission of some 
important right-hand-side variables, several explanatory variables (inflation 
variable, short-term interest rates variable and long-term interest rate variable) are 
added to the model. Thus, five candidate variables (fiscal deficit and money supply 
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variables used in the Eisner (1986) and De Haan and Zelhorst (1988) studies plus 
these three added variables) are assumed to be relevant in the determination of 
real GNP. Second, each of the variables is converted to a stationary process using 
the appropriate degree of differencing. Third, to allow for the possible endogeneity 
of all six variables considered in the model, a six-equation system is constructed 
and estimated. In effect, the resultant system becomes a 66 vector autoregressive 
(VAR) model.  Note that, in order to test Eisner and Pieper’s hypothesis that it is the 
inflation adjusted deficits that matter in analyzing the role of fiscal policy in 
influencing aggregate demand and output, Darrat and Suliman (1992) applied all 
these procedures on both inflation-corrected and non inflation-corrected budget 
deficits data.  
 
After carrying out the above modifications and estimation of their model, Darrat 
and Suliman’s (1992) study find the results suggesting that, regardless of whether 
or not deficits are corrected for inflation, federal deficits exerted a significant 
positive impact on real GNP in the United States during the period 1955-1984. 
However, their results also suggest that Eisner and Pieper’s (1984, 1986) inflation-
corrected deficit measure produces more reliable estimates. Thus, the results 
provide further evidence that the inflation-corrected deficit measures may be more 
useful in assessing the role of fiscal policy in influencing economic activity. In 
addition, as Darrat and Suliman (1992) suggested, the results produce some 
evidence of feedback from real GNP to budget deficits when deficits are not 
corrected for inflation. Thus, based on their results, Darrat and Suliman (1992) 
arrive at the following two conclusions. First, fiscal deficits have a positive and 
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significant impact on economic growth. Second, the inflation-corrected deficit 
measures are statistically exogenous to real output changes, hence regressions 
considering the effect of budget deficits on output should use Eisner and Pieper’s 
(1984, 1986) measure of inflation-corrected deficits to avoid simultaneity bias.  
 
Following the results and conclusions given in Darrat and Suliman (1992), De Haan 
and Sturm (1995) also contribute to the debate by following Darrat and Suliman’s 
(1992) approach using long-run data for the USA. However, in contrast to Darrat 
and Suliman’s results, they find that both inflation-adjusted and non inflation 
adjusted budget deficits exert a negative and significant influence on real GNP 
growth. 
 
In addition to the studies by Eisner and Pieper and the subsequent research that 
revisited their work, Karras (1994) employs a growth model framework to examine 
the effect of budget deficits on real output growth using pooled annual data from 
thirty-two countries covering the period from the 1950s to the 1980s30. The study 
finds that budget deficits are negatively correlated with the rate of growth of real 
output in the studied sample of countries. 
 
Moreover, Al-Khedair (1996) investigates the impact of fiscal deficits on economic 
growth in the seven major industrial countries. The study covers the period from 
1964 to 1993 and estimates an economic growth model that regress the economic 
growth variable against the explanatory variables of budget deficit, money supply, 
                                                 
30 This study also considers the effects of budget deficits on other macroeconomic variables 
including money growth, inflation and investment.  
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nominal exchange rate and foreign direct investment. Results suggest that fiscal 
deficits have a positive and significant effect on economic growth in all the seven 
major industrial countries. 
 
The empirical studies on the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth based on 
a growth model approach we have reviewed so far have considered the context of 
developed countries. However, there also exist some empirical studies that used a 
growth model framework to consider this issue for developing countries. Among 
these is the study by Fischer (1993). In this study, Fischer uses a regression 
analogue of growth accounting to estimate the impact of fiscal deficits (and other 
economic variables) on economic growth (measured by real GDP) using a sample of 
thirty-two countries for the period 1961-1988. Using both cross-sectional and panel 
regressions, the study finds result suggesting that small budget deficits are 
positively associated with growth and large deficits are negatively associated with 
growth. The study further suggests that larger budget surpluses cause higher capital 
accumulation and economic growth.  Fischer’s results are supported by Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) who also find that government budget surpluses are consistently 
correlated with private investment and economic growth. 
 
In another work on developing countries, Nelson and Singh (1994) examine the 
effect of fiscal deficits on growth in a cross-section of seventy low and middle 
income countries. Using a modified version of a growth model of the Harrod-Domar 
type, Nelson and Singh estimate the effect of budget deficits on growth for two 
different periods, 1970-79 and 1980-89. Their model regresses real GDP growth 
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rate against a number of explanatory variables including government budget 
deficits, government revenue, defense spending, domestic private and public 
investment, population growth rate (which is used as a proxy for the labour force), 
per capita income, educational attainment (which is used as a proxy for human 
capital), and the inflation rate. Their results suggest that fiscal deficits appeared to 
have consistently exercised little or no impact of any statistical significance on 
economic growth in developing countries during both periods (the seventies and 
the eighties). Based on further analysis of their results, they conclude that fiscal 
deficits per se may not necessarily be good or bad in the context of economic 
development and argue that what deficit financing is used for in the economy may 
be important in determining the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. They 
point out, for example, that fiscal deficits associated with public infrastructure 
improvements or with the promotion of private investment will most likely enhance 
economic growth – thus running fiscal deficits to finance government spending on 
activities such as these may be good for economic growth and development. 
 
In another study, Goonewardena (1998) uses a modified version of the growth 
model used by Nelson and Singh (1994) to investigate the effects of budget deficits 
on real output growth for Sri Lanka for the sample period 1978 through 1996. In his 
basic model, real GDP growth is used as a dependent variable and independent 
variables include nominal budget deficit as a percentage GDP, private investment as 
a percentage of GDP, net exports as a percentage of GDP, inflation rate, and 
population growth rate (used as a proxy for the labour force). In the process, he 
estimates different versions of his basic growth model, eliminating some of the 
105 
 
statistically insignificant variables. His results based on growth model estimation 
suggest that budget deficits had positive and statistically significant effects on real 
GDP growth in Sri Lanka during the sample period.31 
 
In a more recent study, Adam and Bevan (2005) examine the non-linear effects of 
fiscal deficits on growth for a panel of forty-five developing countries. Their results 
suggest a threshold effect at a level of the deficit of around 1.5% of GDP. Hence, the 
authors argue that while there appears to be a growth pay-off to reducing deficits 
to this level, this effect disappears or reverses itself in the case of further fiscal 
contraction. Thus, the threshold involves not only a change of slope but also a 
change of sign in the relationship, indicating that for an economy not in its steady 
state growth path, there is a range over which deficit financing may be growth 
enhancing.  
 
In another study, Fatima et al. (2011) investigate the impact of fiscal deficit on 
investment and GDP growth for the case of Pakistan using annual time series data 
for thirty years covering the period 1980-2009. A simultaneous equations model 
consisting of two equations is used to estimate the impact of fiscal deficit on 
investment and growth. The first equation estimates the direct effect of the fiscal 
deficit on economic growth. In this equation, real GDP per capita is used as a 
dependent variable and investment (as a share of real GDP per capita), exports (as a 
                                                 
31 In this study, Goonewardena also investigates the same issue using the St. Louis equation. The 
equation regresses annual changes in nominal GDP on annual changes in the cyclically adjusted 
budget deficits and the annual changes in the monetary base for Sri Lanka using data for the period 
1978-1996. The overall results from the estimations of the model also suggest that fiscal deficits 
affect growth positively, with a lag of 2 to 3 years. 
 
106 
 
share of real GDP per capita), imports (as a share of real GDP per capita), fiscal 
deficit and aid are used as the independent variables. The second equation 
estimates the indirect effect of fiscal deficit on economic growth through 
investment. This considers investment (as a share of real GDP per capita) as the 
dependent variable and real GDP per capita, inflation rate, real interest rate, fiscal 
deficit and population growth as independent variables. The estimated results 
suggest that fiscal deficit has a negative and significant impact on both economic 
growth and investment in the context of Pakistan. Following these results, the study 
concludes that fiscal deficit affects economic growth directly and indirectly through 
investment. 
 
In a similar study for Pakistan, Fatima et al. (2012) estimate the economic growth 
effect of budget deficit in Pakistan using time series data from the period 1978 to 
2009. To do this, the study measures the relationship between budget deficits and 
growth using a growth model regression where GDP represents the dependent 
variable and the independent variables include inflation, real exchange rate, real 
interest rate, budget deficit and gross investment. This study also finds that budget 
deficit has a negative and significant impact on economic growth in Pakistan. 
However, it should be noted that the authors fail to state clearly whether the data 
used for the dependent variable was nominal GDP or real GDP, hence raising a 
question mark on the validity of the results if nominal GDP rather than real GDP 
was used as the dependent variable. 
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To summarise the empirical evidence, it appears that the existing empirical 
evidence does not lead to any consensus concerning the impact of fiscal deficits on 
economic growth. As we have seen in the reviewed literature, the available studies 
report mixed results: some studies find that fiscal deficits have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on economic growth; others find that deficits have a 
negative and statistically significant impact on growth; and others even find 
insignificant results. 
 
However, the assessment of the reviewed empirical studies shows two issues which 
are worth noting. First, with very few exceptions, existing empirical studies do not 
attempt to develop evidence bearing directly on the three theoretical perspectives 
concerning the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth: Keynesian, 
Neoclassical and Ricardian. Thus, these studies generally provide informative 
estimates on the relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth which 
cannot be directly linked with particular theoretical proposition. Second, the 
empirical results on the relationship between deficits and economic growth seem 
to be sensitive to a number a number of factors such as model and econometric 
specifications, measurements of the variables, nature of the studied economies and 
time-period.  As a result, the estimates of the relationship between deficits and 
growth can be sensitive to all these factors, thus leading to mixed results.  In 
consideration of these features, therefore, one should be careful to conclude on 
the merits of the three theoretical propositions concerning the impact of fiscal 
defects on economic growth solely on the grounds of empirical evidence. 
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3.4 Policy Implications 
The literature we have reviewed raises a number of issues which have some 
important potential policy implications on the impact of fiscal deficits on economic 
growth in the context of developing countries, and therefore on our study. Some of 
the main potential implications are as discussed below. 
 
First, fiscal deficits have the potential to promote economic growth in developing 
countries given the fact that most of these countries are characterised with large 
amounts of unemployed and underemployed labour and other economic resources 
(that is, they operate far below a full employment level). As Nelson and Singh 
(1994, p.183) argue, given these economic conditions, these countries are most 
likely to be characterised with relatively elastic long run supply curves, thus 
allowing fiscal expansionary policy to have a significant impact on output and 
growth. 
 
Second, the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth is likely to depend on the 
size of the deficits as a percentage of GDP. Small fiscal deficits may be positively 
associated with economic growth, while larger deficits may be negatively 
associated with growth (i.e. the relationship between the two is likely to be non-
linear, or in other words, to have an inverted U shape).  
 
Third, the impact of fiscal deficits on growth is also likely to depend on how the 
deficits are financed. As discussed earlier, for example, under the Keynesian 
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scenario, fiscal deficits financed by monetary accommodation will most likely cause 
higher multiplier effects than bond-financed deficits. On the other hand, alternative 
ways of financing deficits can cause macroeconomic imbalances, which in turn may 
be detrimental to economic growth. Specifically, excessive money printing can 
cause high inflation; excessive foreign borrowing can cause foreign debt problems; 
domestic borrowing can push up domestic interest rates and thus cause crowding 
out problems; and excessive foreign reserve use can lead to capital flight and 
exchange crises. Indeed, deficit financing associated with these macroeconomic 
problems will most likely affect economic growth, especially in the long-run. 
 
Fourth, even where economies are operating in the short run, in which there is a 
room for deficit spending policy to promote output, the impact of deficits on 
economic growth will depend on what deficit financing is used for. In this case, 
running a deficit to finance government expenditures that increase productive 
capacity of the economy such as expenditures on infrastructure to enhance physical 
capital or spending on education and health to enhance human capital will most 
likely have a significant impact on economic growth. On the other hand, however, 
deficit spending associated with operations that are not complementary to the 
production process or wasteful government spending will have a negative or 
neutral impact on economic growth. 
 
Finally, with regard to the empirical estimation issue, it seems that empirical results 
can be sensitive to the issues like model and econometric specifications, and 
measurements of the variables used – among others. This implies that it is 
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important to consider these issues carefully in empirical estimation in order to 
produce accurate and reliable results. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has critically examined the existing theoretical and empirical literature 
on the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. Theoretical literature has 
shown that there are three contending views on this issue. Some economists 
believe that appropriately timed and used deficits can have a significant impact of 
economic growth. Others believe that deficits have little or no impact on economic 
growth and that they merely lead to crowding out problems. Those who support 
this viewpoint also tend to be concerned about the potential macroeconomic 
consequences of the ways in which fiscal deficits are financed – that excessive 
money printing can cause inflation, domestic borrowing can cause crowding out 
problems, foreign borrowing can result in debt crises and excessive use of foreign 
reserves can provoke capital flight and cause exchange crises. These 
macroeconomic problems can indeed be detrimental to economic growth. Finally, 
other economists believe that deficit spending policy is a matter of indifference, 
that it does not have any impact on economic growth.  
 
Following the assessment of these three main theoretical perspectives on the 
impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth, we argue that it is only the first two 
viewpoints, Keynesian and Neo-Classical, that offer the most important starting 
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point for an analysis of the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth, but with 
the two viewpoints representing two different aspects of fiscal policy; the short run 
and the long run, respectively. We dismiss the last theoretical perspective - the 
Ricardian viewpoint – on the grounds that it is based on the assumptions which are 
unrealistic and far from the reality. We further ague that even the Keynesian and 
Neo-Classical analysis mainly explains the level of output and output growth in the 
short-run rather than the long-run rate, while it is the endogenous growth models 
that provide mechanisms by which fiscal policy can affect the long-run growth rate 
of the economy. 
 
In the light of these theoretical contentions on the likely effect of deficits on 
economic growth, we also argue that the issue is ultimately an empirical one. 
However, it appears that the existing empirical evidence is also mixed. Some studies 
find results suggesting that deficits significantly stimulate economic growth. Others 
find that deficits exert a negative impact on economic growth. While some find that 
deficits have a positive or negative but statistically insignificant impact of growth. 
Thus, even the existing empirical evidence does not lead to any consensus about 
the impact of deficits on economic growth.  
 
Based on deduction from the reviewed literature, we argue that fiscal deficits are 
likely to have a significant impact on economic growth in developing countries, 
given the large amount of unemployed and underemployed labour and other 
economic resources that exist in most of these countries. However, it should be 
emphasised that it is not just fiscal deficits per se which matter in determining the 
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impact of deficits on growth.  Other factors – such as the size of the deficits as a 
percentage of GDP, the ways in which fiscal deficits are used, and what deficit 
financing is used for – are important too. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 
 
Chapter Four 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1 Introduction 
We have seen in chapter three that existing empirical literature on the relationship 
between fiscal deficits and economic growth shows mixed results. Some studies 
find a positive and statistically significant relationship. Others find positive or 
negative, but statistically insignificant results. Some find a negative and statistically 
significant relationship. Assessment of these studies has suggested that these 
results have resulted from differences in methodologies, particularly in the models 
and econometric specifications the studies have considered. 
 
The empirical literature also shows that two main types of empirical models have 
been used in estimating the relationship between deficits and growth. The first type 
estimates the relationship between the two using the so-called St. Louis equation 
and the second type uses the formulations and estimations of growth models. 
However, estimation of the St. Louis equation has received serious criticisms that it 
excludes some important explanatory variables that influence growth and suffers 
from a number of econometric problems. Following these criticisms of the St. Louis 
equation and the new developments in growth theory, many recent empirical 
studies that consider the growth impact of fiscal deficits have used the formulations 
and estimations of growth models. 
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However, some of the studies that use the estimations of growth models to assess 
the impact of deficits on growth also suffer from problems related to poor model 
formulation (model misspecification) and estimation. For instance, some studies fail 
to consider the government budget constraint (GBC)32 in their formulations and 
estimations of empirical models. These problems can lead to wrong estimations of 
the deficit-growth relationship.  Other studies suffer from econometric problems 
that can lead to underestimation or overestimation of the regression results. One 
important econometric problem has been the likely presence of endogeneity 
between economic growth and some of the explanatory variables.  
 
From the above, it is clear that careful design and implementation of an 
appropriate methodology is important in the assessment of the impact of fiscal 
deficits on economic growth. This chapter, therefore, is devoted to establishing the 
methodological framework that this study uses to assess the impact of fiscal deficits 
on growth in developing countries. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Following this introduction, Section 4.2 
discusses the theoretical perspectives that this study considers in estimation of the 
impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in developing countries. Section 4.3 
presents the empirical model and the estimation strategy that this study uses in the 
empirical application part to test key hypotheses on the deficit-growth connection 
established in Chapter Three. This empirical model is based on the theoretical 
perspectives introduced in Section 4.2 and recent developments in growth theory. 
                                                 
32 Which impose the requirement that a change in one magnitude has to be matched by offsetting 
changes elsewhere. 
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Section 4.4 discusses the data and data sources used in carrying out this study. 
Section 4.5 presents the econometric method chosen for this study and the reasons 
for choosing it. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Model 
By deduction from the existing literature on the deficit-growth link, we have argued 
in Chapter Three that fiscal deficits are likely to have an impact on economic growth. 
In particular, we have established that the economic growth impact of fiscal deficits 
will depend on the level of output relative to full employment output and the 
government budget constraint in the sense that the growth effect of fiscal deficits 
depends on composition of government expenditure within a limited government 
income.33  These are as discussed below. 
 
Output: 
 
We assume two distinct scenarios concerning the level of output relative to full 
employment output; short run and long run.  In the short run, when the economy is 
operating at low levels of output relative to full employment output, expansionary 
fiscal policy will have a significant impact on output growth. On the other hand, in 
the long run, when the economy is near full employment (or, at full employment), 
expansionary fiscal policy will have very little (or, no) impact on output.  These two 
scenarios can be derived algebraically using the IS-LM framework discussed in 
                                                 
33 This theoretical model follows the theoretical model used Adam and Bevan (2005), but with some 
modifications. 
116 
 
Chapter Three as follows (Goonewardena, 1998 pp. 88-90; Elias and Mutuku, 2014 
pp. 98-99): 
 
The IS curve (or, equilibrium in the goods market) is given as: 
 
   griytycy  )()( …………………………………………………………………… (4.1) 
 
Where; y is real output, c is consumption, i  is investment, g is government 
expenditure, t  is the rate of taxation, and r is the rate of interest. Consumption 
depends on disposable income, and investment depends on the rate of interest. 
The LM curve (or, equilibrium in the money market) is given as: 
 
 )()( rlyk
P
M 

 …………………………………………………………………………… (4.2) 
 
Where; 

M is a fixed amount of nominal money supply (exogenously determined by 
the monetary authorities), P is the average price level, k is the transactionary and 
precautionary demand for money, l  is the speculative demand for money, and 
y and r  are as defined above. Transactionary and precautionary demand for 
money depends on income, and the speculative demand for money depends on the 
rate of interest. 
 
Differentiating equation 4.1, we obtain: 
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 dgdridytcdgdridytdycdy  ')'1('')'(' …………………… (4.3) 
 
Differentiating equation 4.2, holding real money supply )(
P
M constant, we obtain: 
 dykdrl ''0          
  
So that, dy
l
kdr
'
'  …………………………………..……………………………………………… (4.4) 
 
Substituting equation 4.4 into equation 4.3, we obtain: 
 dgdy
l
kidytcdy 
'
'')'1('  ...……………………………………………………… (4.5) 
 
It follows from equation 4.5, therefore, that the fiscal policy multiplier is: 
 
 
'
'')'1('1
1
l
kitcdg
dy

 ………………………………………………………………. (4.6) 
 
Since )'1(' tc   is less than 1, and 
'
''
l
ki  is positive (note that; both 'i and 'l are 
negative, and 'k  is positive), the multiplier is positive. 
 
In the short run (Keynesian case), when the interest rate is low, the fiscal policy 
multiplier is significant [in the extreme Keynesian case, 0'i (i.e. investment is 
interest-inelastic) and, therefore,
)'1('1
1
tcdg
dy

 , giving  the full Keynesian 
effect]. 
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In the long run (Neoclassical case), when the interest rate is high, the fiscal policy 
multiplier is very low [In the extreme Neoclassical case, 0'l  (i.e. money demand is 
interest-inelastic) and therefore 
dg
dy   is zero]. 
 
The above analysis ignores the price effect resulting from expansionary fiscal policy.  
If prices increase when aggregate demand rises due to fiscal expansion, the size of 
the fiscal policy multiplier will be reduced, thus reducing the net increase in output. 
This will be due to at least one of the following consequences of price increase: 
 
(i) Higher prices will reduce the real value of the money stock, thus pushing 
equilibrium in the money market lower 
 
(ii) Higher prices will reduce the real value of the government debt held by 
the private sector, thus pushing equilibrium in the goods market lower. 
 
(iii) Higher prices will increase real tax revenue at each level of income, thus 
pushing equilibrium in the goods market lower. 
 
 
Government budget constraint: 
 
The government makes two types of expenditures; productive expenditure ( pg ) 
and unproductive expenditure ( ug ). Where, as defined earlier in Chapter Three, the 
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former represents expenditures that are complementary to the production process, 
raising the marginal productivity of private factors of production and thus 
enhancing growth, and the latter represents expenditures that, though increasing 
the household utility, do not directly affect production. 
 
So that, total government expenditure )(g  = up gg  ……………………………………… (4.7) 
 
Total government expenditure is financed using tax revenues, grants, domestic 
borrowing, external borrowing and monetisation (Sachs and Larrain, 1993; Adam 
and Bevan, 2005).   
 
The above gives the budget constraint: 
 
Government budget deficit = government expenditure – tax revenues + grants 
 
Where; government budget deficit = domestic borrowing + external borrowing + 
monetisation. 
 
This budget constraint provides the basis for partial analysis of the consequences of 
different budget components. Following Adam and Bevan (2005) and our discussion 
on deficit-growth link in Chapters Two and Three, we expect that: 
 
 An increase in tax or deficit spending to finance an increase in productive 
expenditure is most likely growth enhancing; 
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 An increase in tax to finance certain types of expenditure (termed 
unproductive expenditure in the literature) is always growth retarding, even 
though this might still enhance welfare by entering individual utility 
functions; 
 
 Increase in grant aid is growth enhancing if it is used to reduce taxes or 
increase productive spending. On the other hand, however, its growth effect 
is neutral if it is used to finance non-productive expenditure; 
 
 Financing deficits by domestic borrowing is most likely growth retarding. 
This is due to the likely crowding out effect of private investment when the 
government finances expansionary fiscal policy by borrowing from the 
domestic private sector; 
 
 Financing deficits by excessive foreign borrowing may lead to unsustainable 
levels of foreign debt, which can have detrimental effects on growth.  This 
form of deficit financing will create serious problems especially where funds 
are not invested in productive activities that generate sufficiently high rates 
of return in foreign exchange to service foreign debt; and, 
 
 The impact on growth of financing the budget deficit by monetisation is less 
straightforward. Monetisation may be inflationary, which is directly 
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detrimental to growth.34 However, the government can finance the deficit in 
this way without the cost of inflation if the increase in real output growth 
leads to an increase in the demand for money. If this is the case, then 
monetisation will most likely be growth enhancing. 
 
To summarise, this discussion suggests that the growth impact of expansionary 
fiscal policy depends on the level of output relative to full employment output. In 
the short run, if the economy is operating at low levels of output relative to full 
employment output, expansionary fiscal policy will most likely have a significant 
impact on output growth. On the other hand, in the long run, when the economy is 
near full employment, expansionary fiscal policy will have very little impact on 
output.  The discussion has also suggested that the deficit-growth connection will 
also depend on the government budget constraint (i.e. the composition of 
government expenditure and the ways fiscal deficits are financed). To examine this, 
the discussion has identified two types of government expenditure (i.e., productive 
expenditure and unproductive expenditure) and the five ways of financing it (taxes, 
grants, domestic borrowing, external borrowing and monetisation) and discussed 
the potential consequences of these different components of the government 
budget constraint.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Monetisation will most likely be inflationary when the monetary expansion resulting from money 
creation is higher than the level that the private sector wishes to hold (Weiss, 1995) 
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4.3 Empirical Model and Estimation Strategy 
Our empirical model is based on the theoretical model presented above, which is 
then embedded in an endogenous growth model along the lines of the model of 
government and growth due to Barro (1990), Sala-i-Martin (1990), and Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995, 2004). In particular, the model takes the following 
general form35:   
 
 itititit uWXgy  ''   ………………………………………………………………… (4.8) 
 With ittiitu          
  
Where;  
 gy  is average GDP growth; 
 X   is a vector consisting of the elements of the government budget constraint (tax 
        revenue, non-tax revenue, grants, expenditure, and fiscal deficit); 
W    is a vector of control variables (consisting of the initial income, population 
        growth rate, the level of investment, the inflation rate, the degree of openness,  
        and the degree of financial deepening). 
 
                                                 
35 Note that different versions of this empirical model are estimated in Chapter Six to test the key 
hypotheses on the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth we established in Chapter Three. The 
first version examines the general relationship between fiscal deficits on economic growth. It also 
considers both the fiscal deficit variable and its square variable in the right hand side of the equation 
to test whether the relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth is non-linear. The 
second version replaces the fiscal deficit variable by its sources of financing, domestic financing and 
foreign financing variables, to check whether the impact of fiscal deficits on growth depends on how 
the deficits are financed. The third version disaggregates the total government expenditure, 
considering both economic classification and functional classification, to examine whether the 
impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth depends on the composition of government 
expenditure. 
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Equation (4.8) is a standard fixed effects panel data model. Countries are indexed 
by i , time, defined in terms of five-year periods, by t , and itu  is a two-way error 
term with i denoting time-invariant country-specific effects, t  common time-
varying effects, it  the idiosyncratic  error component, and    and   parameters 
to be determined by the data.  
 
The expected relationships between the elements of the government budget 
constraint and economic growth are as discussed in the theoretical model above 
(see section 4.2). As far as the control variables are concerned, inclusion of the 
initial income variable in our model follows the argument in the neo-classical 
growth literature that countries with lower initial income would be expected to 
grow faster in the transitional stages of development as they catch up (with richer 
countries) to the steady state growth path - the so-called “conditional convergence 
hypothesis” (Nelson and Singh, 1994; Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
2004; Roberts, 2006 – among others).  Various empirical Studies such as Landau 
(1983), Kormendi (1985), Hopper and Marquez (1995), and Roberts (1999) provide 
evidence in support of this hypothesis as they find a strong negative and statistically 
significant effect of initial income on economic growth. On this basis, therefore, 
inclusion of the initial income variable in our empirical model tests the possibility 
that the sample of developing countries considered in this study experienced 
conditional convergence during the sample period. 
 
Neo-classical growth theory also predicts that physical capital accumulation and the 
expansion in the labour force play the crucial role in determining economic growth 
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(Harrod, 1948, 1963; Domar, 1957; Mankiw, 2007). Thus, to account for these 
factors, we follow the standard practice in the empirical literature and include the 
level of investment (measured as a percentage of GDP) and population growth (a 
proxy for the growth of labour force) variables in our empirical model to capture 
the impact of capital accumulation and the expansion of the labour supply on 
growth, respectively. It is also worth noting that, as Nelson and Singh (1994), citing 
Feder (1983) points out, the population growth variable can also be used to 
ascertain whether there is a labour surplus situation, and if such a situation exists, 
whether it has a deterrent or positive effect on economic growth in developing 
countries.  
 
Economic theory also suggests that macroeconomic stability is another important 
determinant of economic growth (Fischer, 1993; Hausman and Gavin, 1996, 2004; 
Agenor, 2004; Fuentes, Larraine and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2006 – among others). A 
variable that is commonly employed in empirical growth models to control for this 
is the inflation rate, i.e., the rate of change of consumer prices; for, this is generally 
considered as a good indicator of the quality of fiscal and monetary policy Fischer, 
1993; Agenor, 2004; Fuentes, Larraine and Schmidt-Hebbel; 2006). According to the 
literature, low and stable inflation is seen as good for growth, while high and 
volatile inflation is regarded as bad for growth (Fischer, 1993; Frankel, 1998; 
Fuentes, Larraine and Schmidt-Hebbel; 2006). Along these lines, therefore, we 
include the inflation rate as a variable in our empirical model to control for 
macroeconomic stability.  
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Openness to international trade (or trade liberalisation) is another factor that has 
been regarded by many, in both academic and policy-making spheres, as one of the 
most important influences on economic growth. Theoretical literature posits a 
number of channels through which openness to international trade affects 
economic growth. One explanation for the theoretical relationship between the 
degree of openness to international trade and growth is in terms of comparative 
advantage; that is, participation in international trade leads to specialisation and 
economies of scale, which in turn can lead to economic growth (Andersen and 
Babula, 2008; David, 2007). This explanation of the openness-growth link is 
therefore associated with the reallocation of resources (and hence more efficient 
use of existing resources) within the national borders determined by exogenous 
differences between countries given by factor endowments. However, research on 
endogenous growth theory (which incorporates endogeneity of technical change) 
since the mid-1980s, offers another explanation of the openness-growth link that 
openness to international trade allows countries to import technological innovation 
(or helps countries to speed up technological progress), which in turn increases 
total factor productivity and promotes growth (Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991; 
Rossman and Helpman, 1991; Andersen and Babula, 2008).  
 
Developments in the theoretical literature on the openness-growth link have 
spawned an extensive empirical literature on this issue - such as Dollar (1992) 
Edwards (1992, 1998), Sachs and Warner (1995), Frankel and Romer (1999), Dollar 
and Kraay (2003, 2004) and Winters (2004), among others - with most of these 
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studies finding evidence in support of the theory.36 On this basis, therefore, a 
number of recent empirical studies on economic growth – see for example Edwards 
(1992, 1998), Frankel and Romer (1999), Dollar and Kraay (2000, 2001) - have 
incorporated an openness variable to account for the influence of the degree of 
openness to international trade on economic growth. Hence, a degree of openness 
variable measured as a ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, which has been widely 
used in the literature and for which data are easily available, is included in our 
empirical model.37 
 
Finally, a degree of financial deepening variable is included in our empirical model 
based on the argument in the literature that a well-developed financial system can 
play a significant role in promoting economic growth (World Bank, 1989; Levine and 
Renelt, 1992; Levine and Zervos, 1993; King and Levine, 1993; Fry, 1995; Levine, 
1997, Agenor, 2004; Levine 2005 – among others). According to the endogenous 
growth literature, a well-developed financial system can promote economic growth 
permanently though a number of channels. For instance, developed financial 
                                                 
36 It should be noted, however, that the important question of whether openness influences growth 
is far from settled in the empirical literature; for a number of the studies that find a positive and 
significant impact of openness on growth have been subject to an important criticism in terms of 
robustness of the results. In particular, the main criticism has come from Edwards (1993) and 
Rodriguez and Rodrick (1999, 2000) who argue that results in favour of openness might have arisen 
from problems related to the use of flawed indicators/measures of openness used and/or model 
misspecification.   
37 Note that there are various measures of the degree of openness to international trade which have 
been employed in the existing empirical literature. These can be classified into four broad 
categories: First, trade volume measures - also known as trade intensity measures - including X/GDP, 
M/GDP, or (X+M)/GDP. Second, direct trade policy measures including tariff rates, non-tariff barriers 
on imports and black market premium for the exchange rate. Third, trade diversion measures that 
basically show the difference between predicted and actual trade. These measures, therefore, 
estimate the overall level of trade protectionism. Fourth, subjective measures such as the real 
exchange rate distortion index suggested by Dollar (1992) and a dummy variable for openness 
measure suggested by Sachs and Warner (1995) – also known as the SW dummy variable – that 
presents a single openness measure covering all major forms of trade restrictions such as non-tariff 
barriers, average tariff rate, black market premium for exchange rate, and state monopoly on major 
exports (David, 2007; Andersen and Babula, 2008; Ulasan, 2012). 
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markets promote the levels of savings and investment in an economy by allowing 
economic agents with surplus financial resources (savers) to earn a return on their 
savings, and economic agents with financial deficits to borrow some funds that 
would otherwise be difficult to get. In doing so, the financial sector can contribute 
to economic growth by mobilising savings and channelling them towards productive 
capital investments.38 In addition, well-developed financial markets help economic 
agents to minimise and diversify risks by saving their financial resources in different 
financial instruments. Finally, developed financial markets allow a more efficient 
allocation of resources across the different users (people and institutions) in the 
economy (Pagano, 1993; Levine, 1997, 2005; Loayza and Rancière, 2004; FitzGerald, 
2006). Indeed, if this were true, then one would expect a well-developed financial 
system to play a key role in promoting economic growth.  
 
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence with respect to this issue is still mixed and not 
as straightforward as the theoretical literature suggests. Some empirical studies (for 
instance, King and Levine, 1993; Levine et al., 2000; Beck et al., 2000) provide 
support for a positive impact of financial deepening. Some studies (such as De 
Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995; Demetrides and Hussein, 1996; Adic and Damar, 2006; 
Loayza and Rancière, 2004) find that financial deepening has a negative impact on 
economic growth. Yet other studies (including Rousseau and Wachtel, 2002, 2011; 
Deidda and Fattouh, 2002; Yilmazkuday, 2011) find that financial deepening has no 
significant impact on economic growth. As Panizza (2013, p. 6) points out, however, 
                                                 
38 According to Agenor (2004, p. 49), for instance, financial deepening leads to improvement in 
financial intermediation, hence leading to a reduction in the cost of intermediation and therefore 
increase in the return to saving. At the same time, the increased efficiency in the process of financial 
intermediation leads to an expansion of investment, which stimulates the rate of economic growth. 
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further analysis of the empirical literature suggests that, while some of empirical 
studies that find a negative or insignificant impact of financial depth on economic 
growth do not challenge the general consensus in the theoretical literature that 
financial depth can promote growth, most of these studies show that the expected 
positive relationship between the financial sector development and growth may 
not hold in economies characterised with high macroeconomic instability  and weak 
institutions. 39  It follows, therefore, that financial deepening (or financial 
development in general) may promote growth under certain conditions such as the 
existence of strong institutions and macroeconomic stability. In the light of these 
findings in the literature, we incorporate a financial deepening variable in our 
empirical model to account for the influence of financial deepening (or financial 
development in broad terms) on economic growth in the sample of developing 
countries considered in this study. To measure the degree of financial deepening in 
our study, we use the ratio of broad money supply (M2) to GDP, which is widely 
used in the literature (FitzGerald, 2006).40 Data for this variable are also easily 
available as compared to data on the other indicators of financial development - 
which can be difficult to get. 
 
                                                 
39  For example, Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) and Yilmazkuday (2011) show that financial 
development does not have a significant impact on growth in countries with high inflation. In 
addition, Deidda and Fattouh (2002) find that financial development has no statistically significant 
impact on growth in countries with small financial sectors. Furthermore, Arestis and Demetriades 
(1997) and Demetriades & Law (2006) find that financial development is not likely to affect growth 
in countries with poor institutions. While De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) argue that the negative 
impact of financial sector development on growth they find for a sample of Latin American countries 
during the 1970s may have been attributed to poor regulation and deposit insurance policies these 
countries experienced during the sample period.  
40 Several other indicators of financial development which have been used in the literature include 
bank credit to the private sector (as a ratio of GDP), the level of stock market activity (usually 
measured by the turnover rate or the ratio of traded value to GDP) and some features of the legal 
system (such as the level of shareholder and creditor protection (FitzGerald, 2006, p. 6). 
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It should be noted that we are aware of the importance of governance variable in 
determining growth. This is well documented in the governance-economic growth 
literature (see, among others, Mauro, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Clague, 1997; 
Knack, 2002, 2003; Feng, 2003; Kaufmann and Kraay, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2004; 
Chauvet and Collier, 2004). However, this variable has been omitted from our 
empirical model mainly because of the lack of data on this variable for the large 
part of our sample period for developing countries. Note that, as Campos and 
Nugent (1999) and Kaufmann et al. (1999) argue, governance is a multidimensional 
issue, thus requiring various measures for each dimension. Kaufmann et al. (1999), 
for example, measure governance using six different dimensions/indicators of 
governance:  government effectiveness, voice and accountability, political stability 
and violence, rule of law and quality of institutions, corruption, and quality of 
regulation. Following this definition and measure of governance by Kaufman et al. 
(1999) the World Bank has developed the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
database which has been used as the main source of aggregate and individual 
governance indicators for over 215 countries since the year 1996 (World Bank, 
2014). Unfortunately, the fact that these data are only available from the mid-
1990s makes it difficult to use them for our study, for using these would give us 
only one data point and thus dropping the number of observations in our dataset 
drastically. Besides, data for most of the governance indicator variables tend to be 
constant or change very little over time hence making it practically difficult to use 
when employing the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator that uses first 
differenced data which we are using in this study.41 
                                                 
41 Note that this estimation method is discussed later in this chapter. 
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We are also aware of some major economic and global crises that occurred during 
our sample period and that would, therefore, have had an impact on economic 
growth performance on the sample of developing we are considering in this study. 
This impact can be captured by including time dummies in our empirical model. 
However, note that these dummies would be removed from our model when 
applying the Arellano and Bond (1991) first-differenced GMM we are using in our 
study. Thus, no time dummies are included in our study because of this problem. 
 
Turning to the estimation strategy, it was hypothesised in Chapter Three that the 
impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth depends on the following three 
factors: (i) the size of deficits as a percentage of GDP (i.e., the relationship is non-
linear), (ii) what deficit financing is used for (i.e., the composition of government 
expenditure) and, (iii) the ways in which deficits are financed. To examine these 
hypotheses, our empirical analysis proceeds in the following four ways. First, we 
investigate whether the data suggest the existence of a non-linear relationship 
between fiscal deficits and growth using a scatter plot of average annual GDP 
growth against the fiscal deficits for the sample of countries used in our study. This 
gives only tentative evidence on the nature of the relationship between the two 
variables. Second, we examine the role of the fiscal deficits on economic growth by 
estimating the growth regression model given in equation (4.8) above. Third, in line 
with equation (4.8), we replace aggregate government expenditure by 
disaggregated expenditures to examine whether the composition of government 
expenditure matters in determining the impact of fiscal deficits on growth. Finally, 
again in line with equation (4.8), we substitute the deficit for its financing to test 
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whether the ways fiscal deficits are financed matters in determining the growth 
impact of deficits. In all these cases, we test for the existence of non-linearity in the 
relationships, particularly on the relationship between deficits and the average 
annual GDP growth.  
  
 
4.4 Data and Data Sources 
 
The International Monetary Fund’s Government Finance Statistics (IMF’s GFS) and 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WB’s WDI) served as the major 
sources of data for our study42. The selection of these sources of data for our study 
was based on the fact that the cross-country macroeconomic data compiled by the 
IMF and the World Bank are the best set of statistical data available for economic 
analysis, especially for developing countries.  
 
However, as has been well recognised, documented, and discussed in many studies 
that have used data from the IMF and the World Bank (Nelson and Singh, 1994: 
Gemmel et al, 2007: Benos, 2009: among others), these sources of data are not 
without some limitations. Some of these limitations are:  
 
(i) Sometimes non-reporting of data and/or lack of data on some variables; 
                                                 
42 Most of the data from these sources were collected from the Economic and Social Data Service 
(ESDS) database - a UK national data service jointly run by Manchester Information and Associated 
Services (MIMAS) at Manchester University and the UK Data Archive (UKDA) at Essex University, the 
IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks, and the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators electronic database. 
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(ii) Differences in accounting concepts and methods followed by countries 
in reporting data and, sometimes, reporting of data using different 
definitions of variables; and,  
 
(iii) Changes in the methodology of construction and classification of 
variables, and therefore in the reporting of data - for instance, changes 
in the methodology of construction and the classification of fiscal data in 
the IMF’s GFS in 2001 (IMF, 2001) - (see Appendix E for summaries of 
these methodological changes in the construction and classification of 
data on fiscal variables in the IMF’s GFS since 2001). 
 
All these data problems affected both the sample of developing countries and the 
sample period we could consider in our study. Data problems in terms of non-reporting 
of data, lack of data on some variables and the use of narrow definitions of fiscal 
variables by some of the countries made it possible to get data for only a small but 
representative sample of thirty-one developing countries for our study (see Appendix F 
for the full list of these countries). This sample includes 9 Low Income economies, 13 
Lower Middle Income economies, and 9 Upper Middle Income economies, and covers 
four different regions:  Asia and the Pacific (9 countries), Latin America and the 
Caribbean (9 countries), Middle East and North Africa (5 countries), and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (8 countries). In terms of the sample period, changes in the methodology of 
construction and classification of fiscal variables in the IMF’s Government Finance 
Statistics (our primary source of fiscal data) in 2001  and poor availability of data based 
on the new methodology (see Appendix E for summaries of these methodological 
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changes in the construction and classification of data on fiscal variables in the IMF’s 
GFS and discussion of problems associated with data availability from the year 2001) 
restricted the sample period we could consider in the empirical part of our study to 
only the period 1972-2001.43 Despite this limitation, we believe that the policy 
implications drawn from the result based on this dataset will still be relevant for the 
period after 2001, given the general current trends in most of the variables we 
consider in this study.   
 
 
4.5 Econometric Method 
The last few decades have seen several important developments in econometric 
methods used in estimating dynamic growth models44.  
 
According to the literature, earlier empirical studies on economic growth (See, for 
example, Landau, 1983; Ram, 1986; Romer, 1986; Barro, 1991; and, Nelson and 
Singh, 1994) widely used cross-section regressions that estimated average data for 
two to three decades for a sample of countries. These studies estimated 
regressions of the following general form (Hsiao, 2003): 
 
                                                 
43 These changes in the methodology of construction and classification of fiscal data by the IMF are 
discussed in detail in the Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 (GFSM 2001). This manual is 
also available in the soft copy on the IMF website: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/pdf/all.pdf. As mentioned in the discussion above, 
Appendix E summarises these methodological changes in the construction and classification of fiscal 
data by the IMF. 
44 These developments have been well summarised and discussed by Hsiao (2003) 
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Where; 0,iy  and tiy ,  are the natural logarithms of GDP or GDP per capita at the 
beginning and the end of the studied period, respectively, so that 
t
yi  corresponds 
to the average GDP or GDP per capita growth rate over the studied period. The 
subscript i  denotes a given country, while x  corresponds to a set of explanatory 
variables other than the initial level of GDP or GDP per capita. Finally,   represents 
an error term. 
 
However, many recent studies on growth empirics in both developed and 
developing countries (See, for example, Mankiw et al. (1992), Levin and Renelt 
(1992), Fischer (1993), Adam and Bevan (2005), among others) seem to favour 
more the estimation of dynamic growth models using a panel data framework 
(Hsiao, 2003). Interest among macroeconomists to use the panel data approach has 
been partly generated by availability of macroeconomic data for large panels of 
countries (Bond et al., 2001; Hsiao, 2003). In addition, a panel data framework has 
some important advantages over cross-section regressions in studying economic 
growth. These advantages have been discussed in Judson and Owen (1996), Hsiao 
(1986, 2003), Bond et al. (2001), Wansbeek (2001) and Baltagi (2008) – among 
others. Some of these advantages are; first, the use of a panel data framework 
normally allows one to get a larger number of data points, more informative data 
and degrees of freedom in comparison to the cross-section approach. As pointed 
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out earlier in Chapter One (see section 1.5), this is especially important in a study 
like ours, given the problem of data availability on a number of variables considered 
in our empirical model. As discussed earlier, data for many economic variables, 
especially fiscal variables, are not consistently available for many developing 
countries, thus making it difficult to get a reasonably large and good time-series or 
cross-sectional data set to use in the empirical analysis. Using a panel data set, 
however, can help to minimise this problem. Second, while cross-section studies 
are likely to suffer from the omitted variable bias problem, by using panel data 
analysis it is possible to control for it. Third, a panel data approach gives more 
variability and less collinearity among the explanatory variables, thus making it 
more likely to produce more efficient coefficient estimates. Finally, the use of panel 
data analysis allows one to control for the likely endogeneity of one or more 
explanatory variables, and measurement error, by using lags of regressors as 
instruments where needed (Hsiao, 1986, 2003; Bond et al., 2001; Wansbeek, 2001; 
Baltagi, 2008 – among others). 
 
Within the panel data framework, ordinary least squares (OLS) and the fixed-effects 
using least squares dummy variables (LSDV) estimation techniques have been 
widely used in studying economic growth. However, these estimation techniques 
have been criticised that they produce biased estimates when employed to 
estimate dynamic growth models, like ours, since in this kind of model the 
unobserved country-specific effects are more likely to be correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable, which is one of the explanatory variables (Hsiao, 1986, 2003; 
Kiviet, 1995; Judson and Owen, 1996 – among others).  
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Several alternative estimation techniques have been developed to address this 
problem. One of the proposed procedures to eliminate the unobserved country-
specific effects involves first-differencing the model (Hsiao, 1986, 2003). To 
illustrate this procedure, let a growth equation - including country-specific effects - 
be expressed as follows (Hsiao, 2003): 
 
   ,,,11 '1 tiitiititit xyyy     ………………………………………… (4.10) 
 
Where i  denotes the unobserved country-specific effects while the other 
variables are as defined earlier. 
 
By taking first-differences, this equation becomes; 
 
      11,,211 '   itittitiitititit xxyyyy   …………..……. (4.11) 
 
As equation 4.11 shows, the unobserved country-specific effects have been 
removed by first-differencing the model. However, this procedure is not without 
limitations. For example, given that the error term is correlated with the first-
differenced lagged dependent variable through the contemporaneous terms in 
period 1t , the OLS estimates will still be biased (Hsiao, 2003). 
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Another proposed procedure to eliminate the unobserved country-specific effects 
involves the use of the so-called within group (WG) estimator. This estimator first 
transforms the above equation as follows (Hsiao, 2003): 
 
      iititiititiit xxyyyy    ,1,1 ' ……………………………… (4.12) 
 
Where; iy  is the time series means of y  for country i . 
 
This transformed equation is then estimated using the OLS method. However, as 
Nickel (1981) argues, since  1,1 itit yy   and  iit    are correlated, the within 
group estimates will also be biased even, though N  is large, when T  is small 
(Nickel, 1981). Furthermore, according to Hsiao (1986, 2003), the within group 
estimate of   is likely to be biased downward, while the OLS estimate level of this 
coefficient is biased upward. 
 
Besides the problem related to the unobserved country-specific effects discussed 
above, there is another potential problem of the likely presence of endogeneity of 
one or more of the explanatory variables in empirical growth studies. 
 
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose an instrumental variable procedure that 
overcomes these problems. This method first-differences the model to eliminate 
the unobserved country-specific effects and the variables for which only cross-
country information is available, and then employs 2,  tiy (or simply 2ty ) as an 
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instrument for 1,  tiy . Under the assumption that the error term of the differenced 
equation is not serially correlated, these instruments will not be correlated 
with 1,,,  tititi  . 
 
Furthermore, Arellano and Bond (1991) argue that it is possible to gain efficiency by 
including additional instruments obtained using the orthogonality conditions that 
exist between lagged values of the dependent variable and the disturbances ti, . 
They propose a general method of moments (GMM), which, like the instrumental 
variables method proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982), uses first-differences to 
eliminate the unobserved country-specific effects and the variables for which only 
cross-sectional information is available. This is expressed as follows: 
 
      11211   itititititititit xxyyyy   ……………………… (4.13) 
 
As discussed above, the error term in this equation might be correlated with the 
differenced lagged dependent variable by construction, hence making the OLS 
estimates of   inconsistent even when the set of variables x is strictly exogenous. 
However, if the error term is not serially correlated, instrumenting for 
211   ititit yyy  will produce consistent estimates. Hence, Arellano and Bond 
show that values of the dependent variable lagged two or more periods are valid 
instruments in the first-differentiated equation. In other words, 2ty , 3ty ,…, Tty   
are valid instruments for 211   ititit yyy  under the assumptions that the error 
term in the differentiated equation is not serially correlated - that is,   0, isitE   
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for ts   - and that 0( 1 tiiyE   for .2t  If there is any strict exogenous variable 
in the equation,   0isti vxE  for all ,, ts  then all the past, present and future values 
of itx  are valid instruments in all of the differenced equations, even if this variable 
is correlated with the effects. Finally, some of the explanatory variables in the 
equation can be predetermined in the sense that the error term in the past affects 
the current value of the variable,   0isitvxE  for s < t , but current and future 
values of the error term do not affect the current value of the variable,   0isitvxE  
for ts  . If this is the case, the values of the predetermined variables lagged one 
period or more are valid instruments in the first-difference equation. 
 
The consistency of the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimators depends on 
whether the instruments used in the difference equations are valid or not. To fulfil 
this requirement, it is necessary that the error term is not serially correlated at 
second-order – that is,   02  itit vvE . To address this issue, Arellano and Bond 
(1991) suggest two specifications tests that are commonly used within the GMM 
framework; first, the test that evaluates the hypothesis for lack of second-order 
serial correlation in the differenced residuals; and, second, the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of the instruments. 
 
To provide empirical evidence to support their argument, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
compare the performance of the Anderson and Hsiao estimator against various 
GMM procedures using a Monte Carlo approach and find that the GMM estimators 
produce substantial efficiency gains. However, in a later study, Kiviet (1995) uses a 
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slightly different experimental design to compare the Anderson and Hsiao 
estimator and various GMM estimators and finds that the Anderson and Hsiao 
estimator compares favourably with GMM estimators. Thus, based on these 
findings, Kiviet (1995) concludes that no estimator technique has been found to the 
most appropriate choice in all situations. This conclusion by Kiviet (1995) is 
supported by the findings in a later study by Judson and Owen (1996), in which it is 
found that the best estimation technique changes with the size of the panel.  
 
Further developments of the GMM estimator have been made recently. For 
example, in an attempt to look for even more efficient GMM estimators, studies by 
Ahn and Schmidt (1995), Arellano and Bover (1995) and, Blundel and Bond (1998) 
have proposed to incorporate some additional moment conditions. However, this 
procedure is not recommended by Hsiao (2003) who argues that, while it is possible 
in theory to add additional moment conditions to improve the asymptotic efficiency 
of GMM, it is doubtful how much efficiency gain one can achieve by using a very 
large number of moment conditions in a small sample. Hsiao (2003) further argues 
that, if higher-moment conditions are used, the estimator can be very sensitive to 
outlying observations. 
 
Judson and Owen (1999) run a Monte Carlo experiment to evaluate different 
estimation techniques, including the ones we have discussed above. Based on the 
results, they recommend using the Arellano and Bond first-differenced estimator 
for dynamic panel data models when T is small ( 10T ), which is a feature of our 
dataset. In another study, Shioji (2001) favours using the Arellano and Bond first-
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differenced estimator for dynamic panel data models. Shioji argues that those 
methods that eliminate the average cross sectional variations from data, either by 
first-differencing (the Arellano and Bond estimator) or by using dummies (LSDV or 
the so-called corrected LSDV developed by Kiviet (1995)) are much more reliable 
than the GMM estimator proposed by Blundel and Bond (1998). In Shioji’s view, 
when instruments are weak, the Blundel and Bond estimator, which involves 
equations in levels form, perhaps cannot properly handle the endogeneity problem. 
 
Based on the discussion above, therefore, the first-differenced Arellano and Bond 
estimator seems to be the best estimation technique to use in our study. Hence, we 
use this estimator for various scenarios of model estimation in the empirical part of 
our study.  
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed a methodological framework that our study implements 
in examining the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in developing 
countries. It first presented discussion of the theoretical framework that this study 
considers in analysing the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. This 
framework has established that the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth 
depends on the level of output relative to full employment output. It also depends 
on the composition of government expenditure and the ways fiscal deficits are 
financed. This theoretical framework is then embedded in an endogenous growth 
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model along the lines of the model of government and growth due to Barro (1990), 
Sala-i-Martin (1990), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995, and 2004) to set up 
an empirical model that will be used in the empirical application (Chapter Six) to 
assess the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in developing countries.  
Following this the discussion has presented issues related to data and data sources 
considered for this study. 
 
Furthermore, the discussion has highlighted two important econometric issues that 
need to be dealt with in estimations of macroeconomic panel data models. These 
are the presence of country-specific effects and the likely endogeneity of some of 
the explanatory variables in the model. Based on the analysis of how various 
estimation approaches address, or fail to address, these problems, it has been 
established in the discussion that the first-differenced Arellano and Bond (1991) 
GMM estimation approach provides a better tool to use in our study.  
 
However, before proceeding to estimating the growth regression model in Chapter 
Six, the next chapter provides a quantitative descriptive analysis of the trends of the 
major variables considered in the empirical model.  
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Chapter Five 
 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE TRENDS IN FISCAL DEFICITS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapter has discussed, among other things, the theoretical model 
explaining the relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth. Using this 
theoretical model, the empirical model followed in this study to examine the 
relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth in developing countries was 
also discussed, taking into account some of the control variables commonly used in the 
existing empirical literature on economic growth. Before we estimate this empirical 
model in Chapter Six, this chapter analyses the trends of the major variables included 
in the model - including fiscal deficits, economic growth and some of the control 
variables. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows. Following this introductory section, section 5.2 
analyses the trends in fiscal deficits.  Section 5.3 analyses the trends in economic 
growth. Section 5.4 analyses the trends in government expenditure and its composition. 
Section 5.5 examines whether the trends in fiscal deficits and government expenditure 
suggest any relationship between these two and economic growth. Section 5.6 
analyses the trends in some of the control variables that are included in our empirical 
model to examine the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in developing 
countries. Finally, section 5.7 concludes.  
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Before turning to the analysis, however, it is important to point out the following two 
important issues. First, as discussed earlier in Chapter Four, data for most of the 
variables included in the model, especially consolidated fiscal data, are not consistently 
available for many of the developing countries. Given this problem, a small but 
representative sample of only thirty-one developing countries is used to analyse the 
impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in developing countries. Our analysis in 
this chapter, therefore, employs these data from the sample of thirty-one countries to 
analyse the trends in fiscal deficits, economic growth and other macroeconomic 
variables included in our empirical model. The analysis considers data for the whole 
sample of thirty-one countries. In addition, it considers data for the four different 
regions represented in the sample - Asia and the Pacific (9 countries), Latin America 
and the Caribbean (9 countries), Middle East and North Africa (5 countries), and Sub-
Saharan Africa (8 countries) – separately in order to examine whether there are any 
significant regional differences in terms of the trends in the major variables included in 
our empirical model. 
 
Second, our analysis in this chapter concentrates only on descriptive statistics/analysis, 
and does not deal with the issues related to causality and/or lags. These issues are 
dealt with later in Chapter Six. This decision is taken bearing in mind that the 
methodology that we follow in the analysis in this chapter cannot easily address these 
issues, and that these issues can be addressed better when performing regression 
analysis, which is the focus of our analysis in Chapter Six. 
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5.2 Trends in Fiscal Deficits  
 
It was argued in Chapter Three that the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth 
depends not only on the size of fiscal deficits, but also on how the deficits are financed. 
It is important therefore that, when analysing the trends of fiscal deficits in developing 
countries, we consider not only the trends in total fiscal deficits but also how these 
deficits are financed. Thus, this section analyses the trends in both total fiscal deficits 
and deficit financing.  
 
5.2.1 Total Fiscal Deficits 
 
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 show the trend in fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP for the 
entire set of developing countries and different regions considered in this study. On 
average, fiscal deficits for the entire set of countries in the study increased from 4.26 
percent of GDP in 1972-1976 to 5.29 percent in 1982-1986. Thereafter, the level of 
total fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP decreased sharply to only 2.15 percent of 
GDP during 1997-2001.  This reduction in the level of fiscal deficits from the mid-1980s 
may be explained by the macroeconomic reforms (such as tax reforms, public 
expenditure reduction – among others) that most of the developing countries have 
widely implemented since the mid-1980s. 
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Table 5.1: Deficit as a percentage of GDP by region, 1972-2001 
 
Region 1972-2001 1972-1976 1977-1981 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 
Asia and the Pacific 4.26 4.47 5.44 5.74 4.29 2.50 3.18 
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.70 2.60 2.14 3.17 0.75 0.10 1.58 
Middle East and North Africa 4.98 7.05 8.65 8.11 3.68 1.41 1.54 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.27 4.16 5.40 5.43 5.73 2.81 2.14 
All Developing Countries (31) 3.63 4.26 4.98 5.29 3.53 1.67 2.15 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics 
  Yearbooks (various issues) 
 
Similar to the whole set of countries considered in the study, on average, the level of 
fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP in all four regions decreased from the mid-1980s. 
The highest decrease corresponds to the Middle East and North Africa region. This 
region reduced the level of deficit from about 8.11 percent of GDP in 1982-1986 to 
about 1.54 percent in 1997-2001. On the other hand, Asia and the Pacific reduced the 
level of deficit the least, with the deficit in this region falling from 5.74 percent of GDP 
in 1982-1986 to only 3.18 percent in 1997-2001. The other two regions, Latin America 
and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa managed to reduce their respective levels of 
deficit from 3.17 and 5.43 percent of GDP in 1982-1986 to 1.58 and 2.14 percent in 
1997-2001. 
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Figure 5.1 
Fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP, 1972-2001
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics 
  Yearbooks (various issues) 
 
 
5.1.2 Deficit Financing 
 
Fiscal deficit financing varied considerably over the period 1972-2001 (see Table 5.2). 
For the set of developing countries as a whole, foreign financing was the main source 
of deficit financing during the 1970s. However, this changed from the early 1980s and 
domestic financing became the main source of deficit financing.  
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Table 5.2: Deficit financing as a percentage of total deficit by region, 1972-2001 
 
Financing 1972-2001 1972-1976 1977-1981 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 
 
Asia and the Pacific 
Domestic Financing 73.77 59.53 55.57 57.92 109.04 87.96 53.89 
Foreign Financing 26.23 40.47 44.43 42.08 -9.04 12.04 46.11 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Domestic Financing -58.11 7.72 -737.01 61.57 409.29 14.49 99.37 
Foreign Financing 158.11 92.28 837.01 38.43 -309.29 85.51 0.63 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Middle East and North Africa 
Domestic Financing 65.68 17.56 58.17 72.75 79.09 68.08 124.20 
Foreign Financing 34.32 82.44 41.83 27.25 20.91 31.92 -24.20 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Domestic Financing -18.81 76.23 39.79 89.57 -352.41 36.20 60.78 
Foreign Financing 118.81 23.77 60.21 10.43 452.41 63.80 39.22 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
All Developing Countries (31) 
Domestic Financing 9.38 41.06 -202.76 68.23 75.18 49.92 78.65 
Foreign Financing 90.62 58.94 302.76 31.77 24.82 50.08 21.35 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics 
  Yearbooks (various issues) 
 
Across the different regions, Asia and the Pacific and Middle East and North Africa 
regions depended largely on domestic sources of deficit financing during the entire 
period. Domestic financing in these regions was 73.77 percent and 65.68 percent of the 
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total deficit, respectively, over the period 1972-2001. In contrast, the other two regions, 
Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, relied heavily on foreign 
sources of deficit financing over the entire period. Foreign financing was 158.11 
percent of the total deficit in Latin America and 118.81 percent of total deficit in sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
5.3 Trends in Economic Growth  
 
As Table 5.3 and Figure 5.2 below shows, average GDP growth for the set of thirty-one 
developing countries considered in this study remained positive for all five-year periods 
between 1972 and 2001.  
 
Table 5.3: GDP growth rate by region, 1972-2001 
 
Region 
 
1972-2001 
  
1972-1976 1977-1981 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 
Asia and the Pacific 5.30 4.85 6.10 4.90 6.23 6.81 2.93 
Latin America and the Caribbean 3.66 4.49 5.56 0.97 3.62 4.26 3.04 
Middle East and North Africa 4.52 9.04 3.14 3.86 4.19 4.34 4.31 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.67 5.07 5.55 3.10 3.07 2.52 2.55 
All Developing Countries (31) 4.28 5.51 5.32 3.13 4.33 4.56 2.97 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the World Bank’s World Development 
  Indicators Database 
 
 
On average, the GDP growth rate for the whole set of countries in the sample was 
about 4.3 percent. However, as expected, average GDP growth rate varied significantly 
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over the study period. Starting with average GDP growth rates of about 5.5 percent 
during the period 1972-1976 and 5.3 percent during the period 1977-1981, countries 
suffered a sharp decline in average GDP growth rate to only about 3.1 percent during 
the period 1982-1986. Average GDP growth rate then increased moderately to about 
4.3 percent and 4.6 percent during the 1987-1991 and 1992-1996 respectively, before 
falling sharply again to about 3 percent during the period 1997-2001. It should be 
pointed out that lowest growth during the periods 1982-1986 and 1997-2001 is not 
surprising given the serious economic problems that most developing countries 
suffered during the early 1980s (see Weiss, 1995; Jha, 2003 – among others) and the 
economic consequences of the Asian financial crisis during the late 1990s (Furman and 
Stiglitz, 1998; Haggard, 2000; Agenor et al., 2000). 
 
Figure 5.2 
GDP growth rate, 1972-2001
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from the World Bank’s World Development  
  Indicators Database 
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As one would expect, there were some differences in economic growth across the 
different regions. On average, Asia and the Pacific region achieved the highest average 
GDP growth rate, about 5.3 percent, over the entire study period. This region grew 
fastest in four out of six five-year periods: 1977-1981, 1982-1986, 1987-1991 and 1992-
1996. The slowest growth period for this region corresponds to the period 1997-2001 
when most of the economies in this region suffered from the Asian financial crisis. 
 
On the other hand, Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa regions 
grew slowest on average as compared to other regions. These regions achieved 
average GDP growth rate of only about 3.7 percent during the entire study period as 
compared to the average GDP growth rate of about 4.3 percent achieved by the whole 
set of 31 developing countries considered in this study. On average, GDP growth rate 
for both of these regions has been particularly disappointing since the 1980s. 
 
5.4 Trends in Government Expenditure and its Composition 
 
We argued in Chapter Three that the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth 
depends on the composition of government expenditure; i.e. some components of 
government expenditure are more likely to be growth enhancing than others. 
Following this argument, this study tests - among other hypotheses - a hypothesis that 
the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in developing countries depend on the 
composition of government expenditure in these countries. Thus, it is important that 
we consider the evolution/trends in both total government expenditure and its 
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composition in examining the impact of deficit spending on economic growth in 
developing countries.  
 
5.4.1: Total Government Expenditure 
 
A number of existing studies that have analysed the evolution and trends in 
government expenditure for different economies with different levels of spending have 
standardised expenditure by considering spending as a percentage of GDP.  These are 
for example, Easterly et al., 1997; Kneller et al., 1999; Adam and Bevan, 2005. Our 
analysis of the trends in government expenditure follows this approach. 
 
Table 5.4 summarises the trends in government expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
for the whole sample of developing countries considered in this study and for the four 
different regions represented in this sample. 
 
 
Table 5.4: Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 1972-2001 
 
Region 1972-2001 1972-1976 1977-1981 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 
Asia and the Pacific 23.50 19.03 22.22 25.52 24.09 22.63 22.93 
Latin America and the Caribbean 20.22 20.06 20.64 21.43 19.21 19.40 21.04 
Middle East and North Africa 33.11 37.85 39.42 35.73 28.20 29.46 27.57 
Sub-Saharan Africa 26.32 21.62 25.81 25.21 29.28 26.78 28.44 
All Developing Countries(31) 24.83 23.22 25.57 25.92 24.68 23.87 24.42 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics 
  Yearbooks (various issues) 
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Total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP for the whole set of 31 
developing countries considered in this study varied slightly between 23 percent and 
26 percent over the study period. Average total spending as a percentage of GDP 
increased from about 23 percent during the period 1972-1976 to about 26 percent 
during the periods 1977-1981 and 1982-1986. It then decreased to about 25 percent 
during the period 1987-1991 and about 24 percent during the periods 1992-1996 and 
1997-2001. As argued earlier, this decrease in total government expenditure (as a 
percentage of GDP) during the last three five-year periods may be explained by the 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes that most of the developing countries 
implemented since the mid 1980s.  
 
Total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP also varied across different 
regions. In general, the Middle East and North Africa region was the highest spender in 
terms of total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP. On the other hand, 
Latin America and the Caribbean region spent the lowest in terms of total government 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
 
5.4.2: Composition of Government Expenditure 
 
The previous section has analysed the trends in total government expenditure in the 
whole sample of developing countries considered in this study as well as in the 
different regions represented in the sample. However, as argued earlier, it is also 
necessary to take into account the composition of government expenditure in 
analysing the effect of deficit financed government expenditure on growth. Thus, this 
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section analyses the composition of government expenditure for the whole set of 
developing countries considered in this study and for the four different regions 
represented in the sample. To do this we look at two classifications of government 
expenditure; namely, economic classification and functional classification of 
government expenditure. 
 
 (i) Economic Classification of Government Expenditure 
 
Table 5.5 summarises the evolution and trends in the economic classification of 
government expenditure.  This classifies government outlays into two types; current 
expenditure and capital expenditure.  
 
Looking at the whole set of developing countries in the study, current expenditure took 
the highest share of government expenditure, about 78 percent, over the entire study 
period. The share of current expenditure also tended to increase over the study period, 
going up from about 76 percent during the period 1972-1976 to about 80 percent 
during the period 1997-2001.  In contrast, capital expenditure as a share of total 
expenditure averaged at only around 22 percent during the study period (1972-2001), 
and showed a general declining trend from around 24 percent in 1972-1976 to around 
20 percent in 1997-2001.  These values in terms of the shares of current and capital 
expenditures are quite similar to those found in the studies on the composition of 
government expenditure in developing countries by Devarajan et al. (1996) and Ghosh 
and Gregoriou (2006). 
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Table 5.5: Economic classification of government expenditure: Current expenditure 
and capital expenditure (as percentage of total expenditure), 1972-2001 
 
Expenditure 1972-2001 1972-1976 1977-1981 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 
 
Asia and the Pacific 
Current Expenditure 74.04 77.25 74.95 71.76 76.39 74.50 76.00 
Capital Expenditure 25.96 22.75 25.05 28.24 23.61 25.50 24.00 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Current Expenditure 81.07 74.36 77.30 85.22 83.55 81.97 84.40 
Capital Expenditure 18.93 25.64 22.70 14.78 16.45 18.03 15.60 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Middle East and North Africa 
Current Expenditure 73.12 69.58 68.50 75.45 77.44 73.93 74.46 
Capital Expenditure 26.88 30.42 31.50 24.55 22.56 26.07 25.54 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Current Expenditure 80.76 79.63 79.79 83.82 77.31 79.55 84.67 
Capital Expenditure 19.24 20.37 20.21 16.18 22.69 20.45 15.33 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
All Developing Countries (31) 
Current Expenditure 77.79 75.69 75.90 79.48 78.96 77.99 80.43 
Capital Expenditure 22.21 24.31 24.10 20.52 21.04 22.01 19.57 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics 
  Yearbooks (various issues) 
 
 
As far as the economic classification of government expenditure across different 
regions is concerned, Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa regions 
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spent the highest share of current expenditure in total government outlays, 
approximately 81 percent, over the study period, while Middle East and North Africa 
region spent the lowest, about 73 percent. The Asia and the Pacific region spend a 
slightly higher share of current expenditure in total government outlays than Middle 
East and North Africa, about 74 percent.  
 
Similar to what happened to the whole set of countries in the study, the share of 
current expenditure in total government outlays increased in three of the four regions 
over the study period. It increased by approximately 10 percentage points in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 5 percentage points in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 4 
percentage points in Middle East and North Africa.  
 
(ii) Functional Classification of Government Expenditure 
 
Table 5.6 summarises the functional composition of government expenditure for the 
entire set of countries in the study and for different regions represented in the study. 
This classifies spending on different sectors. 
 
For the whole set of countries in the study, economic services, education and general 
public services received the highest shares of total government outlays (about 23, 15 
and 13 percent, respectively) over the study period. On the other hand, defence and 
health received the lowest shares (about 10 and 7, respectively). Interestingly, a similar 
composition of government expenditure to this is observed in different regions over 
the study period. 
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Another interesting observation is that spending on education and health, which is 
labelled in the existing literature as being growth enhancing, increased in all regions 
over the study period. On the other hand, spending on general public services and 
defence and economic services was reduced in all regions over the study period. 
 
Table 5.6: Functional classification of government expenditure (as percentage of total 
expenditure), 1972-2001 
 
Expenditure 
 
1972-2001 1972-1976 1977-1981 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 
 
Asia and the Pacific 
General public services 11.60 11.60 12.77 13.10 12.32 10.38 8.21 
Defence expenditure 9.69 13.23 12.20 9.37 8.76 8.91 8.26 
Education expenditure 12.76 13.08 12.46 11.29 12.30 13.18 13.51 
Health expenditure 5.16 4.80 4.67 4.78 4.97 5.21 5.54 
Economic services 25.61 27.77 29.64 35.22 26.90 26.95 24.68 
Social security and welfare 3.85 4.79 4.27 2.61 3.61 6.17 4.95 
Other expenditures  31.34 24.73 23.98 23.63 31.12 29.20 34.84 
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
General public services 10.42 13.48 12.43 11.94 8.89 8.06 6.90 
Defence expenditure 6.85 7.49 7.26 6.99 6.83 5.82 4.99 
Education expenditure 16.04 16.47 15.72 14.69 14.00 16.96 17.96 
Health expenditure 9.34 7.14 8.94 8.74 10.38 11.31 11.26 
Economic services 18.17 24.12 22.58 17.88 15.86 14.18 11.56 
Social security and welfare 20.28 20.21 18.69 21.17 19.65 22.83 23.51 
Other expenditures  18.90 11.09 14.38 18.60 24.40 20.85 23.82 
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Middle East and North Africa 
General public services 8.30 10.84 10.27 8.67 8.11 5.41 5.79 
Defence expenditure 16.35 18.34 17.84 18.81 16.12 13.49 13.07 
Education expenditure 14.33 13.66 13.04 13.47 15.07 15.33 15.72 
Health expenditure 4.02 3.51 3.75 3.96 4.15 4.56 4.37 
Economic services 24.02 29.81 28.04 22.01 20.26 21.49 20.84 
Social security and welfare 8.64 6.88 7.31 8.62 9.60 9.18 9.44 
Other expenditures  24.33 16.95 19.76 24.47 26.69 30.55 30.76 
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
General public services 18.58 27.01 24.39 18.29 13.94 12.20 16.52 
Defence expenditure 8.58 7.42 9.17 9.67 8.66 7.89 6.08 
Education expenditure 17.08 17.62 16.07 16.91 16.22 17.16 19.34 
Health expenditure 6.75 6.85 6.21 6.33 6.64 7.58 7.68 
Economic services 20.65 23.70 23.21 20.43 22.84 14.90 12.37 
Social security and welfare 5.28 5.75 5.60 5.88 3.89 4.74 7.23 
Other expenditures   23.08 11.65 15.35 22.48 27.81 35.53 30.78 
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
All Developing Countries (31) 
General public services 12.35 16.01 15.22 13.05 10.99 9.29 9.22 
Defence expenditure 9.69 10.97 10.99 10.39 9.50 8.59 7.70 
Education expenditure 15.09 15.37 14.47 14.12 14.26 15.64 15.39 
Health expenditure 6.64 5.79 6.16 6.29 6.79 7.43 7.49 
Economic services 22.71 26.01 25.58 23.71 21.55 19.58 17.80 
Social security and welfare 10.34 10.20 9.65 10.94 9.77 11.99 12.05 
Other expenditures  23.17 15.66 17.92 21.50 27.14 27.49 30.34 
Total  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics 
  Yearbooks (various issues) 
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5.5 Fiscal Deficits, Government Expenditure and Economic Growth 
 
Having examined the trends of fiscal deficits, expenditure and growth separately in the 
above sections, this section examines whether our data suggest any relationship 
between (i) fiscal deficits and economic growth, and (ii) government expenditure and 
economic growth. 
 
(i) Fiscal Deficits and Economic Growth 
 
 
Figure 5.3 below suggests that there was a negative relationship between fiscal 
deficit as a percentage of GDP and GDP growth rate during the sample period.  
 
Figure 5.3 
 
GDP growth rate, fiscal deficit and deficit 
financing as percentage of GDP, 1972-2001
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from the World Bank’s World Development 
  Indicators and IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks (various issues) 
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Fiscal deficit increased from about 4.3 percentage of GDP in 1972-1976 to about 5.3 
percent of GDP in 1982-1986. In contrast, GDP growth rate declined during this 
period from about 5.5 percent to about 3.1 percent. Fiscal deficit then declined 
drastically to about 1.7 percent of GDP in 1992-1996, but during this period GDP 
growth rate went up to about 4.6 percent. Finally, as fiscal deficits went up 
between 1992-1996 and 1997-2001 to about 2.2 percent of GDP, GDP growth rate 
went downward to about 2.3 percent during this period. 
 
Trends in domestic financing and external financing (see Figure 5.3) show that both 
forms of financing were negatively related to GDP growth rate during the study 
period. 
 
(ii) Government Expenditure and Economic Growth 
 
It was shown earlier that, on average, current expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 
the whole set of developing countries considered in this study increased over the 
period 1972-2001, while capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP decreased. 
Current expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from approximately 17.8 
percent in 1972-1976 to about 19.7 percent 1997-2001. On the other hand, capital 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP decreased from about 6 percent to 5 percent 
during the same period. 
 
Figure 5.4 below presents graphically these trends in current and capital expenditure, 
together with trends in GDP growth rates.  By observing this graph, one may argue that 
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there was a general positive relationship between capital expenditure and GDP growth 
rate, and a negative relationship between GDP growth rate and current expenditure, 
during the sample period. 
 
Figure 5.4 
 
GDP growth rate and government current and 
capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 
1972-2001
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from the World Bank’s World Development 
  Indicators and IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks (various issues) 
 
 
With regard to the functional classification of government expenditure, a number of 
studies (such as Nelson and Singh, 1994; Barro, 1995; Warner, 1997 – among others) 
have suggested that, as argued in chapter three, spending on education, health and 
economic services is likely to be growth-enhancing. Looking at the correlation between 
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spending on these sectors and economic growth (Figure 5.5), however, this does not 
seem to have been the case, at least in the contemporaneous period, in the set of 
countries included in this study.  These results may not be surprising for developing 
countries given the high level of unemployment and underemployment of labour and 
other economic resources. Note also that, as discussed later in Chapter Six, some of the 
components of government expenditure, such as education and health expenditure are 
expected to affect economic growth with lags, hence making it difficult for the impact 
on growth of these components of government expenditure in the same five-year 
period (Gemmel et al., 2007; Benos, 2009 – among others). 
 
Figure 5.5 
 
GDP growth rate and functional composition of 
government expenditure as percentage of GDP, 
1972-2001
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks (various issues) 
 
163 
 
5.6 Trends in Control Variables 
 
This section analyses the trends in the control variables we consider in our empirical 
model to estimate the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth, as discussed in the 
preceding chapter.  These include population growth rate, inflation rate, level of 
investment (as a percentage of GDP), degree of openness, and the degree of financial 
deepening. 
 
Taking these in turn, population growth rate was 2.22 percent on average during the 
study period. By looking at the various five-year periods, it increased slightly from 2.42 
percent during the first five-year period to 2.49 percent during the second five-year 
period, and then decreased for each of the last four five-year periods to around 1.81 
percent during the period 1997-2001 (see Table 5.7 below).   
 
Table 5.7: Trends in population growth rate (in percentage), 1972-2001 
 
Region 1972-2001 1972-1976 1977-1981 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 
Asia and the Pacific 2.13 2.32 2.25 2.10 2.12 2.03 1.97 
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.05 2.33 2.37 2.17 1.99 1.81 1.63 
Middle East and North Africa 2.42 2.56 2.78 2.91 2.44 2.13 1.69 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.40 2.55 2.74 2.68 2.41 2.09 1.93 
All Developing Countries (31) 2.22 2.42 2.49 2.40 2.21 2.00 1.81 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the World Bank’s world Development 
  Indicators Database 
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Across the regions, on average, Middle East and North Africa had the highest 
population growth rate of about 2.42 percent over the entire period, followed by Sub-
Saharan Africa with 2.40 percent, Asia and the Pacific with about 2.13 percent and 
finally Latin America and the Caribbean with about 2.05 percent.  Despite these 
differences, however, all the four regions experienced somewhat stable population 
growth rates of between 2 and 3 percent over the study period, with these rates 
showing a general decreasing trend over time. 
 
The inflation rate in turn, the indicator of macroeconomic stability, was somewhat 
volatile and remained in the moderate double digit figures on average for a large part 
of the study period (Table 5.8).45 It was around 24 percent during the period 1972-1976, 
and then fell significantly to around 16 and 17 percent during the periods 1977-1981 
and 1982-1986, respectively, before jumping up again to around 20 percent during the 
period 1987-1991. Thereafter, and corresponding to the period of macroeconomic 
adjustment programmes in developing countries, it fell to about 18 percent during the 
period 1992-1996 and then to a single digit figure of approximately 8 percent during 
1997-2001. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Numerical definition of moderate inflation is far from standardised in the literature. Dornbusch 
and Fischer (1991, 1993) define moderate inflation as an inflation in the 15 – 30 percent range. 
Cottarelli and Szapary (1998) describe moderate inflation that is below 30 percent but well above 0 - 
2 percent. Piana (2001) consider inflation as moderate when it is in the range of 5 percent to 25 - 30 
percent. Hence, for the purpose of this study, we take account of all these definitions (and other 
definitions given in the literature) and describe moderate inflation as an inflation in the range of 
above 2 percent and less than 30 percent.  
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Table 5.8: Trends in inflation rate (in percentage), 1972-2001 
 
Region 1972-2001 1972-1976 1977-1981 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 
Asia and the Pacific 8.84 11.96 9.86 7.17 8.01 8.60 7.88 
Latin America and the Caribbean 26.71 52.08 23.26 27.91 36.06 22.31 10.66 
Middle East and North Africa 11.13 9.73 13.54 12.94 15.77 12.77 4.62 
Sub-Saharan Africa 18.20 10.63 13.51 16.97 19.32 23.83 7.91 
All Developing Countries (31) 17.39 24.20 15.41 16.65 20.32 17.18 8.17 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the World Bank’s world Development 
  Indicators Database 
 
In terms of the regional trends in inflation rates, Latin America and the Caribbean 
experienced the highest average rate of inflation, 26.71 percent, during the study 
period, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa with 18.20 percent, and Middle East and North 
Africa with 11.13 percent.46 As the average inflation rate figures show in the table 
above, all these three regions experienced the double-digit figures of inflation which 
was also somewhat volatile for the large part of the study period.47 In contrast to these 
three regions, however, average inflation rate in Asia and the Pacific region remained 
generally low in single-digit figures and stable for a significant part of the study period. 
On average, the rate of inflation in this region was 8.84 percent during the entire study 
period. 
                                                 
46 Note that the high rate of inflation in Latin America and the Caribbean region could be explained 
by the persistent high moderate double digit inflation that a number of Latin American countries 
suffered during the large part of the 1980s and early 1990s (Dornbusch and Fisher, 1991, 1993; 
Loungani and Swagel, 2001). 
47 Dornbusch and Fisher (1991, 1993) and Loungani and Swagel (2001) report similar average 
inflation figures and trends for these regions during this period. 
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Turning to the trends in the level of investment, on average, total investment as a 
percentage of GDP for the whole set of developing countries considered in this study 
was about 22.35 percent, and remained fairly stable, over the study period (Table 5.9).  
It was about 20.01 percent during the first five-year period, then increased to about 
23.57 percent during the second five-year period, and then fell slightly to about 22 
percent during the next two five-year periods. Total investment then went up to its 
highest level, about 24 percent, during the period 1992-1996, after which it decreased 
again slightly to about 22 percent during the last five-year period. 
 
Similar to the general trend in the average level of investment for the whole set of 
developing countries as discussed above, all the four regions maintained fairly constant 
levels of investment as a percentage of GDP of around 20 to 25 percent during a large 
part of the study period. 
 
Table 5.9: Trends in the level of investment (as a percentage of GDP), 1972-2001 
 
Region 1972-2001 1972-1976 1977-1981 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 
Asia and the Pacific 24.71 17.34 22.67 25.33 25.56 28.72 24.04 
Latin America and the Caribbean 19.78 19.58 23.02 18.12 18.50 20.08 19.68 
Middle East and North Africa 23.42 21.89 27.39 24.89 21.59 22.72 22.40 
Sub-Saharan Africa 21.93 18.98 22.83 19.40 21.47 23.46 21.79 
All Developing Countries (31) 22.35 20.01 23.57 21.63 21.82 23.89 21.93 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the World Bank’s world Development 
  Indicators Database 
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Regarding the study’s indicator of the degree of openness, measured as exports plus 
imports (X+M) as a percentage GDP, as Table 5.10 below shows, it is evident that the 
set of countries included in the study became relatively more open over time during 
the study period. The average degree of openness for the whole set of countries 
increased significantly from about 50 percent during the period 1972-1976 to about 61 
percent during the period 1977-1981. Thereafter, it went down slightly to about 58 
percent during the first half of the 1980s, the period when many developing countries 
experienced serious macroeconomic problems such as debt crises and shortages of 
foreign exchange and public finances (Weiss, 1995; Jha, 2003 – among others). 
However, following implementation of the trade liberalisation measures and other 
economic reforms since the mid 1980s, the degree of openness picked up again as 
expected to about 64 percent during 1987-1991, and continued to increase to about 72 
percent during the period 1992-1996 and about 75 percent during the period 1997-
2001.  
 
Table 5.10: Trends in the degree of openness, 1972-2001 
 
Region 1972-2001 1972-1976 1977-1981 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 
Asia and the Pacific 63.73 45.61 55.55 55.54 62.35 74.33 85.75 
Latin America and the Caribbean 62.80 39.71 58.53 52.99 64.73 74.08 75.08 
Middle East and North Africa 56.39 54.48 59.50 50.26 54.02 62.00 58.07 
Sub-Saharan Africa 70.42 62.03 71.07 69.84 69.67 73.71 72.59 
All Developing Countries (31) 64.00 49.62 61.06 57.64 63.59 72.11 74.79 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the World Bank’s world Development  
  Indicators Database 
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As far as the regional trends are concerned, all the four regions appear to have 
experienced a general increasing trend in the degree of openness during the study 
period. The degree of openness increased significantly from about 46 percent and 40 
percent in 1972-1977 to about 86 percent and 75 percent in 1997-2001 in Asia and the 
Pacific region and Latin America and the Caribbean region, respectively. What is more, 
these two regions started with the lowest degrees of openness and ended with the 
highest degrees of openness, thus reflecting the significant trade reforms that these 
regions pursued during the study period.  With regard to the other two regions, the 
degree of openness increased from about 62 percent during 1972-1976 to about 73 
percent during 1997-2001 in Sub-Saharan Africa, while that of Middle East and North 
Africa increased the least from about 54 percent to just about 58 percent during the 
period.   
 
Finally, the degree of financial deepening, measured by amount of supply of broad 
money (M2) as a percentage of GDP, improved continuously during the study period 
(see Table 5.11 below). It started at about 26 percent during the period 1972-1996 and 
increased continuously to about 45 percent during the period 1997-2001. Despite this 
increase, however, it is evident from the statistics given in Table 5.11 that the overall 
average degree of financial deepening for the set of developing countries considered in 
this study remained very low during the study period. This was estimated to be only 
about 37 percent for the whole set of developing countries during the period 1972-
2001. 
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Across the different regions, on average, the highest degree of financial deepening 
over the entire period corresponds to Middle East and North Africa, 49.46 percent on 
average, followed by Asia and the Pacific with 41.41 percent. On the other hand, Sub-
Saharan Africa and Latin America had the lowest averages of the degree of financial 
deepening of about 31 and 30 percent, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5.11: Trends in the degree of financial deepening, 1972-2001 
 
Region 1972-2001 1972-1976 1977-1981 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1996 1997-2001 
Asia and the Pacific 41.41 27.15 33.41 39.31 42.73 47.46 58.55 
Latin America and the Caribbean 29.56 21.91 27.44 31.31 27.86 31.92 36.79 
Middle East and North Africa 49.46 33.41 43.26 53.16 55.22 54.38 56.34 
Sub-Saharan Africa 31.29 24.75 29.16 31.56 32.31 31.89 33.61 
All Developing Countries (31) 36.66 26.07 32.13 37.22 37.90 40.05 45.44 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the World Bank’s world Development 
  Indicators Database 
 
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed the trends in fiscal deficits, economic growth and 
government expenditure for the sample of developing countries considered in this 
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study. This chapter has also analysed the trends in control variables included in our 
empirical model to estimate the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in 
developing countries. 
 
Analysis of the trends in fiscal deficits has shown that the set of developing countries 
included in this study as a whole had deficit spending throughout the study period. The 
level of deficit as a percentage of GDP increased initially until the mid-1980s and 
decreased thereafter as a result of economic reforms that most of the developing 
countries implemented since mid-1980s. Analysis has also shown that the level of 
deficits as a percentage of GDP, and the level of deficit reduction since the mid-1980s, 
varied significantly between different regions of the developing world.  
 
In relation to economic growth, on average, countries achieved positive GDP growth 
over the whole period of the study. However, GDP growth rate for the whole set of 
countries and between the different regions varied considerably over the study period. 
 
On government expenditure, total spending as a percentage of GDP for the whole 
set of countries varied slightly over the study period. Again, similar to the level of 
fiscal deficits and economic growth, there were differences between regions in 
terms of the level of total government expenditure. As far as the composition of 
government expenditure is concerned, in terms of economic classification of 
spending, current expenditure took the highest share of total expenditure as 
compared to capital expenditure, and this share increased over the study period. In 
terms of functional classification of government expenditure, the top three sectors 
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in terms of the allocation of government expenditure were economic services, 
education and general public services, while defence and health received the least 
amount in general. 
 
Looking at the relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth, the trends 
in these two variables for the set of countries considered in this study have 
suggested a negative relationship. 48  In terms of the relationship between 
government expenditure and economic growth, it appears that there is a general 
positive relationship between capital expenditure and economic growth and a 
negative relationship between current expenditure and economic growth.  
 
Finally, in terms of the regional differences, the trends in the variables we have 
considered in the analysis suggests that, though there were some differences 
between the regions, the differences were not very significant. 
 
The quantitative descriptive analyses we have performed in this chapter, of course, 
mask some important relationships between the variables. The next chapter, in 
turn, performs a more formal investigation by empirically estimating the impact of 
fiscal deficits and other variables on economic growth using regression analysis and 
discussing the results. 
 
 
                                                 
48 Note that this may be unsurprising in the short-run, since it is possible that as the economy 
improves the deficit will fall, as the deficit is endogenous, at least in the Keynesian model (Weiss, 
1995). 
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Chapter Six 
 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF FISCAL DEFICITS ON ECONOMIC 
GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four discussed the empirical model we use in this study to estimate the 
impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. This chapter estimates the model 
using data from a panel of thirty-one developing countries for the period 1972-2001. 
As pointed out earlier in Chapter Four (Section 4.3), we use different versions of 
this empirical model to test the key hypotheses on the impact of fiscal deficits on 
economic growth we established earlier in Chapter Three. The first version 
examines the general relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth. The 
second version replaces the fiscal deficit by its sources of financing to examine 
whether the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth depends on how deficits 
are financed. The third version disaggregates the total expenditure to examine 
whether the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth depends on the 
composition of government expenditure. Later, we introduce regional dummies in 
each of the above three versions of the model to investigate whether there are any 
regional differences in the relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth 
in developing countries. 
Before we proceed with model estimation, it is important to take into consideration 
a number of issues that have been a cause of bias and inconsistency of the 
regression estimates in some of the existing empirical studies on the relationship 
between fiscal policy and economic growth. One of the main issues is the 
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misspecification of the growth equation by failure to consider the implications of 
the government budget constraint in the regressions. The government budget 
constraint requires considering both sides of the government budget (revenue side 
and expenditure side) simultaneously in the regressions for a meaningful analysis of 
the effects of fiscal policy on economic growth.  Studies by Helms (1985), Mofidi 
and Stone (1990), Kneller et al. (1999), Bleaney et al. (2001), Angelopoulos et al. 
(2007), and Romero-Avila-Strauch (2008) showed that empirical studies on fiscal 
policy and economic growth which do not take into account both sides of the 
government budget in the regressions suffer from significant bias and inconsistency 
in the coefficient estimates. All these studies have emphasised the need to consider 
both the revenue and expenditure side of the government budget simultaneously in 
the regressions that examine the effects of fiscal variables on economic growth. 
Our study pays careful attention to the implication of the government budget 
constraint by including the revenue side of the government budget in all of our 
regression equations, in addition to the expenditure side and the fiscal balance, 
which are the variables of interest in our study. In doing this we disaggregate 
revenue into tax revenue, non-tax revenue and grants.   
 
However, as Kneller et al. (1999) argue, if there are n distinct government 
expenditure and revenue elements, then the government budget constraint will 
imply the following identify: 
0
1
, 

n
j
itjM  
Where: itjM ,  represents the fiscal variable j  relating to country i at time t . 
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This full identity of the government budget constraint cannot be included in 
regressions due to the existence of perfect collinearity between the n elements of 
itjM . arising from the identity of the government budget constraint (Kneller et al., 
1999). Indeed, some components of the government budget constraint are likely to 
move simultaneously. For example, an increase in government revenue is very likely 
to lead to an increase in government expenditure. On this basis, therefore, different 
components of government expenditure are very likely to move simultaneously 
with government revenue. This means that including the full identity of the 
government budget constraint in regressions may result into perfect or high 
correlation between different components of the government budget constraint, 
which is a potential cause of the multicollinearity problem in regressions.  
 
Based on the above discussion, at least one element of itjM ,  must be omitted from 
the regression equation to avoid perfect collinearity between fiscal variables 
(Kneller et al., 1999; Bleaney et al., 2001). Ideally, according to the theory, the 
variable to be omitted should be one that has a neutral or negligible effect on 
growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1999; Bose et al., 2003; Benos, 2009). Along these 
lines, our study follows Barro (1990); Bose et al. (2003) and Benos (2009) and 
chooses to exclude the fiscal variable non-tax revenue from the estimated 
regressions. This choice to omit the non-tax revenue variable is based primarily on 
the theoretical prediction that variation in non-distortionary revenue items is not 
likely to generate significant effects on growth (Barro, 1990; Kneller et al., 1999; 
Benos, 2009). 
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Another problem in the studies on the effects of fiscal policy on growth concerns 
the issue of causality between the two. It is important to recognise that causality 
between fiscal variables and growth may not run exclusively in one direction, i.e. 
not only do changes in fiscal variables affect economic growth but the reverse 
causality may also be a possibility (Bose et al., 2003; Benos, 2009). For example, 
when an economy enjoys high economic growth (independently of any fiscal policy 
changes) it is very likely that government tax revenues will also rise and the budget 
deficit will fall. Similarly, when an economy faces a slowdown in economic growth, 
the government may pursue expansionary fiscal policy (by increasing expenditure 
and/or reducing taxes) to stimulate growth and therefore increase the budget 
deficit. Failure to take into account the issue of causality between growth and fiscal 
variables may lead to substantial bias and inconsistency of the coefficient estimates 
from the regressions (Bose et al., 2003). To account for this problem, as discussed 
earlier in Chapter Four, we employ various scenarios of the GMM estimation 
technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This technique involves first 
differencing and lags of the dependent and independent variables as instruments. 
First differencing addresses the potential two-way causality between explanatory 
variables and the dependent variable. In addition, by first differencing, this 
technique also deals with series non-stationarity and removes country-specific 
effects, which are a potential source of omitted variables bias (Arellano and Bond, 
1991; Baldacci et al., 2003; Benos, 2009).   
 
In addition, existing literature shows that fiscal policy is likely to have an effect on 
growth with lags. We consider this issue by following a common approach used in 
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existing empirical studies (such as Kneller et al., 1999; Folster and Henrekson, 2001; 
Adam and Bevan, 2005; Angelopoulos et al., 2007; Benos, 2009) of working with 
five-year averages, which allows a long enough period to capture the effects of 
fiscal policy actions on growth.49 However, as Gemmel et al. (2007) and Benos 
(2009) argue, the long-run effects of some components of fiscal policy, for example 
spending on health and education, may not be fully captured by five-year averages. 
Hence, we also analyse the one-period lagged effects on growth of fiscal variables 
(and other explanatory variables) for which theory suggests that the full effects on 
growth may take longer than a five-year period. 
 
It should also be noted that, as we discussed earlier in Chapter Four, quality of data, 
especially data on fiscal variables, for most of the developing countries is not 
optimal. This is mainly due to the inconsistency in data availability and the fact that 
various countries report data using different conventions for the measurement of 
the size of the public sector and different definitions (of say revenue and 
expenditure), and/or some important elements of fiscal data are sometimes 
casually estimated, often by the use of no more than crude extrapolation (IMF GFS 
– various issues, Porter and Ranney, 1982; Nelson and Singh, 1994; Gemmel et al., 
2007; Benos, 2009). All these limitations are likely to lead to unreliable results in 
empirical studies, like ours, in terms of the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates. 
Taking this into account, analysis in this study therefore focuses mainly on the 
direction and the significance of the results in terms of the estimated growth 
effects of explanatory variables considered in various model estimations. 
                                                 
49 Using five-year averages also helps to eliminate some short-run cyclical simultaneity between 
fiscal policy variables and economic growth (Nelson and Singh, 1994; Adam and Bevan, 2005).  
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Following this introduction, the rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 
discusses some regression diagnostics we carried out before performing formal 
model estimation. Section 6.3 examines the impact of total fiscal deficits on 
economic growth. Section 6.4 examines the impact of alternative ways of deficit 
financing on economic growth. Section 6.5 analyses the effects of different 
components of government expenditure on economic growth. This considers both 
economic and functional classification of government expenditure. Section 6.6 is 
devoted to the discussion of the results on control variables.  Section 6.7 examines 
whether there are any regional differences in relationships between fiscal deficits 
and economic growth. Finally, section 6.8 concludes. 
 
6.2 Regression Diagnostics 
Before proceeding to the regression analysis and discussion of the results, it is 
instructive to perform diagnostic checks to ensure that the data meet all necessary 
regression assumptions and conditions. Failure to do this may lead to misleading 
results. Thus, we conducted/considered a number of regression diagnostics for our 
data before using them in formal model estimation. These diagnostics involved the 
following. First, we checked for outliers and removed all outlying observations. 
Second, we checked for normality to ensure that data for all variables included in 
the model are normally distributed. As a result of this, we performed some 
necessary transformations of some variables.  This involved mainly transforming 
data for some variables into natural logarithms. Descriptive statistics of data after 
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removing outliers and performing necessary transformations are summarised in 
Table 6.1 below. 
  
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
GDP growth (GDP) 184 4.29 2.76 -3.34   11.40 
Population growth (POP) 186 2.22 0.696 0.19   3.82 
Degree of openness  (OPEN) 183 4.018 0.52 2.37 5.35 
Rate of Inflation  (INFL) 179 2.39 0.85 -0.59 4.57 
Total investment (INV) 181 3.05 0.28 2.26 3.86 
Money Supply (M2) 182 3.48 0.47 2.23 4.52 
Total Fiscal Deficit (DFCT) 183 3.48 3.58  -4.40   14.32 
Domestic Financing (DFIN) 172   2.42 2.94 -3.13 11.23 
External Financing (EXTFIN) 172 1.42 1.88 -2.24 7.56 
Total Government expenditure (GOVEXP) 181 3.13 0.37 2.09 3.91 
Government Current expenditure (CURREXP) 176 2.89   0.39 1.91 3.60 
Government Capital Expenditure (CAPEXP) 175 1.49  0.67 -0.29 2.88 
Expenditure on Public Service (PSEXP) 164 0.84 0.75 -0.67 2.44 
Defence expenditure (DEFEXP) 147 .63 .78 -1.52 2.18 
Spending on Education (EDUEXP) 164 1.15 0.65 -1.40 2.16 
Spending on Health (HLTHEXP) 164 0.23 .74 -1.49 1.61 
Spending on Economic Services (ECONEXP)   163 1.51 0.62 -0.11   2.82 
Total tax Revenue (TAX) 182 16.37 5.77 5.02   32.61 
Grants (GRANTS) 139 -.976 1.98 -7.33 3.34 
 Source:   Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators CD-ROM and IMF’s Government Finance  
  Statistics CD-ROM and Yearbooks (Various issues) 
 Note:      - All figures are calculated based on five-year averages 
 - All the variables are in natural logarithm except GDP, GDP-1, DFCT, DFIN, EXTFIN and TAX 
 - All the original figures on fiscal variables, investment and money supply were expressed as a percentage of GDP 
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Third, we checked that multicollinearity is not existent in our data.  It should be 
noted that when there is a perfect or near perfect linear relationship between two 
or more explanatory variables, the estimates for a regression model cannot be 
uniquely calculated (Hsiao, 2003; Baltagi, 2008; Gujarati, 2009; Asterious and Hall, 
2011 – among others).  On this basis, therefore, we checked for multicollinearity 
using the correlation matrix presented in Table 6.2 below. Generally, most of the 
respective pairwise correlations are reasonably low to suggest that the problem of 
multicollinearity is not worrisome in our data. Another useful form of information 
we get from the correlation matrix below is that correlations between GDP growth 
and most of the explanatory variables are not very strong. This suggests that the 
relationship between GDP growth and most of the right-hand side variables in our 
model might not be strongly significant. In addition to correlation analysis, we 
estimated variance inflation factors (VIFs) in each of the regression models we 
performed. Results of VIFs, which are reported later in the discussion, also suggest 
that multicollinearity, although existent, is not a serious problem.  
 
In addition to performing the above-discussed diagnostic tests, it is important to 
note that we are aware of the recent developments in the literature in relation to 
diagnostic testing for unit roots (nonstationarity) in panel data studies, see Maddala 
and Wu (1999), Phillips and Moon (2000), Choi (2001), Levin et al. (2002), Hsiao, 
2003, Baltagi, 2008 – among others. Following these developments, some empirical 
studies employing panel data have attempted to test for unit roots, depending on 
the time series structure of the panel data and econometric methods used in these 
studies (Phillips and Moon, 2000; Bond et al., 2001). 
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Table 6.2: Correlation Matrix 
Variables GDP GDP-1 POP OPEN INFL INV M2 DFCT DFIN EXTFIN GOVEXP CURREXP CAPEXP PSEXP DEFEXP EDUEXP HLTHEXP ECONEXP TAXEXP GRANTS 
 GDP 1.00                    
GDP-1 0.14 1.00                   
 POP -0.09 -0.05 1.00                  
 OPEN -0.02 -0.01 -0.30 1.00                 
INFL -0.13 -0.21 0.21 -0.21 1.00                
INV 0.47 0.33 -0.30 0.30 -0.24 1.00               
M2 0.26 0.32 -0.37 0.25 -0.50 0.41 1.00              
DFCT -0.04 0.05 0.09 -0.10 0.08 -0.01 0.10 1.00             
DFIN 0.02 0.08 0.07 -0.22 -0.05 -0.10 0.31 0.81 1.00            
EXTFIN -0.13 0.01 -0.00 0.13 0.23 0.25 -0.25 0.47 0.04 1.00           
 GOVEXP -0.10 -0.08 -0.11 0.50 -0.05 0.18 0.34 0.45 0.32 0.42 1.00          
CURREXP -0.14 -0.16 -0.03 0.42 -0.09 0.02 0.33 0.42 0.36 0.30 0.92 1.00         
CAPEXP 0.13 0.18 -0.22 0.39 0.05 0.55 0.23 0.27 0.01 0.55 0.58 0.28 1.00        
PSEXP -0.10 -0.22 0.09 0.45 0.05 -0.02 -0.26 0.15 -0.16 0.44 0.52 0.49 0.25 1.00       
DEFEXP 0.08 0.07 0.27 -0.26 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.38 0.38 0.21 0.33 0.35 0.11 -0.05 1.00      
EDUEXP -0.18 -0.07 0.05 0.72 -0.06 0.07 0.16 0.05 -0.09 0.22 0.70 0.68 0.38 0.49 0.10 1.00     
HLTHEXP -0.29 -0.26 -0.12 0.75 -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 -0.15 0.29 0.62 0.60 0.31 0.53 -0.14 0.83 1.00    
ECONEXP 0.05 0.10 -0.04 0.35 -0.18 0.46 0.15 0.33 0.14 0.51 0.65 0.46 0.72 0.40 0.21 0.42 0.43 1.00   
TAX -0.03 -0.09 -0.17 0.56 0.01 0.20 0.27 0.22 0.06 0.40 0.85 0.81 0.49 0.53 0.18 0.75 0.71 0.53 1.00  
GRANTS -0.02 -0.25 -0.21 0.25 0.13 0.03 -0.02 0.19 0.10 0.24 0.52 0.51 0.24 0.29 0.15 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.40 1.00 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators CD-ROM and IMF’s Government Finance Statistics CD-ROM and Yearbooks (Various issues) 
Note:  All the variables are in natural logarithm expect GDP, GDP-1, DFCT, DFIN, EXTFIN and TAX 
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In relation to our study, note that the use of five-year average data and Arellano 
and Bond (1991) GMM estimator that first-differences the data, helps to deal with 
any potential problems of nonstationarity in the data. Besides, as Baltagi (2008) 
argues, using panel data can help to avoid the problem of spurious regression, 
which can be caused by nonstationarity, among other factors. In the words of 
Baltagi (2008): 
 
“Unlike the single time-series spurious regression literature, the panel data 
spurious regression estimates give a consistent estimate of the true value of 
the parameter as both N and T tend to . This is because the panel 
estimator averages across individuals and the information in the 
independent cross-section data in panel leads to a stronger overall signal 
than the pure time-series case” (Baltagi, 2008: pp. 273-274). 
 
 
According to Baltagi (2008), therefore, one does not need to worry about 
nonstationarity of the variables in a panel-data setting, as the regression estimates 
will give consistent results. Phillips and Moon (2000) seem to support Baltagi (2008) 
by showing that in a panel-data analysis the regression stops being spurious and 
consistently estimates what is actually there – i.e., if there is a relation, it will 
estimate the relation, and on the other hand, if there is no relation, it will estimate 
zero.   
 
On the basis of the above discussion, therefore, we argue that the use of five-year 
average data, the first-differenced Arellano and Bond estimator, and dynamic panel 
data, all helps to deal with any potential problems of nonstationarity of variables, 
and the problem of spurious regression.   
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Having examined our data using the regression diagnostics discussed above, we 
were satisfied that our data meet all necessary regressions assumptions. Thus, we 
moved on to perform formal model estimation and discussion of the results as 
presented in the following sections. Note also that other important diagnostic 
testing such as tests for autocorrelation are performed as we carry out these formal 
model estimations.  
 
 
6.3 Fiscal Deficits and Economic Growth 
 
Existing literature on the link between fiscal deficits and economic growth was 
discussed in Chapter Three. Based on the critical analysis of this literature, we 
hypothesised that fiscal deficits are likely to have an impact (positive or negative) 
on growth, and that this impact depends on the following three factors: (i) the size 
of fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP; (ii) the ways in which deficits are financed; 
and, (iii) the composition of government expenditure. This section examines 
whether fiscal deficits have any significant impact on economic growth in 
developing countries. It also examines whether the relationship between fiscal 
deficits and economic growth depends on the size of fiscal deficits as a percentage 
of GDP – that is, whether the relationship between the two is non-linear.  
 
To do this, we estimate our empirical model given in the regression equation (4.8) 
taking into account the implication of the government budget constraint and all 
other issues that studies on fiscal policy and economic growth are likely to suffer 
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from as discussed in section 6.1 above. Recall our earlier discussion on the 
implication of the government budget constraint (see section 6.1) that to 
determine the effect of the fiscal balance, or government expenditure or revenue 
on economic growth, all three of these components of the government budget 
constraint should be included simultaneously in a regression equation to be 
estimated. However, as argued earlier, these components are likely to move at the 
same time. As a result, high correlations between different components of 
expenditure, revenue and fiscal balance might occur when all of these components 
of the government budget constraint are considered simultaneously, thus leading 
to a multicollinearity problem in the estimated model. In order to avoid this 
problem, as mentioned earlier, we follow the spirit of Barro (1990), Kneller et al. 
(1999), Bose et al. (2003) and Benos (2009) and exclude non-tax revenue from the 
government budget constraint. These authors argue that the impact of changes in 
non-tax revenue on economic growth is expected to be neutral on the basis of 
theoretical prediction that economic growth is likely to be invariant to changes in 
non-distortionary revenue items.  
 
In addition, to ensure that our empirical results does not suffer from the 
multicollinearity problem we conducted a correlation analysis (as discussed earlier 
in section 6.2) to examine how strongly the explanatory variables included in the 
model are related to each other. Using the correlation matrix presented in Table 6.2 
above, we checked for multicollinearity using correlation analysis. This analysis 
suggested that multicollinearity is not severe in our model, since most respective 
pairwise correlations are reasonably low. In addition to examining pairwise 
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correlations between the explanatory variables, we estimated the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) to check for multicollinearity based on the simple ordinary least 
square (OLS) estimation of our model. Based on the rule of thumb of critical value 
of VIF of 10 or tolerance value – defined as 1/VIF – of lower than 0.1 (Gujarati, 1995, 
2009; O’Brien, 2007), the estimated VIFs (see calculated VIFs below) also suggested 
that multicollinearity, though present, was not severe in our model. 
 
Variation Inflation Factors 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
GOVEXP 4.66 0.214523 
TAX 2.92 0.342092 
OPEN 1.97 0.508844 
GRANTS 1.81 0.554007 
M2 1.67 0.599337 
INV 1.63 0.612293 
DFCT 1.58 0.632647 
INFL 1.46 0.683882 
GDP-1 1.35 0.743167 
POP 1.30 0.766502 
Mean VIF 2.03  
 
 
Before we proceed with formal model estimation, we follow a common approach in 
econometric analysis of considering an informal test based on the analysis of a 
simple scatter plot of our data. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 below present scatter plots of 
GDP growth against fiscal deficits (as a percentage of GDP) for the whole sample of 
thirty-one developing countries considered in this study and for four different 
regions (Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and 
North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa) respectively, for the period 1972-2001. 
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Figure 6.1:  Fiscal deficits and economic growth in developing countries during the 
period 1972-2001 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators CD-ROM and IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics CD-ROM and Yearbooks (Various issues 
 
 
Figure 6.2:  Fiscal deficits and economic growth in different regions of the 
developing world during the period 1972-2001 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators CD-ROM and IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics CD-ROM and Yearbooks (Various issues 
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Analysis of these scatter plots suggest that the relationship (correlation) between 
fiscal deficits and economic growth may be negative. There is also a hint from the 
analysis of scatter plots in Figure 6.2 that the deficit-growth relationship appears 
not to be significantly different between regions. However, this evidence on the 
relationship between fiscal deficits and GDP growth for a panel of developing 
countries considered in our study is only tentative and does not consider the 
direction of causality.   
 
To examine the relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth for our 
sample of developing countries in a robust (formal) way we proceed with 
estimation of our econometric model given by equation 4.8. As we discussed 
earlier, estimation of this model is performed using the generalised methods of 
moment (GMM) estimation technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).  To 
do this, we follow Arellano and Bond’s (1991) approach and estimate our model 
using all three model specifications suggested in the Arellano and Bond (1991) 
GMM estimator – exogenous, predetermined and endogenous – before we can 
choose the preferred model(s) based on model results and specification tests. The 
exogenous model assumes that all the explanatory variables are considered as 
strictly exogenous; the predetermined model specifies that a set of explanatory 
variables are considered as predetermined; and, the endogenous model treats a set 
of explanatory variables as endogenous.  
 
It is worth noting that treating variables as strictly exogenous, predetermined or 
endogenous has a very important implication on the number of instruments used in 
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the estimated model. If an explanatory variable is treated as strictly exogenous, 
then all its current and lagged values are available to use as valid instruments. In 
the case of a predetermined variable, the levels lagged one or more periods are 
valid instruments. Whereas, in the case of endogenous variable, levels lagged two 
or more periods qualify as valid instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991). This means 
that, treating variables as predetermined or endogenous quickly increases the 
number of valid instruments in the model.  
 
Given the number of explanatory variables considered in our model and the small 
cross-sectional dimension of our data (only thirty-one countries), we avoid the 
over-fitting problems in our model estimation by using a reduced number of 
instrumental variables. Thus, we employ a short lag structure for each of the above 
three specifications (exogenous, predetermined and endogenous) by considering 
only the current and the one-period lagged levels of the corresponding variables in 
our regression analysis unless otherwise stated. 
 
Table 6.3 below presents the results obtained by using all three scenarios suggested 
in the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator as discussed above. Note that in 
analysing these results, we concentrate initially on model specification and 
selection of preferred model(s) and inference on the estimated coefficients is made 
later on.  
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Table 6.3: Results on the effect of total fiscal deficits on economic growth 
 
Independent variables Exogenous 
(1) 
Predetermined 
(2) 
Endogenous 
(3) 
GDP-1 -.4465434* 
(0.057) 
-.4761598*** 
(0.000) 
-.4982869*** 
(0.000) 
GDP-2 -.5177906*** 
(0.004) 
-.5672662*** 
(0.000) 
-.5660948*** 
(0.000) 
POP 
 
.0217803* 
(0.055) 
.0205549** 
(0.027) 
.0206103** 
(0.027) 
POP-1 .0086501 
(0.267) 
.0132537** 
(0.021) 
.0153048***   
(0.009) 
INFL .99787486 
(0.691) 
.99644165 
(0.499)   
.998106 
(0.703) 
INFL-1 
 
.98121724** 
(0.018) 
.98216231*** 
(0.004) 
.97771027*** 
(0.001) 
INV 
 
1.040759*** 
(0.001) 
1.0316874** 
(0.029) 
1.0270961** 
  (0.043)   
INV-1 1.0501645*** 
(0.003) 
1.0475103*** 
(0.000) 
1.0498726*** 
(0.000) 
OPEN 
 
1.0214823 
(0.195) 
1.0258994* 
(0.058) 
1.0194712 
(0.176) 
OPEN-1 .99964996 
(0.988) 
.9955125 
(0.841) 
1.0069631 
(0.737) 
M2 .95918664** 
(0.035) 
.95598056*** 
(0.004) 
.9502704*** 
(0.003)   
M2-1 .98854373 
(0.190) 
.98972208 
(0.363) 
.98943857 
(0.409) 
DFCT 
 
.0010961 
(0.519) 
-.0000256 
(0.989) 
.0001058 
(0.951) 
DFCT-1 
 
-.0010874 
(0.412) 
-.0016763 
(0.165) 
-.0020918* 
(0.099) 
GOVEXP 
 
.91465485*** 
(0.008) 
.93171547* 
(0.068) 
.92129582** 
(0.018) 
GOVEXP-1 
 
1.0055092 
(0.814)  
1.0214972 
(0.412) 
1.0182416 
(0.501) 
TAX .005267*** 
(0.000) 
.0047506*** 
(0.000) 
.0051894*** 
(0.000)     
TAX-1 
 
.0016095 
(0.238) 
.0015185   
(0.213) 
.0023797 
(0.106) 
GRANTS 
 
1.0034119 
(0.150) 
1.0030044 
(0.196) 
1.003866 
(0.077) 
GRANTS-1 1.0027025 
(0.158) 
1.0014874 
(0.486) 
1.0021241 
(0.281) 
Observations 
Number of Countries 
Wald Test of joint Significance 
Test of serial autocorrelation 
First order (m1) 
Second order (m2) 
55 
23 
0.0000 
 
0.0872 
0.1709 
55 
23 
0.0000 
 
0.0833 
0.3475 
55 
23 
0.0000 
 
0.0850 
0.3390 
Notes. 
- *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively 
- The values in parentheses under the coefficients are P-values 
- The problem of data availability means that only 23 (out of 31 countries developing countries 
included in our sample) are considered in our model estimations here. 
189 
 
Recall that the major focus in this section is to examine the relationship between 
fiscal deficits and economic growth. Our key hypothesis on this relationship is that 
fiscal deficits have an impact (positive or negative) on economic growth and that 
this impact depends on the size of deficits as a percentage of GDP – that is, the 
relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth is non-linear of an 
inverted U-shaped type.  In order to test whether the relationship between fiscal 
deficits and economic growth is non-linear, our initial regressions included both the 
fiscal deficit variable (DFCT) and the square of DFCT (DFCT2) variable. When both 
these variables were included in the estimated model, however, the results were 
very poor and indicated some model specification problems. Based on these results, 
therefore, we concluded that the hypothesis that the relationship between fiscal 
deficits and economic growth was non-linear in the set of developing countries 
considered in this study is rejected in our model.50 Following these results also, we 
decided to drop the square of DFCT (DFCT2) variable in our final regressions in this 
section, and for all other versions of the model estimated in the subsequent 
sections. 
 
Returning to the discussion of the results presented in Table 6.3 above, column (1) 
reports the results based on exogenous model specification. In this model, all the 
right-hand side variables other than the lagged dependent variables are assumed 
strictly exogenous.  
 
                                                 
50 In other words, we do not find evidence of non-linear relationship between fiscal deficits and 
economic growth in our data. 
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Turning to the test statistics, the tests for first-order and second-order 
autocorrelation (p-values of 0.087 and 0.171, respectively) presented no evidence 
of model misspecification. We also estimated the Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions using the one-step homoscedastic estimator (we have not reported the 
results here) and this passed the test too.51 These results, therefore, suggests that 
the model does not face specifications problems. 
 
Analysis of the results on the coefficient estimates shows that the lagged GDP 
variable (GDP-1) enters the model with a negative sign, and this is statistically 
significant, hence showing evidence of the so-called conditional convergence in the 
growth literature (Sala-i-Martin, 1996; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Roberts, 
2006). Investment (INV), degree of openness (OPEN), a proxy for financial 
deepening (M2), government expenditure (GOVEXP) and grants (GRANTS) all have 
the expected positive sign. However, only the investment variable (INV) is 
statistically significant at the conventional levels of significance for both the current 
and one-lagged period levels. The proxy for financial deepening (M2) and 
government expenditure (GOVEXP) are significant in the current period only, while 
openness (OPEN) and grants (GRANTS) are statistically insignificant in both periods. 
 
Turning briefly to other variables in the model, population growth (POP) and tax 
revenue (TAX) enter the model with a positive sign in both periods, although these 
are significant in the current period only. The inflation variable (INFL) also enters 
the model with a positive sign in both periods but this is statistically significant in 
                                                 
51 Note that the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions cannot be computed when the robust 
estimator – vce (robust) is specified in the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimation. 
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the one-lag period only, a finding that suggests that inflation did not have a 
deterrent effect on economic growth in the set of developing countries we have 
considered in this study during the period 1972-2001. 
 
Our main variable of interest in this section, fiscal deficits (DFCT), enters the model 
with a positive sign in the current period and a negative sign in the one-period 
lagged level. However, neither of these coefficient estimates were statistically 
different from zero at the conventional levels of significance. This suggests that 
fiscal deficits did not have any significant positive or negative impact of economic 
growth in the sample of developing countries considered in this study during the 
period 1972-2001. 
 
Even though the exogenous model discussed above appears to have no evidence of 
misspecification problems and a number of explanatory variables enter the model 
with the expected signs and are statistically significant, the assumption of strict 
exogeneity of all explanatory variables made in this model is implausible 
theoretically and might not be optimal for our model. As argued earlier, the 
causality between some of the right-hand variables in our model and economic 
growth is likely to be two-way causality – that is, not only do changes in the 
explanatory variables affect growth but also the reverse causality is a likely 
possibility. For example, when an economy enjoys high economic growth, 
independently of fiscal policy changes, government tax revenues will very likely go 
up and the size of the fiscal deficit will fall, and vice versa. Similarly, high economic 
growth is very likely to attract a higher level of investment in an economy.  One 
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may also argue that the levels of money supply and inflation in an economy are not 
strictly exogenous, but determined by the monetary authorities depending on the 
forecasted economic performance and by commercial banks in response to changes 
in market conditions. 
 
Based on the above discussion, therefore, some of the explanatory variables in our 
model could be treated as either predetermined or endogenous. As discussed 
earlier, treating some of the right-hand side variables as predetermined or 
endogenous increases the number of valid instruments, which may lead to 
improvements in the model performance. 
 
Taking into account the possibility of no strict exogeneity of the explanatory 
variables, we therefore estimate our model based on the predetermined and 
endogenous model specifications. In column (2) we present the results based on 
predetermined model specification. In this model, we treat all explanatory variables 
as predetermined with the exception of population growth (POP) and the degree of 
openness (OPEN), which are assumed exogenous. We assume population growth 
(POP) is exogenous for consistency with the theory and approach that most of the 
existing empirical studies on economic growth have followed. The decision to treat 
the degree of openness variable (OPEN) as exogenous is due to the fact that this 
depends not only on the demand for imports by the domestic economy, but also on 
the changes in the demand for the country’s exports by the rest of the world. This is 
an exogenous factor to the economy for small open economies like most, if not all, 
of the developing countries considered in this study.    
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The results of both the specification tests and coefficient estimates show significant 
improvement when compared with those for the exogenous model. As far as the 
results on the specification tests are concerned, note that the p-value of the 
specification tests for no second-order autocorrelation has increased considerably 
from 0.171 to 0.347. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions using the one-
step homoscedastic estimator (results are not reported here) also indicated some 
significant improvement as compared to those of the exogenous model.  In terms of 
the results on the coefficient estimates of the explanatory variables, these also 
shows that the statistical significance for many of these estimates has improved 
significantly as compared to those based on the exogenous model specification. 
Other noticeable improvement in relation to the coefficient estimates is that the 
coefficient estimates for the population growth variable (POP) have now become 
statistically significant in both current and one-lagged periods and the degree of 
openness variable (OPEN) has now become significant in the short-run. These 
results on the specification tests and coefficient estimates for the predetermined 
model, therefore, provide some evidence that our model is better specified as 
predetermined instead of exogenous. 
 
In column (3) we present the results based on the endogenous model specification. 
In this model, we treat investment (INV), fiscal deficits (DFCT), government 
expenditure (GOVEXP) and tax revenue (TAX) as endogenous variables based on the 
suggestions from the literature, population growth (POP) and the degree of 
openness (OPEN) are treated as exogenous variables based on the reasons given in 
the discussion above, and all other remaining variables are treated as 
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predetermined. The results of the model specification in this scenario present no 
evidence of model misspecification problems and those on coefficient estimates 
show that many of the explanatory variables enter the model with the expected 
signs.  
 
Comparison of the results based on the endogenous and predetermined model 
shows that the results of the estimated coefficients for the two models are quite 
similar for all the explanatory variables with the exception of openness (OPEN), 
grants (GRANTS) and fiscal deficits (DFCT). The openness variable (OPEN), though 
enters both models with a positive sign for both current and one-lagged periods, 
but is not statistically different from zero for the case of the endogenous model. 
The grants variable (GRANTS), though appearing to enter both models with a 
positive sign for both periods’ models, is only statistically significant in the current 
period for the endogenous model. The deficit variable (DFCT) is statistically 
insignificant in both periods for the case of the predetermined model while it is 
statistically significant in the one-lagged period for the case of the endogenous 
model.  
 
When comparing the results of the specification tests for the two models, however, 
these show that the predetermined model is slightly better than the endogenous 
model (the p-value of the specification tests for no second-order autocorrelation is 
0.347 for the predetermined model and 0.339 for the endogenous model). On the 
basis of these results, therefore, it can be argued that, although there is no 
significant difference in treating investment and fiscal variables as either 
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predetermined or endogenous, our model still performs better when modelled as 
predetermined. 
 
Turning to the inference on the coefficient estimates for our preferred model 
specification, the predetermined model, lagged GDP (GDP-1) enters the model with 
a negative and statistically significant sign, suggesting that the set of developing 
countries considered in this study experienced conditional convergence during the 
period 1972-2001. Investment (INV), degree of openness (OPEN), a proxy for 
financial deepening (M2), government expenditure (GOVEXP) and grants (GRANTS) 
enter the model with the expected positive sign. However, only the investment 
(INV) variable is statistically significant for both the current and one-lagged period 
levels. The degree of openness (OPEN), proxy for financial deepening (M2) and 
government expenditure (GOVEXP) are statistically significant in the current period 
only, while grants (GRANTS) is statistically insignificant in both periods. 
 
The estimated coefficients for population growth (POP), inflation (INFL) and tax 
revenue (TAX) have a positive sign in both the current and one-lagged periods. 
However, only population growth (POP) is significant in both periods, while tax 
revenue (TAX) is significant in the current period only, and inflation (INFL) is 
significant in the one-lag period only. This section’s focus variable, DFCT, enters the 
model with a negative but statistically insignificant sign for both the current and 
one-lagged periods, which suggests that fiscal deficits did not have any significant 
impact on economic growth. 
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To sum up on our overall results with respect to the effect of fiscal deficits on 
economic growth, which is the major focus of analysis in this section, the evidence 
at hand suggests that fiscal deficits per se did not have any significant impact on 
economic growth in the set of developing countries considered in this study. As 
discussed earlier, we also find no evidence of any presence of a non-linear 
relationship between fiscal deficits and growth either. In comparison with the 
empirical studies we reviewed in Chapter Three, our findings are generally similar 
to those of Nelson and Singh (1994) who also find no evidence of significant impact 
of fiscal deficits on economic growth in a cross-section of seventy developing 
countries. However, they are in sharp contrast to the study by Adam and Bevan 
(2005) which finds the presence of a non-linear relationship between deficits and 
economic growth in the context of developing countries.52  
 
This section was devoted to the analysis of the impact of fiscal deficits per se on 
economic growth. However, the literature we reviewed in Chapter Three shows 
that the impact of fiscal deficits on growth may depend on the ways in which the 
deficits are financed and what deficit financing is used for. The next two sections, 
therefore, examine the economic growth impact of the alternative ways of deficit 
financing and the components of government expenditure, respectively.  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
52 However, it should be noted that there are differences between these studies with regard to the 
model specification, time period and sample of countries considered. 
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6.4 Deficit Financing and Economic Growth 
As mentioned above, this section considers the growth impact of the alternative 
ways of financing fiscal deficits. The rationale for doing so is that, as discussed 
earlier in Chapter Three, a strand of the literature on deficit-growth connection 
shows that the impact of fiscal deficits on growth may depend on the ways fiscal 
deficits are financed. Following this, we hypothesised the following in Chapter Four. 
First, financing deficits by domestic borrowing is most likely to retard growth 
following the likely crowding out effect of private investment as this form of deficit 
financing leads to government competing with the private sector for the available 
financial resources. Second, financing deficits by excessive foreign borrowing may 
lead to unsustainable levels of foreign debt, something which can have detrimental 
effects on economic growth. Third, financing the budget deficit by monetisation 
may be inflationary, which can have negative effects on economic growth. To test 
these hypotheses, therefore, we substitute the deficit variable in our regression 
model by its different sources of financing. However, given the way the data are 
reported in our main source of data on fiscal variables - IMF’s Government Finance 
Statistics -  we are able to classify deficit financing into two categories only; 
domestic financing and external financing.53 The former comprises short-term and 
long-term borrowing from domestic financial institutions and the private sector, 
and changes in cash and deposits. On the other hand, the latter comprises 
borrowing from the international development institutions and foreign 
governments (IMF’s GFS manuals - various issues). 
                                                 
53 Note that both domestic financing and external financing are given as a percentage of GDP in the 
model estimation. 
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As in the previous section, we started our analysis be checking that our model does 
not suffer from a multicollinearity problem. This analysis was performed using 
correlation analysis and examination of variance inflation factors (VIFs). Correlation 
analysis was carried out by examining the correlation matrix presented in Table 6.2 
and this suggested that multicollinearity, though present, was not severe in our 
model as most of the respective pairwise correlations seemed to be reasonably low. 
The results on estimated VIFs (as reported below) again presented more evidence 
that multicollinearity was not serious in our model, as the highest score was just 
4.73 - which is far below the critical value of 10. 
 
Variation Inflation Factors 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
GOVEXP 4.73 0.211305 
TAX 3.01 0.332720 
M2 2.53 0.395695 
OPEN 2.15 0.465562 
DFIN 1.96 0.510862 
GRANTS 1.88 0.530883 
INV 1.77 0.565527 
INFL 1.74 0.576276 
EXTFIN 1.46 0.685864 
POP 1.37 0.731940 
GDP-1 1.33 0.752421 
Mean VIF   2.17  
 
Given this, we proceeded with the model estimation using the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) estimation technique and the results obtained by employing all three 
proposed specifications are presented in Table 6.4 below. 
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Table 6.4: Results on the effect of the alternative ways of deficit financing on 
economic growth 
Independent variables Exogenous 
(1) 
Predetermined 
(2) 
Endogenous 
(3) 
GDP-1 
 
-.6269126*** 
(0.001) 
-.5228141*** 
(0.000) 
-.5228141*** 
(0.000) 
GDP-2 
 
-.67888*** 
(0.000) 
-.6539782*** 
(0.000) 
-.6539782*** 
(0.000) 
POP 
 
.0262807** 
(0.063)   
.0248006** 
(0.034) 
.0248006** 
(0.034) 
POP-1 
 
.0117746 
(0.162) 
.0157206** 
(0.012) 
.0157206** 
(0.012) 
INFL .98930203** 
(0.015) 
.99032313** 
(0.024) 
.99032313** 
(0.024) 
INFL-1 .98176157*** 
(0.000) 
.98405656*** 
(0.000) 
.98405656*** 
(0.000) 
INV 1.0555659*** 
(0.000) 
1.0412581*** 
(0.001) 
1.0412581*** 
(0.001) 
INV-1 1.0625911** 
(0.020) 
1.0542306*** 
(0.005) 
1.0542306*** 
(0.005) 
OPEN 
 
1.0364886** 
(0.030) 
1.0490091*** 
(0.001) 
1.0490091*** 
(0.001) 
OPEN-1 .99478146 
(0.792) 
.98827113 
(0.394) 
.98827113 
(0.394) 
M2 .90232456*** 
(0.000)   
.90891464*** 
(0.000) 
.90891464*** 
(0.000) 
M2-1 1.0154388 
(0.567) 
1.0121416 
(0.550) 
1.0121416 
(0.550) 
DFIN 
 
.0005159 
(0.675) 
.0002091 
(0.848) 
.0002091 
(0.848) 
DFIN-1 
 
-.0023387** 
(0.098) 
-.0029796** 
(0.016) 
-.0029796** 
(0.016) 
EXTFIN 
 
.0016806 
(0.256)   
.0016682 
(0.272) 
.0016682 
(0.272) 
EXTFIN-1 
 
-.0058541** 
(0.080) 
-.0063697** 
(0.019) 
-.0063697** 
(0.019) 
GOVEXP 
 
.93591389*** 
(0.001) 
.93269606*** 
(0.001) 
.93269606*** 
(0.001) 
GOVEXP-1 
 
1.038165 
(0.274) 
1.0578511** 
(0.045) 
1.0578511** 
(0.045) 
TAX .0072586*** 
(0.000) 
.0066872*** 
(0.000) 
.0066872*** 
(0.000) 
TAX-1 
 
.0017395 
(0.494) 
.0012105 
(0.473) 
.0012105 
(0.473) 
GRANTS 
 
1.0036857 
(0.298) 
1.003739 
(0.144) 
1.003739 
(0.144) 
GRANTS-1 1.0005874 
(0.842) 
.99940428 
(0.812) 
.99940428 
(0.812) 
Observations 
Number of Countries 
Wald Test of joint Significance 
Test of serial autocorrelation 
First order (m1) 
Second order (m2) 
49 
20 
0.0000 
 
0.0191 
0.2112 
49 
20 
0.0000 
 
0.0254 
0.3077  
49 
20 
0.0000 
 
0.0254 
0.3077 
- *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively 
- The values in parentheses under the coefficients are P-values 
- The problem of data availability means that only 20 (out of 31 countries developing countries 
included in our sample) are considered in our model estimations here. 
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It is important to note that, as in the previous section, we will concentrate initially 
on model specification and selection of preferred model(s) and then make 
inferences on the estimated coefficients made for our preferred model(s) later on.  
 
Turning to the results presented in Table 6.4, column (1) reports the results 
corresponding to the exogenous model specification. The test for autocorrelation 
shows no evidence of serial correlation in the first differenced residuals at order 2 
(m1 = 0.019 and m2 = 0.211). The model also passed the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions.54  Thus, the model passes both specification tests, and 
in doing so, presents evidence of no misspecification problems. 
 
Similar to the results in the previous section, the coefficient on the lagged GDP 
(GDP-1) is negative and strongly significant, thus providing further evidence of 
conditional convergence in the studied countries. In addition, the coefficient 
estimates on investment (INV), degree of openness (OPEN), a proxy for financial 
deepening (M2), government expenditure (GOVEXP) and grants (GRANTS) are again 
positive, consistent with the results in the previous section and the theory. 
However, only the investment variable (INV) appears to have significantly 
influenced economic growth in both periods. The coefficients for the degree of 
openness (OPEN), a proxy for financial deepening (M2) and government 
expenditure (GOVEXP) are statistically significant in the current period only, while 
grants (GRANTS) is again insignificant in both periods.  
                                                 
54  Note that the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions was performed for a one-step 
homoscedastic estimator case (we do not report the results here) to check if overidentiying 
restrictions are valid. 
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Again, the coefficients for population growth (POP), inflation (INFL) and tax revenue 
(TAX) are positive, consistent with our results in the previous section. However, 
only the coefficients for inflation (INFL) appear to be statistically significant in both 
the current and one-lagged periods, while the coefficients for population growth 
(POP) and tax revenue (TAX) are significant in the current period only.  
 
The results on our main variables of interest in this section - domestic financing 
(DFIN) and external financing (EXTFIN) of deficits shows that both variables entered 
the model with a positive sign in the current period and a negative sign in the one-
lagged period, although the results were statistically significant for the lagged 
period only. These results, therefore, suggest that both domestic financing and 
external financing of deficits, while not having any immediate significant effect on 
economic growth, exerted a negative and statistically significant effect on growth 
with a lag.    
 
Generally, analysis of the results based on the exogenous specification shows that 
the model does not face misspecification problems and most of the explanatory 
variables enter the model with the expected signs. However, as argued in the 
previous section, the assumption of strict exogeneity might not be optimal (i.e., it is 
unrealistic) for our model. We suggest that a number of explanatory variables in 
our model should be considered as either predetermined or endogenous. Thus, it is 
important that we re-estimate our model using the predetermined and endogenous 
specifications. 
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On the basis of the above, columns (2) and (3) present the results based on 
predetermined and endogenous model specifications, respectively. We follow the 
criteria used in the previous section to specify these models. In the predetermined 
model, we treat all explanatory variables as predetermined with the exception of 
population growth and the degree of openness variables, which are treated as 
strictly exogenous. For the endogenous model, we treat all the fiscal variables and 
investment variable as endogenous, population growth and the degree of openness 
variables are treated as strictly exogenous, and all other variables are considered as 
predetermined.  
 
Comparing columns (2) and (3) shows that the results based on the predetermined 
and endogenous model estimations are quite similar in terms of test statistics and 
coefficient estimates. Both models passed the specification tests of no 
autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals at order 2 (m1 = 0.025 and m2 = 
0.308) and the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions.  The coefficient estimates 
on the explanatory variables are also similar in terms of signs, significance and 
magnitude. This suggests that it does not make a difference in treating fiscal 
variables and investment as either predetermined or endogenous.  
 
The results in columns (2) and (3) also show significant improvement as compared 
to the results based on exogenous model specification. The p-values of the 
specification tests for no first-order and second-order autocorrelation in columns 
(2) and (3) have increased from 0.019 to 0.025 and 0.211 to 0.308, respectively. The 
results also show some improvement in the coefficient estimates – e.g. p-values for 
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many coefficient estimates have improved and the coefficient estimates for two 
more variables, population growth (POP) and government expenditure (GOVEXP) 
have now become statistically significant in both periods.   These results provide 
further evidence that our model is better modelled as either predetermined or 
endogenous - hence our preferred models in this section. 
 
Further analysis of the results on the coefficient estimates for our preferred models 
show that these are largely similar to those of our preferred model in the previous 
section. Once again, Lagged GDP enters our preferred models with a negative and 
statistically significant sign. Similarly, coefficient estimates for investment (INV) and 
population growth (POP) are positive and statistically significant for both the 
current and one-lagged period as in the previous section, while those for the 
degree of openness (OPEN), a proxy for financial deepening (M2) and tax revenue 
(TAX) are again positive and statistically significant in the current period only. Note 
also that the grants variable (GRANTS) is again positive but statistically insignificant 
in both periods.   
 
As far as the results for the remaining control variables used in the estimations are 
concerned, inflation (INFL) and government expenditure (GOVEXP) now enters our 
preferred models with a positive and statistically significant sign in both periods. 
These results are slightly different from the ones we obtained for these variables in 
the previous section.  
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Turning to this section’s focus variables, domestic financing (DFIN) and external 
financing (EXTFIN) are negative and statistically significant for the one-lagged 
period in all scenarios. These results imply that both forms of deficit financing 
exerted a significant negative effect on economic growth in developing countries 
with a lag. It is important to point out that these results are somewhat surprising 
given our earlier results that the overall fiscal deficits did not have any significant 
impact on growth in developing countries. However, based on a careful 
investigation of this paradox in terms of the results on the overall deficit and deficit 
financing, and the procedures we followed in carrying out the estimations, we 
suspect that this is a data quality issue. Recall that, while we included the total fiscal 
deficit variable in the empirical model that we used to estimate the impact of the 
overall fiscal deficits on growth, this variable was simply replaced by the two 
variables representing the sources of deficit financing in the model that examines 
the growth impact of the ways the fiscal deficits are financed. Another possible 
explanation of these differences in the results is that our model estimations in this 
section employs a smaller sample (only 20 countries and 49 observations) than the 
one we used in estimating the impact of overall fiscal deficits on growth (23 
countries and 55 observations)55.  
 
6.5 Composition of Government Expenditure and Economic Growth 
Research on the relationship between the composition of government expenditure 
and economic growth has shed some light that certain components of government 
                                                 
55Hence, this suggests that the results are also sensitive to the use of different model formulations 
and the set of countries picked up in model estimation. 
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expenditure lead to higher economic growth than others (Landau, 1983; Aschauer, 
1989; Barro, 1990, 1991; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin; 1995; Chu et al., 1995; Devarajan et al., 1996; Ghosh and 
Gregoriou, 2006; among others). Many observers in this research classify 
government expenditures into ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ expenditures, and 
argue that spending associated with the former category promotes economic 
growth while spending associated with the latter category has little or no impact on 
economic growth (Landau, 1983; Aschauer, 1989; Barro, 1990, 1991; Chu et al., 
1995; Barro and Sala-i-Martin; 1995; Devarajan et al., 1996; Ghosh and Gregoriou, 
2006; among others).  
 
A strand of literature we reviewed in Chapter Three shows that fiscal deficits 
associated with ‘productive expenditure’ will most likely enhance economic growth, 
while fiscal deficits associated with some categories of largely current expenditure 
will have little or no impact on growth. In this section, therefore, we empirically 
investigate whether fiscal deficits in the sample of developing countries considered 
in our study were associated with productive expenditure or not. We proceed with 
this investigation in two steps. First, we consider the economic classification of 
government expenditure by disaggregating total government expenditure into 
capital expenditure and current expenditure. Second, we consider the functional 
classification (also known as sectoral classification) of government expenditure by 
disaggregating government expenditure into various categories of sectoral 
spending. 
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(i) Economic classification of government expenditure and economic growth 
Economic classification of government expenditure categorises expenditure into 
capital and current expenditure. A commonly held view between these two types of 
government expenditure is that capital expenditure is most likely to promote 
economic growth while current expenditure will be less associated with economic 
growth (Deverajan et al., 1996). According to this view, therefore, government 
capital expenditure would be seen as productive expenditure and government 
current expenditure would be considered unproductive expenditure. However, the 
existing empirical literature finds conflicting results regarding the economic growth 
impact of these two types of expenditure. For example, studies by Aschauer (1989), 
Barro (1990, 1991) and Gupta et al. (2005) find that capital expenditure is 
associated with productive spending while current expenditure is associated with 
unproductive spending. On the other hand, however, Devarajan et al. (1996), and 
Ghosh and Gregoriou (2006) find that current spending has a positive effect on 
growth while capital spending has a negative effect on growth. Then again, in other 
studies, Holtz-Eakin (1994); and, Evans and Karras (1994) find that public capital 
investment has no significant impact on growth.  
 
Given these mixed results in the existing studies, we follow the spirit of Devarajan 
et al. (1996), Miller and Russek (1997), Ghosh and Gregoriou (2006), and Benos 
(2009) and refrain from making an a-priori classification of public expenditure into 
‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’. Instead, we allow the data to tell us which 
components of government expenditure were productive and which ones were 
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unproductive in the set of developing countries considered in our study. Our 
argument here is that fiscal deficits associated with financing economic expenditure 
found to be ‘productive’ would most likely be growth promoting in the context of 
developing countries, while deficit financing allocated towards expenditure that 
seems to be ‘unproductive’ will less likely promote growth. 
 
As in the previous sections, before we proceed with model estimation, we first 
checked for multicollinearity using both correlation analysis and estimation of 
variance inflation factors (VIFs). In terms of correlation analysis, investigation of all 
respective pairwise correlations (see Table 6.2) suggested no presence of 
multicollinearity problem in the model. Calculated VIFs (see estimated VIFs below) 
looked fine too as all were less than the critical value of ten. The highest VIF score 
was 4.46 while the mean VIF was 2.91. 
 
Variation Inflation Factors 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
CURREXP 4.86 0.205865 
TAX 3.33 0.300461 
CAPEXP 2.32 0.431713 
INV 2.09 0.478351 
OPEN 1.92 0.521112 
GRANTS 1.89 0.530486 
M2 1.79 0.558439 
DFCT 1.73 0.578044 
INFL 1.64 0.607998 
GDP-1 1.39 0.718126 
POP 1.36 0.732669 
Mean VIF   2.21  
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Having satisfied that multicollinearity is not a problem in our model, we went on to 
perform the regression analysis using all three Arellano and Bond (1991) model 
specifications, and the results are as presented in Table 6.5(a) below.  
 
In regression (1) all explanatory variables are assumed to be exogenous. The test 
for autocorrelation shows no evidence of serial autocorrelation in the first 
differenced residuals at order 2 (m1 = 0.698 and m2 = 0.4143). The model also 
passed the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions (results are not reported here) 
too.56 These results suggest that the model does not face specification problems. 
However, poor results of the coefficient estimates make one think that perhaps the 
assumption of strict exogeneity of all explanatory variables is not optimal and/or is 
unrealistic for our model. Besides, the results obtained in the previous two sections 
in this regard suggest that some of the explanatory variables are better modelled as 
either predetermined or endogenous instead of strictly exogenous.  
 
On the basis of the above, in regression (2) all explanatory variables are assumed to 
be predetermined with the exception of population growth and degree of openness, 
which are treated as strictly exogenous like in the previous sections. In regression 
(3) in turn, we treat all the fiscal variables and investment as endogenous, 
population growth and degree of openness are treated as treated as strictly 
exogenous, and all other variables are treated as predetermined. 
 
                                                 
56  Note that the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions was performed for a one-step 
homoscedastic estimator case (we do not report the results here) to check if overidentifying 
restrictions are valid. 
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The results of the specification tests for the two models are slightly better than the 
model that assumes strict exogeneity of all explanatory variables, hence providing 
further evidence that some of the explanatory variables in our model are better 
modelled as either predetermined or endogenous. Further analysis of the results of 
the two models also shows that, like in the previous section, it does not make a 
difference treating fiscal variables and investment as either predetermined or 
endogenous as the results for both test statistics and coefficient estimates in these 
two models are very similar.  
 
Table 6.5(a) Results on the effect of capital and current expenditure on economic 
growth 
Independent variables Exogenous 
(1) 
Predetermined 
(2) 
Endogenous 
(3) 
GDP-1 -.3136223 
(0.142) 
-.4617318*** 
(0.000) 
-.4617318*** 
(0.000) 
GDP-2 -.435288*** 
(0.007) 
-.5232596*** 
(0.000) 
-.5232596*** 
(0.000) 
POP 
 
.0271094** 
(0.051) 
.023161** 
(0.031) 
  .023161** 
(0.031) 
POP-1 .0011738 
(0.900) 
.0093506 
(0.107) 
.0093506 
(0.107) 
INFL .99708446 
(0.664) 
.9977225 
(0.741) 
.9977225 
(0.741) 
INFL-1 .98689286 
(0.158) 
.98226495** 
(0.026) 
.98226495** 
(0.026) 
INV 1.0566778*** 
(0.000) 
1.0452477*** 
(0.006) 
1.0452477*** 
(0.006) 
INV-1 1.0518576*** 
(0.004) 
1.0420815*** 
(0.002) 
1.0420815*** 
(0.002) 
OPEN 
 
1.0164515 
(0.413) 
1.0145955 
(0.471) 
1.0145955 
(0.471) 
OPEN-1 .97273314 
(0.193) 
.98701662 
(0.511) 
.98701662 
(0.511) 
M2 .94316655*** 
(0.003) 
.94327473*** 
(0.001) 
.94327473*** 
(0.001) 
M2-1 1.0055124 
(0.696) 
1.0060957 
(0.672) 
1.0060957 
(0.672) 
DFCT 
 
-.0009482 
(0.494) 
-.0017221 
(0.118) 
-.0017221 
(0.118) 
DFCT-1 
 
-.0014571 
(0.334) 
-.001452 
(0.210) 
-.001452 
(0.210) 
CURREXP 
 
.9927236 
(0.706) 
.9988152 
(0.953) 
.9988152 
(0.953) 
CURREXP-1 
 
.98996034 
(0.699) 
.97976964 
(0.412) 
.97976964 
(0.412) 
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CAPEXP 
 
.99108656 
(0.375) 
.99074678 
(0.246) 
.99074678 
(0.246) 
CAPEXP-1 
 
.99167445 
(0.352) 
.99985641 
(0.986) 
.99985641 
(0.986) 
TAX 
 
.004564*** 
(0.000) 
.0041407*** 
(0.000) 
.0041407*** 
(0.000) 
TAX-1 
 
.0027574** 
(0.054) 
.0027553** 
(0.031) 
.0027553** 
(0.031) 
GRANTS 
 
1.0028299 
(0.242) 
1.0033745 
(0.143) 
1.0033745 
(0.143) 
GRANTS-1 1.0024697 
(0.262) 
1.0016502 
(0.400) 
1.0016502 
(0.400) 
Observations 
Number of Countries 
Wald Test of joint Significance 
Test of serial autocorrelation 
First order (m1) 
Second order (m2) 
52 
22 
0.0000 
 
0.0698 
0.4143 
52 
22 
0.0000 
 
0.0773 
0.6905 
52 
22 
0.0000 
 
0.0773 
0.6905 
- *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively 
- The values in parentheses under the coefficients are P-values 
- The problem of data availability means that only 22 (out of 31 countries developing countries 
included in our sample) are considered in our model estimations here. 
 
 
Turning to the analysis of coefficient estimates in our preferred specifications, 
coefficient estimates for lagged GDP, Investment (INV), a proxy for financial 
deepening (M2) and grants (GRANTS) are quite similar to those we obtained in the 
previous two sections both in terms of the direction and significance. Population 
growth (POP) is now statistically significant in the current period only, while 
inflation (INFL) is statistically significant in the one-lagged period only. Contrary to 
our results in the previous two sections, degree of openness (OPEN) is now 
insignificant in both periods. Tax revenue (TAX) still enters our model with a 
positive sign and is now statistically significant in both periods. 
 
The estimated coefficients on the fiscal deficit variable (DFCT), after disaggregating 
government expenditure into current and capital expenditure, show that the effect 
of fiscal deficits on economic growth was not statistically different from zero, 
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consistent with our earlier results in section 6.357. These results again suggest that 
fiscal deficits did not have any significant effect on economic growth in the sample 
of developing countries we have considered in this study during the period 1972-
2001. 
 
With regard to the focus variables in this section, the results show that both current 
expenditure (CURREXP) and capital expenditure (CAPEXP) had positive but 
statistically insignificant effects on economic growth. This means that both capital 
expenditure and current expenditure were, on average, not productive in the 
sample of developing countries we have considered in this study during the period 
1972 – 2001.  However, we suspect that the lack of statistical significance may have 
been contributed by variability in productivity in the countries considered in our 
sample. 
 
(ii) Functional classification of government expenditure and economic growth 
In addition to the economic classification, government expenditure can be classified 
based on functional expenditure (also known as sectoral expenditure). In this 
section, therefore, we disaggregate government expenditure into functional 
expenditure to investigate which components of this expenditure were growth 
enhancing, if any, and which ones were not, and what this would imply on the 
deficit spending policy in developing countries.  
                                                 
57Thus, fiscal deficits variable enters our model as statistically not different from zero irrespective of 
whether we consider total government expenditure (as we did in section 6.3) or we disaggregate 
government expenditure into current and capital expenditure in our model. 
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Given the way data on functional expenditure are reported in IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics, our main source data on fiscal variables, our data on functional 
spending were classified into the following categories: spending on general public 
services, defence, education, health, economic services, social security and welfare, 
and other expenditure. However, due to the poor data availability and quality, social 
security and welfare expenditure and other expenditure categories were not 
included in our final model estimation and analysis. 
 
Before we proceed with our analysis, however, it is worth noting that neither 
economic theory nor empirical evidence provides clear-cut answers on the 
relationship between different types of sectoral composition of government 
expenditure and economic growth. The theory generally provides a rationale for 
government provision of goods and services based on the market failure to provide 
public goods and internalise externalities (Devarajan et al., 1996). Based on this 
theoretical reasoning, Arrow and Kurz (1970) and Barro (1990) present theoretical 
models showing that all government spending is productive.  
 
More recently, however, the development of endogenous growth theory a number 
of empirical studies have tried to link particular components sectoral spending 
(such as transport and communication, education and health) and economic growth. 
For example, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and Odedokun (2001) show that 
investment in transport and communications has a positive and significant impact 
on economic growth. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 2004), Barro and Lee (2001), 
Bleaney et al. (2001), Odedokun (2001) and, Ghosh and Gregoriou (2006) show that 
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spending on education has a positive impact on growth. Miller and Russek (1997), 
Bleaney et al. (2001), and, Ghosh and Gregoriou (2006) find that health expenditure 
has a positive impact on growth. On the other hand, Devarajan et al. (1996) find 
that expenditure in all these sectors – transport and communication, education and 
health – has either a negative or an insignificant impact on economic growth.  
 
As in the previous section, we proceed with our analysis here in the spirit of 
Devarajan et al. (1996), Ghosh and Gregoriou (2006) and Benos (2009) by not 
classifying public expenditure as being productive and unproductive to begin with, 
but let the data to tell us which components of sectoral spending were productive 
in the set of developing countries we have considered in our study. 
 
Once again, we started our analysis by checking for multicollinearity using 
correlation analysis and estimated variation inflation factors (VIFs).  Examination of 
relevant pairwise correlations (given in the correlation matrix presented in Table 
6.2) and VIFs (see calculated VIFs below) both suggested that multicollinearity is not 
an issue of concern in our model. The highest VIF score was 6.67 while the mean 
VIF was just 2.76. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
214 
 
Variation Inflation Factors 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
HLTHEXP 6.67 0.149910 
EDUEXP 5.12 0.195231 
TAX 4.66 0.214439 
OPEN 3.70 0.270541 
M2 2.59 0.385808 
PSEXP 2.40 0.415960 
DEFEXP 2.03 0.493419 
INV 1.94 0.514356 
ECONEXP 1.90 0.526262 
POP 1.79 0.559196 
GRANTS 1.51 0.664007 
DFCT 1.49 0.670959 
GDP-1 1.46 0.685027 
INFL 1.43 0.697632 
Mean VIF   2.76  
 
 
Given the results on the multicollinearity check above, we carried on with 
regression analysis and the results were as given in Table 6.5 (b) below. In 
regression (1) all the explanatory variables are treated as strictly exogenous. In 
regression (2) they are all treated as predetermined with the exception of 
population growth and degree of openness which are again considered as strictly 
exogenous like in the previous sections. In regression (3) in turn, all fiscal variables 
and investment are treated as endogenous, population growth and degree of 
openness are considered as strictly exogenous, and all other variables are treated 
as predetermined. 
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Table 6.5(b) Results on the effect of government functional spending on economic 
growth 
 
Independent variables Exogenous 
(1) 
Predetermined 
(2) 
Endogenous 
(3) 
 
GDP-1 -.6048181*** 
(0.003) 
-.5149819*** 
(0.001) 
-.5149819*** 
(0.001) 
GDP-2 -.9118759*** 
(0.000) 
-.8698699*** 
(0.000) 
-.8698699*** 
(0.000) 
POP 
 
.0268864*** 
(0.006) 
.0259719** 
(0.013) 
.0259719** 
(0.013) 
POP-1 -.0063358 
(0.563) 
-.0066219 
(0.638) 
-.0066219 
(0.638) 
INFL 1.000108 
(0.989) 
.99918164 
(0.913) 
.99918164 
(0.913) 
INFL-1 .98308784 
(0.108) 
.98340425** 
(0.064) 
.98340425** 
(0.064) 
INV 1.0768379*** 
(0.000) 
1.0633439*** 
(0.000) 
1.0633439*** 
(0.000) 
INV-1 1.0476566* 
(0.074) 
1.0518008** 
(0.044) 
1.0518008** 
(0.044) 
OPEN 
 
1.0433483** 
(0.020) 
1.0553147*** 
(0.009) 
1.0553147*** 
(0.009) 
OPEN-1 1.0080111 
(0.834) 
1.0049105 
(0.893) 
1.0049105 
(0.893) 
M2 .891092*** 
(0.000) 
.89336513*** 
(0.000) 
.89336513*** 
(0.000) 
M2-1 1.0563399* 
(0.061) 
1.0345917 
(0.165) 
1.0345917 
(0.165) 
DFCT 
 
-.0008887 
(0.717) 
-.0018668 
(0.335) 
-.0018668 
(0.335) 
DFCT-1 
 
.0011307 
(0.438) 
.0007856 
(0.524) 
.0007856 
(0.524) 
PSEXP 
 
1.0167872* 
(0.063) 
1.0148959 
(0.116) 
1.0148959 
(0.116) 
PSEXP-1 
 
.96880309** 
(0.021) 
.97014736** 
(0.046) 
.97014736** 
(0.046) 
DEFEXP 
 
1.0281636 
(0.120) 
1.0299214 
(0.110) 
1.0299214 
(0.110) 
DEFEXP-1 
 
.97749373 
(0.228) 
.97851428 
(0.223) 
.97851428 
(0.223) 
EDUEXP 
 
.9942491 
(0.723) 
.99720083 
(0.875) 
.99720083 
(0.875) 
EDUEXP-1 
 
1.0068161 
(0.641) 
1.0060699 
(0.655) 
1.0060699 
(0.655) 
HLTHEXP 
 
.94468882 
(0.154) 
.93227448** 
(0.043) 
.93227448** 
(0.043) 
HLTHEXP-1 
 
.97665023 
(0.417) 
.975106 
(0.360) 
.975106 
(0.360) 
ECONEXP 
 
1.008467 
(0.330) 
1.0135298 
(0.169) 
1.0135298 
(0.169) 
ECONEXP-1 
 
1.0043289 
(0.773) 
1.0072862 
(0.617) 
1.0072862 
(0.617) 
TAX .0020111 
(0.380) 
.0014046 
(0.503) 
.0014046 
(0.503) 
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TAX-1 
 
.0023876 
(0.219 
.0028994* 
(0.077) 
.0028994* 
(0.077) 
GRANTS 
 
.99894486 
(0.808) 
.99852459 
(0.729) 
.99852459 
(0.729) 
GRANTS 1.0007063 
(0.858) 
1.0002455 
(0.942) 
1.0002455 
(0.942) 
Observations 
Number of Countries 
Wald Test of joint Significance 
Test of serial autocorrelation 
First order (m1) 
Second order (m2) 
39 
17 
0.0000 
 
0.0501 
0.0591 
39 
17 
0.0000 
 
0.0620 
0.4201 
39 
17 
0.0000 
 
0.0620 
0.4201 
- *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively 
- The values in parentheses under the coefficients are P-values 
- The problem of data availability means that only 17 (out of 31 countries developing countries 
included in our sample) are considered in our model estimations here. 
 
The results on model specification are better in regressions (2) and (3) since the 
specification tests of no autocorrelation in the first differenced residual at order 2 
in these two regressions are m1 = 0.0620 and m2 = 0.4201 as compared to m1 = 
0.0501 and m2 = 0.0591 in regression (1). This means that treating explanatory 
variables, with the exception of population growth and the degree of openness, as 
either predetermined or endogenous makes it even more difficult to reject the 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals at order 2 as 
compared to when all explanatory variables in our model are treated as strictly 
exogenous. The results therefore suggest that some of the explanatory variables 
are better modelled as either predetermined or endogenous instead of strictly 
exogenous. 
 
Comparison of the results based on predetermined and endogenous specifications 
once again shows that the results for these two specifications are very similar with 
respect to both specification tests and coefficient estimates. This implies that it still 
does not make a difference in modelling fiscal variables and investment as either 
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predetermined or endogenous. It is also interesting to note that many coefficient 
estimates in these two specifications are largely consistent with those obtained in 
the first three versions of our model. For example, similar to the results for our 
preferred models in the previous three versions, lagged GDP is negatively and 
significantly associated with GDP growth. Additionally, like the results for our 
preferred models in the previous versions, investment (INV) appears to have a 
positive and statistically significant effect on economic growth in both periods, a 
proxy for financial deepening (M2) is statistically significant in the current period 
only and grants (GRANTS) is positive but statistically insignificant in both periods. 
 
As far as the results on the coefficient estimates for other variables in our model 
are concerned, population growth (POP), degree of openness (OPEN), inflation 
(INFL) and tax revenue (REV) still enter both models with a positive sign. However, 
population growth (POP) and degree of openness (OPEN) are statistically significant 
in the current period only, while inflation (INFL) and tax revenue (TAX) appear to be 
significant in the one-lagged period only.   
 
Regarding the results on the components of government expenditure, which is this 
section’s focus variables, we find that spending on education (EDUEXP), defence 
(DEFEXP) and economic services (ECONEXP) had positive but statistically 
insignificant effects on economic growth. On the other hand, health expenditure 
(HLTHEXP) had an instantaneous positive and significant effect on growth, while 
public service expenditure (PSEXP) had a significant positive effect on economic 
growth with a lag.  
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Finally, the results on the fiscal deficits variable (DFCT), once again, suggest that 
deficit spending did not have any statistically significant impact on economic 
growth in developing countries during the period 1972-2001. This finding is not 
surprising given the weak impact most of the components of government 
expenditure appear to have had on economic growth in developing countries as our 
empirical results suggest. 
 
To conclude on the composition of government expenditure and economic growth, 
our results show that most of the components of government expenditure did not 
have any significant impact on economic growth in developing countries for the 
period 1972-2001. These results hold when total government spending is 
disaggregated based on either economic classification or sectoral classification of 
government expenditure. The implication of this finding on the impact of deficit 
spending policy on economic growth is straightforward – deficit spending would not 
have a significant positive impact on economic growth when this spending is 
associated with financing government activities which are not growth enhancing. 
 
 
6.6 Analysis of the Results on Control Variables 
 
The major focus of discussion in sections 6.3 to 6.5 above was on the deficit-growth 
connection. The discussion examined the impact of fiscal deficits on economic 
growth. It also examined how the deficit-growth link depends on the alternative 
ways of deficit financing and the composition of government expenditure. This 
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section, in turn, discusses some general findings of the results for the control 
variables we considered in our regression model. To do this, we only consider the 
results from our preferred specifications from each version of the model we 
estimated in sections 6.3 – 6.5 above. These results are presented in Table 6.6 
below. 
 
Table 6.6: Summary of the results on control variables 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
GDP-1 -.4761598*** 
(0.000) 
-.5228141*** 
(0.000) 
-.4617318*** 
(0.000) 
-.5149819*** 
(0.001) 
GDP-2 -.5672662*** 
(0.000) 
-.6539782*** 
(0.000) 
-.5232596*** 
(0.000) 
-.8698699*** 
(0.000) 
POP 
 
.0205549** 
(0.027) 
.0248006** 
(0.034) 
.023161** 
(0.031) 
.0259719** 
(0.013) 
POP-1 .0132537** 
(0.021) 
.0157206** 
(0.012) 
.0093506 
(0.107) 
-.0066219 
(0.638) 
INFL .99644165 
(0.499) 
.99032313** 
(0.024) 
.9977225 
(0.741) 
.99918164 
(0.913) 
INFL-1 .98216231*** 
(0.004) 
.98405656*** 
(0.000) 
.98226495** 
(0.026) 
.98340425* 
(0.064) 
INV 1.0316874** 
(0.029) 
1.0412581*** 
(0.001) 
1.0452477*** 
(0.006) 
1.0633439*** 
(0.000) 
INV-1 1.0475103*** 
(0.000) 
1.0542306*** 
(0.005) 
1.0420815*** 
(0.002) 
1.0518008** 
(0.044) 
OPEN 
 
1.0258994* 
(0.058) 
1.0490091*** 
(0.001) 
1.0145955 
(0.471) 
1.0553147*** 
(0.009) 
OPEN-1 
 
.9955125 
(0.841) 
.98827113 
(0.394) 
.98701662 
(0.511) 
1.0049105 
(0.893) 
M2 .95598056*** 
(0.004) 
.90891464*** 
(0.000) 
.94327473*** 
(0.001) 
.89336513*** 
(0.000) 
M2-1 .98972208 
(0.363) 
1.0121416 
(0.550) 
1.0060957 
(0.672) 
1.0345917 
(0.165) 
DFCT 
 
-.0000256 
(0.989) 
 -.0017221 
(0.118) 
-.0018668 
(0.335) 
DFCT-1 
 
-.0016763 
(0.165) 
 -.001452 
(0.210) 
.0007856 
(0.524) 
DFIN 
 
 .0002091 
(0.848) 
  
DFIN-1 
 
 -.0029796** 
(0.016) 
  
EXTFIN 
 
 .0016682 
(0.272) 
  
EXTFIN-1 
 
 -.0063697** 
(0.019) 
  
GOVEXP 
 
.93171547* 
(0.068) 
.93269606*** 
(0.001) 
  
GOVEXP-1 
 
1.0214972 
(0.412) 
1.0578511** 
(0.045) 
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CURREXP 
 
  .9988152 
(0.953) 
 
CURREXP-1 
 
  .97976964 
(0.412) 
 
CAPEXP 
 
  .99074678 
(0.246) 
 
CAPEXP-1 
 
  .99985641 
(0.986) 
 
PSEXP 
 
   1.0148959 
(0.116) 
PSEXP-1 
 
   .97014736** 
(0.046) 
DEFEXP 
 
   1.0299214 
(0.110) 
DEFEXP-1 
 
   .97851428 
(0.223) 
EDUEXP 
 
   .99720083 
(0.875) 
EDUEXP-1 
 
   1.0060699 
(0.655) 
HLTHEXP 
 
 
 
  .93227448** 
(0.043) 
HLTHEXP-1 
 
   .975106 
(0.360) 
ECONEXP 
 
   1.0135298 
(0.169) 
ECONEXP-1 
 
   1.0072862 
(0.617) 
TAX 
 
.0047506*** 
(0.000) 
.0066872*** 
(0.000) 
.0041407*** 
(0.000) 
.0014046 
(0.503) 
TAX-1 
 
.0015185 
(0.213) 
.0012105 
(0.473) 
.0027553** 
(0.031) 
.0028994* 
(0.077) 
GRANTS 
 
1.0030044 
(0.196) 
1.003739 
(0.144) 
1.0033745 
(0.143) 
.99852459 
(0.729) 
GRANTS-1 
 
1.0014874 
(0.486) 
.99940428 
(0.812) 
1.0016502 
(0.400) 
1.0002455 
(0.942) 
Observations 
Number of Countries 
Wald Test of joint Significance 
Test of serial autocorrelation 
First order (m1) 
Second order (m2) 
55 
23 
0.0000 
 
  0.0833 
0.3475 
49 
20 
0.0000 
 
0.0254 
0.3077 
52 
22 
0.0000 
 
0.0773 
0.6905 
39 
17 
0.0000 
 
0.0620 
0.4201 
- *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively 
- The values in parentheses under the coefficients are P-values 
- The number of observations and countries differs across models due to the lack of availability of 
data for some explanatory variables for some of the countries we have included in our sample. 
 
 
Column (1) reports the results for the preferred model specification on the effect of 
total fiscal deficits on economic growth. Column (2) reports the results for the 
preferred specification on the effect of the alternative ways of deficit financing on 
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growth. Column (3) reports the results for the preferred specification concerning 
the effect of current and capital expenditure on growth. Finally, column (4) reports 
the results for the preferred specification on the effect of government functional 
expenditure on growth. 
 
Analysis of the estimated coefficients for the control variables shows mixed results. 
Some of the results are broadly consistent with the literature. For instance, there is 
some evidence of the presence of conditional convergence, indicated by the 
negative and statistically significant value of the estimated coefficient on the initial 
income variable. In addition, the results for the estimated coefficients for the 
investment and degree of financial deepening variables suggest that these variables 
had the expected positive and statistically significant impact on economic growth. 
Other results, however, are not entirely in support of the literature. For example, 
the result for the openness variable suggests that a higher degree of openness was 
positively associated with higher economic growth as expected, although the 
statistical evidence is not entirely conclusive and robust. Also, the results show that 
- contrary to the standard notion - inflation had a significant positive effect on 
growth with a lag, a finding that suggests that inflation was helpful rather than 
harmful to economic growth in studied sample of developing countries during the 
study period. 
 
In relation to other control variables, the results suggest that population growth 
exerted a significant positive effect on economic growth in the short-run, while 
grants, although entering all model estimations with the expected positive sign, did 
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not have any significant effect on economic growth in the considered sample of 
developing countries during the study period. Finally, the estimated coefficients on 
tax revenue, although positive in sign in all model estimations, were not entirely 
robust. 
 
These results for the control variables are further explained and discussed in a more 
detail below.   
 
(i) Initial Income 
The estimated coefficient on the initial income variable (GDP-1) is consistently 
negative and statistically significant in all four cases, suggesting that the sample of 
developing countries considered in our study experienced conditional convergence 
during the period 1972-2001. Conditional convergence refers to the tendency for 
initially poor economies to grow systematically more quickly than the initially richer 
economies once a set of other conditioning factors has been controlled for (Roberts, 
2006; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, and Sala-i-Martin, 1996). Literature on 
economic growth and convergence shows that a negative coefficient on the initial 
income variable, when other appropriate additional explanatory variables are 
included in the growth regression equation, suggests conditional convergence 
(Quah, 1995; Estrada et al., 2015).  It should be noted that our estimated coefficient 
on the initial income that ranges between -0.47 to -0.52 compares well with those 
reported in the studies by Hopper and Marquez (1995) and Roberts (1999) who 
223 
 
estimated it to be around -0.43 and those by Bairam (1987) and McCombie and 
Thirlwall (1994) who found it to be about -0.50. 
 
(ii) Investment 
Our results on the investment variable (INV) are very consistent with the literature. 
The coefficient estimate of this variable is consistently positive and strongly 
significant in all four scenarios, which suggests that investment was a very 
important determinant of economic growth in the studied group of developing 
countries during the sample period.  This finding is very much in line with 
predictions of economic theory that investment is an important determinant of 
economic growth. This finding in terms of the importance of investment in 
economic growth is also in line with the empirical results obtained in many studies 
on the relationship between investment and economic growth such as Anderson 
(1990), Khan and Reinhart (1990), Chow (1993), Patnaik and Chandrasekhar (1996), 
Anwer and Sampath (1999), Zhang (2003), among others.  
 
(iii) Financial Deepening 
The estimated coefficient of the proxy for financial deepening (M2) is consistently 
positive in both the current and the one-lagged periods, but statistically significant 
in the current period only. This suggests that financial sector deepening exerted an 
instantaneous positive effect on economic growth in the sample of developing 
countries considered in this study, although this effect tended to disappear after a 
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short period58. The finding that financial sector deepening does contribute to 
economic growth is consistent with the standard conventional wisdom and much of 
the evidence on financial development that it enhances economic growth. This 
finding is in line with the with the findings obtained in the empirical studies by King 
and Levine (1993), De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995), Levine (1997, 2005), Arestis 
and Demetriades (1997), Levine et al. (2000), Beck et al. (2000), Ghirmay (2004), 
Antony and Tajudeen (2010), Cihak et al. (2012), Estrada et al. (2015), Ghildiyal et al. 
(2015) – among others, who report a positive and significant effect of various 
indicators of financial deepening on economic growth. However, there are also a 
number of empirical studies (such as Ram, 1999; Andersen and Tap, 2003; 
Rousseau and Watchel, 2005; among others) that find the effect of financial 
deepening on economic growth to be weak. On the other hand, some studies (for 
example, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Demirgue-Kunt and Detragiache, 1999; 
Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Gennaioli et al., 2012; Sahay et al., 2015) even find 
that financial sector deepening, especially rapid and excessive financial deepening 
in an environment that lack satisfactory legal or regulatory infrastructure to exploit 
financial sector development successfully or financial deepening that is associated 
with rather too rapid growth of credit, can lead to financial crisis - which in turn can 
result in a serious negative effect on economic growth.  
 
 
                                                 
58 It is interesting to note that this finding is consistent with the findings in a number of studies on 
the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy using the St. Louis framework we reviewed in Chapter 
Three. Recall that a number of these studies reported that the impact of M2 (as a ratio of GNP or 
GDP, and which is used as a proxy of monetary policy in these studies) on economic growth is 
positive and instantaneous, although this impact tends to disappear quickly. 
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(iv) Openness 
The results on the estimated coefficients on the degree of openness variable 
(OPEN) suggest that openness exerted a positive effect on economic growth in the 
sample of developing countries considered in our study, although the statistical 
evidence is not entirely conclusive and robust. The estimated coefficient of this 
variable in the short run, although exhibiting the expected positive in sign in all four 
scenarios, was not statistically different from zero in one scenario. On the other 
hand, the results on the estimated coefficient of the variable in the one-lagged 
period shows that, although positive in all four scenarios, they were not statistically 
significant in all cases.  
 
A number of factors could probably explain our inconclusive and non-robust results 
on the effect of openness on economic growth in the sample of developing 
countries considered in this study. First, most of the developing countries followed 
protectionist trade policies for a significant part of our study’s sample period, 1970s 
to mid-1980s or early-1990s. This point is also raised in Ulasan (2012) who argue 
that lack of conclusive evidence on the openness-growth connection in developing 
countries could be partly explained by the fact that substantial part of the studies 
on this issue use data that cover the pre-economic reforms of mid-1980s or early-
1990s period when most of the developing countries followed protectionist trade 
policies.  
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Second, dependence by most of the developing countries on the exports of primary 
commodities which tend to face cyclical price collapses and low-elasticity of 
demand (Prebisch, 1950; Shafaeddin, 2005; Baldwin, 2008) and therefore making 
expansion of their production and exports less attractive. In addition, exports of 
primary agricultural commodities from these countries have for many years been 
affected by the support many of the developed countries provide to their 
agricultural producers through a number of policy measures, such as tariffs that 
discriminate against agricultural imports and subsidies that lower production costs 
and encourage greater production (Tokarick, 2003; Fenira, 2015). In fact, these 
agricultural support policies in developed countries have often been cited as one of 
the major reasons many developing countries have failed to achieve rapid 
expansion of their agricultural exports (Fenira, 2015, p. 478).  
 
Third, weak contribution of openness to growth in developing countries can also be 
explained by failure by many of these countries to gain productivity growth through 
international trade due to the lack of complementary inputs (such as appropriate 
skills levels and enough capital intensities) these countries need in order to be able 
to adapt goods and new techniques invented in more technologically advanced 
countries (Basu and Weil, 1998; Acemoglu, and Zilibotti, 2001; Andersen and Babula, 
2008; Sakyi et al., 2012)59. In fact, some empirical studies such as Dowrick and 
Golley (2004), Kim and Lin (2009) and Kim (2011) have suggested that trade 
openness has benefited developed countries more than developing countries due 
to inability of the developing countries to increase productivity growth by taking 
                                                 
59 Note that productivity growth has been identified in the literature as one of the channels though 
which openness can enhance economic growth (see Andersen and Babula, 2008). 
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advantage of knowledge accumulation and technology spillovers, even though 
there are no barriers to the diffusion of technology.   
 
Fourth, our mixed results on the degree of openness variable may also be an 
indication that the results are somewhat sensitive to different model specifications 
and the set of countries picked up during model estimations.   
 
It is worth noting, however, that our inconclusive and non-robust results in relation 
to the effect of openness on economic growth are not new. In this regard, note that 
whether openness has any significant effect on economic growth in developing 
countries remains very much an unresolved question in the empirical literature. On 
one hand, one set of empirical studies (such as Sachs and Warner, 1995; Sinha and 
Sinha, 1996; Edwards, 1998; Yanikkaya, 2003; Mbabazi et al., 2006; among others) 
find openness to be positively and strongly associated with economic growth in 
developing countries. On the other hand, another set of studies such as Rodriguez 
and Rodrik (2001), Brunner (2003), Sarkar (2007) and Fenira (2015), among others, 
find very little evidence that openness is significantly associated with economic 
growth in developing countries, when other factors are controlled for. While 
differences with regard to the definitions and measures of openness, model 
specifications and econometric techniques used, time-period and sample of 
countries studied could explain the lack of consensus in the empirical literature on 
this issue (Greenaway et al., 2002; Sakyi et al., 2012), these mixed results also 
shows that a definitive evidence on the impact of openness on economic growth, 
particularly for developing countries, is not yet known.  
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(v) Population Growth 
The coefficient estimate on the population growth variable (POP) is uniformly 
positive and significant especially in the short-run. As pointed out earlier, the 
population growth variable is commonly included in the empirical growth models as 
a proxy for labour force growth. Furthermore, as Nelson and Singh (1994), citing 
Feder (1983), points out, population growth can also be included as an explanatory 
variable in empirical growth models to ascertain if there exists a labour surplus 
situation, and if such a situation exists, whether it hurts or helps economic growth 
in developing countries (p. 170)60. Hence, our finding of a consistently positive and 
significant effect of population growth variable in the short run may be taken as an 
indication that labour surplus situation was not the general case for the sample 
countries in the period under investigation, at least in the short run, and that 
output grew in response to additional labour inputs.61   
 
Our finding supports what is known as a revisionism viewpoint in literature, which 
suggests that population growth positively, contribute to economic growth (Darrat 
and Al-Yousif, 1999). According to this viewpoint, there are at least three channels 
through which population growth can stimulates economic growth. First, 
population growth increases the size of the labour force available to produce and 
                                                 
60 In turn, Nelson and Singh (1994) include population growth for this reason as an explanatory 
variable in their study “The Deficit-Growth Connection: Some Recent Evidence from Developing 
countries”. Other empirical studies on economic growth for developing countries that use 
population growth variable for similar reason as an explanatory variable in their empirical models 
include, for example, Feder (1983), Singh (1985) and Singh (1992), among others.  
61 Note that this finding is consistent with that of Feder (1983) who found a positive and significant 
impact of population growth on economic growth for semi-industrialised economies during the 
period 1964-1973. It is, however, different from the finding by Nelson and Singh (1994) who report 
population growth to have had no significant impact on growth in a set of seventy developing 
countries over the period 1970-1989. 
229 
 
this will thus positively contribute to economic growth. In addition, an increase in 
the size of the labour force can help firms to produce based on the division of 
labour and specialisation, which will also most likely increase productivity and 
therefore the level of output. Second, population growth increases the market size 
for goods and services and this pushes firms to use available resources more 
efficiently and/or innovate in order to meet the increased market-demand. 
Efficiency in use of resources and innovation in turn leads to economic growth. 
Third, population growth is likely to pressurise governments to develop 
infrastructure (such as transport and communication, schools and hospitals, etc.), 
something which will most likely boost economic growth and development 
(Boserup, 1965, Simon, 1987, Darrat and Al-Yousif, 1999; among others).  
 
However, it is important to mention that the finding that population growth 
stimulated growth in our sample countries in the period under investigation goes 
against the popular prediction in the growth theory literature that population 
growth is detrimental to economic growth.62 Although, this theoretical prediction 
that population growth is harmful to economic growth is also not yet well 
supported empirically (Temple, 1999 p. 142). In an attempt to explain lack of 
definitive empirical support to this theoretical prediction, Kelley (1988) argues that 
some public policies are likely to exacerbate the ‘expected’ negative effects of 
population growth.  Thus, taking into account that empirical model estimation in 
this study controls for various aspects of public policy, perhaps we can rule out, at 
least to some extent, the possibility that the ‘expected’ negative effect of 
                                                 
62 The key papers in this literature are Malthus (1798) and Solow (1956).   
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population growth on economic growth is made stronger by such public policies. 
Moreover, it is argued in the literature that the ‘expected’ small negative effect of 
labour force growth on economic growth is partially mediated changes in labour 
force participation (Brander and Dowrick, 1994; Pritchett, 1996; Temple, 1999). On 
this basis, therefore, we also suspect that actual changes in labour composition and 
participation in developing countries may be one of the reasons for our finding of 
significant positive effect of population growth on economic growth. 
 
(vi) Inflation 
The coefficient estimates for the inflation variable suggest that, while inflation 
appears to have had a weak impact on economic growth in the short run, it had a 
positive and significant impact on growth with a lag. This suggests that moderate 
inflation of between 8 – 17 percent on average (see Table 5.7) that our sample of 
developing countries experienced during the study period was positively rather 
than negatively related with growth especially in the long term. While these results 
provide evidence in support of the structuralists view that inflation is essential for 
economic growth (Mallik and Chowdhury, 2001; Hussain and Malik, 2011), they are 
contrary to the general theoretical prediction and common belief that inflation 
impedes economic growth.  
 
While these results appear somewhat surprising given the level of inflation 
experienced in this set of countries during the study period, they are in line with 
several other empirical studies such as Tobin (1965), Hess and Morris (1996), Shi 
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(1999), Mallik and Chowdhury (2001), Hussain and Malik (2011), among others, that 
also find inflation to have a positive and significant effect on economic growth.63  
 Furthermore, the results are consistent with a number of existing empirical studies 
that find ‘moderate’ inflation to be positively associated with growth (See for 
example, Khan and Senhadji, 2001; Gillman et al., 2002; Drukker et al., 2005; 
Kremer et al., 2009; Bick, 2010; among others). Although these studies also suggest 
that this ‘moderate’ inflation can positively influence economic growth only until a 
certain threshold level beyond which it starts to impede growth. Most of these 
studies report varied threshold levels for developed and developing countries. For 
example, Khan and Senhadji (2001) report the threshold of between 1 - 3 percent 
for developed countries and 11 - 12 percent for developing countries. Gillman et al. 
(2002) find the threshold points of 1 percent for developed countries and 11 
percent for developing countries. Drukker et al. (2005) find the threshold of about 
19 percent for a mixed sample of developed and developing countries, but different 
thresholds points of about 3 percent and 13 percent for developed and developing 
countries, respectively. Kremer et al. (2009) estimate the threshold of 2 percent for 
developed countries and 17 percent for developed countries. Bick (2010) finds the 
threshold of about 12 percent for developed countries and 19 percent for 
developing countries.64  
                                                 
63 On the other hand, however, it worth pointing out that our results are in sharp contrast to the 
ones obtained in several other studies on developing countries. For example, the study by Nelson 
and Singh (1994) finds that inflation had a negative and significant impact on growth in a set of 
seventy developing countries during the period 1970-1979.63 In addition, the studies by Easterly et 
al., (1997) and Calderon & Serven (2003) find inflation to be a deterrent to economic growth for a 
number of Latin-American countries. 
64 In other similar studies on the issue, Bruno (1995) and Bruno and Easterly (1998) find that 
economic growth on average increased as inflation rates rose from negative or low rates to about 20 
– 25 percent threshold level for 127 countries using data for the period 1960-1992. Pollin and Zhu 
(2005) find that inflation is associated with some gains in GDP growth up to about 15 - 18 percent 
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While our study does not estimate a ‘growth-maximising’ or a ‘threshold’ rate of 
inflation for the sample of countries under investigation65, the threshold levels of 
inflation reported in the studies reviewed above shows that the level of inflation 
experienced, on average, in the sample of developing countries considered in our 
study was well within the range that several other studies have found inflation to 
be positively related with growth in developing countries.   
 
(vii) Other Variables 
Turning briefly to the variables that entered our empirical model under the 
consideration of the government budget constraint, the results on the effect of 
taxation (TAX) on economic growth are inconclusive. As depicted in Table 6.6, the 
estimated coefficient of this variable, although consistently positive in sign in all 
scenarios in the short run, it was statistically significant in three out of four cases, 
with the insignificant estimate being the one with least number of observations (39 
observations) and countries (17 countries). The results also show that tax was 
positively and significantly associated with growth with a lag in two cases only, 
while in the other two cases it was not significant.  
 
These mixed results on the tax revenue variable may be an indication of the point 
we raised earlier that the results are somewhat sensitive to different model 
                                                                                                                                          
inflation threshold for a cross-country study of 80 developed and developing countries. Baglan and 
Yoldas (2014) find that inflation enhances growth only up to a threshold point of 12 percent using 
data on a panel of 92 developing countries.  
65 We do not perform this estimation as it is beyond the scope and focus of our study. Besides, as 
Ghosh and Phillips (1998 p.41) point out, such rate might be expected to somewhat differ across 
countries.  
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specifications and the set of countries picked up during model estimations. Also, we 
suspect that these mixed results on the tax revenue variable could a data quality 
and availability issue as significant amount of data for this variable for a number of 
countries and over a period of time was missing from the sources we used to collect 
data. Based on these mixed results of this variable, together with these data quality 
and availability issues, therefore, we are reluctant to draw any conclusive or 
definitive inference with respect to the effect of taxation on economic growth.  
 
Finally, the results on the grants variable (GRANTS) shows that, although this 
variable enters the model with the expected positive sign in all four scenarios, it did 
not have any statistically significant effect on economic growth in the sample of 
developing countries considered in this study. This finding supports the main 
finding in a number of recent empirical studies on this issue (Hansen and Tarp, 
2001; Easterly, 2003; Easterly et al., 2004; Roodman, 2007; Rajan and Subramanian, 
2005 – among others) that aid has been ineffective in promoting economic growth 
in developing countries.  Most of these studies come to this conclusion even after 
controlling for ‘good policy environment’, which the earlier and most influential 
study by Burnside and Dollar (2000) suggested to be an important determinant for 
the aid to have robust positive effect on economic growth.  
 
Following Burnside and Dollar (2000), most of these studies use some key indicators 
of macroeconomic policy (such as budget surplus/deficit relative to GDP, inflation 
and trade openness, etc.) to construct a ‘policy index’ variable which is then 
included in the estimated empirical models to capture the impact of ‘good policy 
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environment (Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Easterly, 2003). While we do not construct 
and use this policy index variable in our empirical model because of the lack of 
enough information needed in order construct this policy index, we believe that, by 
controlling for most of these macroeconomic variables in our study, we are able to 
capture, at least to some extent, this expected impact of ‘policy environment’. It is 
also possible that the expected growth effect of aid in a good policy environment is 
captured by interaction of aid variable with other of the economic policy 
explanatory variables in the model (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 
2001; Easterly, 2003). However, the effect of interaction between variables are not 
considered here due to data quality and availability issue. 
 
Following the finding and conclusion of the work by Burnside and Dollar (2000) that 
aid promotes economic growth in a ‘good policy environment’ a number of 
economists and international development agencies have argued that aid will have 
no effective impact of growth when it is coincided with poor economic policies, 
corruption and poor governance (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; DFID and HM Treasury, 
2002; CIDA, 2002; Wolfensohn, 2002). For example, in the words of the former 
president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn (2002), quoted in Easterly (2003): 
“We have learned that corruption, bad policies and weak governance will 
make aid ineffective.” (Easterly, 2003: p. 25: citing James Wolfensohn at a 
speech during the U.N conference on “Financing for Development held in 
Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002, in which cited a number of lessons 
learned by the international aid community, in World Bank, 2002) 
 
In light of this argument, therefore, one can argue that our insignificant results on 
the impact of grants on economic growth may also be explained by the possibility 
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that government spending, part of which is financed by grants, in most developing 
countries was most probably coincided with poor economic policies, corruption and 
poor governance during the sample period considered in this study (Nelson and 
Singh, 1994; World Bank, 2000).  
 
To summarise this discussion on the results on the control variables, coefficient 
estimates on these variables show mixed results. Results for some of the control 
variables are broadly consistent with the literature, meaning that these variables 
were important in explaining economic growth in developing countries. Others, 
although exhibiting the expected signs, are   statistically insignificant. On the other 
hand, others are inconclusive. These results have some important policy 
implications for developing countries – which are discussed later in Chapter Seven. 
 
 
6.7 Analysis of Regional Differences 
 
As pointed out earlier in Chapter One, existing empirical studies on the deficit-
growth connection in developing countries (such as Nelson and Singh, 1994; Adam 
and Bevan, 2005) provide results based on the analysis of data pooled from large 
samples of developing countries. Similarly, our regression results in sections 6.3 to 
6.5 above have been based on the analyses of data pooled from a group of thirty-
one developing countries. However, economic characteristics of the set of countries 
from different regions considered in these studies (including ours) are potentially 
different, hence making generalisation of the results based on the data pooled in 
this way potentially unreliable and misleading. On this basis, therefore, it seems 
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more appropriate to analyse whether regional differences are important (or not) in 
our model estimation, before we can generalise our results for all the developing 
countries.  
 
This section considers this by including three regional dummies in each of the 
models we analysed in sections 6.3 to 6.5 above. These dummies are for the 
following regions represented in our data set: South Asia and the Pacific (SAP), Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC), and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Inclusion of the 
dummies, however, makes it practically difficult to apply the GMM technique in the 
model estimation since its first-differencing procedure would wipe out all the 
regional dummies. Thus, we choose to estimate all our models in this section using 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) technique.  
 
Note that - as we discussed in Chapter Four (section 4.6) – the OLS method is likely 
to produce biased estimates for a dynamic growth model like ours since in this kind 
of model the unobserved country-specific effects are likely to be correlated with 
the lagged dependent variable – which is one of the explanatory variables. Despite 
this limitation, we believe that the results based on this technique can still be 
informative in analysing whether the regional differences are important in our 
model.  
 
Turning to the regression results, Table 6.7 below summarises the results for the 
different versions of our model.  
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Table 6.7 Results on the effect of fiscal deficit on economic growth with regional 
dummies 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
GDP-1 
 
 .0672494 
(0.650) 
.0726896 
(0.632) 
.0407691 
(0.781) 
-.1670152 
(0.350) 
POP 
 
 .0044882 
(0.335) 
.0050823 
(0.289) 
.0053617 
(0.265) 
.0048253 
(0.457) 
INFL  
 
1.0013233 
(0.646) 
1.0001671 
(0.962) 
1.0003177 
(0.926) 
.9982715 
(0.661) 
INV  
 
1.041769*** 
(0.002) 
1.0457191*** 
(0.000) 
1.0376011*** 
(0.007) 
1.045099** 
(0.010) 
OPEN 
 
 1.0021175 
(0.762) 
1.0025763 
(0.744) 
1.0012155 
(0.877) 
1.0094234 
(0.331) 
M2  
 
1.0022411 
(0.778) 
1.0003101 
(0.970) 
1.0048889 
(0.595) 
1.0045409 
(0.669) 
DFCT 
 
 
 
-.0002494 
(0.770) 
 -.0001056 
(0.911) 
-.0001911 
(0.830) 
DFIN 
 
  1.0006403 
(0.523) 
  
EXTFIN 
 
  .99863973 
(0.400) 
  
GOVEXP 
 
 .96498078** 
(0.017) 
.96666691** 
(0.028) 
  
CURREXP 
 
   .96423562** 
(0.020) 
 
CAPEXP 
 
   .99468866 
(0.416) 
 
PSEXP 
 
    1.0010705 
(0.873) 
DEFEXP 
 
    .99727741 
(0.594) 
EDUEXP 
 
    .99875837 
(0.866) 
HLTHEXP 
 
    .97624197** 
(0.025) 
ECONEXP 
 
 
 
   .99568404 
(0.597) 
TAX 
 
 .0012504 
(0.146) 
.0009557 
(0.245) 
.0016266* 
(0.079) 
.0015985 
(0.220) 
GRANTS 
 
 1.0027165 
(0.243) 
1.0032923 
(0.157) 
1.0029595 
(0.226) 
1.0006869 
(0.777) 
AP 
 
.0067459 
(0.243) 
.0031285 
(0.740) 
-.0013469 
(0.888) 
.0045451 
(0.653) 
.0157644 
(0.123) 
LAC 
 
-.009781 
(0.197) 
-.0119894 
(0.217) 
-.0116092 
(0.254) 
-.0109482 
(0.325) 
.011122 
(0.443) 
SSA 
 
-.0100231 
(0.110) 
-.0094364 
(0.227) 
-.0093857 
(0.265) 
-.0085311 
(0.354) 
.0102713 
(0.308) 
Constant 
 
.0463673*** 
(0.000) 
.98422918 
(0.696) 
.98052062 
(0.652) 
.98596916 
(0.742) 
.84561086*** 
(0.007) 
Observations 
Number of Countries 
Wald Test of joint 
Significance 
Adjusted R-square 
184 
31 
0.0032 
 
0.0720 
110 
31 
0.0000 
 
0.3293 
104 
31 
0.0000 
 
0.3447 
105 
31 
0.0000 
 
0.3346 
85 
31 
0.0001 
 
0.3547 
- *, **, *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively 
- The values in parentheses under the coefficients are P-values 
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Regression (1) estimates the impact of regional dummies only on economic growth. 
Regression (2) estimates the impact of total fiscal deficits on economic growth. In 
regression (3), the total fiscal deficits variable is replaced by two broad categories 
of deficit financing, namely domestic financing and external financing. In regression 
(4), total government expenditure is disaggregated into two economic 
classifications of government expenditure, capital expenditure and current 
expenditure. Finally, in regression (5), government expenditure is disaggregated 
according to the functional classification of government expenditure. 
 
The results show that all three regional dummies are not statistically significant in 
all the five scenarios. These results imply that, while there were some differences 
between the four regions represented in our sample of 31 developing countries 
during the study period, these differences were not statistically significant.  Note 
that these results are consistent with our tentative conclusions regarding regional 
differences given in Chapter Five and section 6.3 of this chapter. 
 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has empirically investigated the impact of fiscal deficits on economic 
growth for a panel of thirty-one developing countries over the period 1972-2001. 
To do this, we estimated the growth model we developed in Chapter Four using the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalised Methods of Moment (GMM) estimation 
technique. Four different versions of this growth model were estimated in order to 
test our key hypotheses on the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. The 
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first version considered the effect of total fiscal deficits on economic growth. The 
second version considered the growth effects of the alternative ways of financing 
deficits. The third version estimated the effect of current and capital expenditures 
on growth. Lastly, the fourth version considered the effect of government sectoral 
spending on economic growth.  Our main findings are as follows. First, fiscal deficits 
per se had no significant impact on economic growth in the context of developing 
countries.  Second, domestic and external financing of the deficits affected growth 
negatively with a lag.  Third, most of the components of government expenditure, 
including the standard candidates of productive expenditure such as capital 
expenditure and spending on education and economic services did not have any 
significant impact on economic growth.  Finally, analysis of results on the control 
variables show that the panel of developing countries considered in this study 
experienced ‘conditional convergence’ during the study period. The results also 
show that investment and financial deepening exerted a significant positive effect 
on economic growth, as expected.  Other results, however, are not entirely 
consistent with the literature. For example, the results for the degree of openness 
and tax revenue variables suggest that these were positively associated with 
economic growth, although the statistical evidence is not entirely robust. Grants 
had a positive but statistically insignificant effect on growth. In relation to other 
control variables, we find that population growth had a positive and statistically 
significant effect on growth in the short-run, while, contrary to the standard 
theoretical prediction, moderate inflation experienced by the set of developing 
countries considered in this study appears to have had no deterrent effect on 
economic growth in these countries during the study period. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
DISCUSSION OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter has examined empirically the impact of fiscal deficits on 
economic growth in developing countries. Based on the estimation of a growth 
model using a panel of thirty-one developing countries for the period 1972-2001, it 
has provided empirical evidence on the following key hypotheses on the 
relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth in developing countries. 
First, fiscal deficits have a significant positive or negative impact on economic 
growth in developing countries. Second, the impact of fiscal deficits on growth 
depends on how the deficits are financed. Third, the composition of government 
expenditure matters in determining the impact of fiscal deficits on economic 
growth. The estimated empirical evidence has important policy implications for 
developing countries.  This chapter, therefore, discusses some key policy 
implications of our empirical findings on the relationship between fiscal deficits and 
economic growth for developing countries, taking into consideration the current 
trends in economic policy in these countries. 
 
To achieve this, the rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 discusses 
policy implications based on the estimated effect of fiscal deficits on economic 
growth. Section 7.3 considers the implications of the results on the effect of 
alternative ways of financing fiscal deficits on growth. Section 7.4 examines policy 
implications of the results on the composition of government expenditure and 
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economic growth. Section 7.5 discusses the policy implications of the results on the 
other policy variables considered in our empirical model. Finally, Section 7.6 
concludes. 
 
 
7.2 Fiscal Deficits 
Our empirical results on the deficit-growth link suggest that there is weak evidence 
that fiscal deficits per se had any significant positive or negative impact on 
economic growth in developing countries during the period 1972-2001. The 
estimated coefficients on the fiscal deficit variable, although negative in sign in 
most cases, were not statistically different from zero in all of our preferred model 
specifications. This means that the evidence at hand rejects our hypothesis that 
fiscal deficits had a significant positive or negative impact on economic growth in 
developing countries during the study period.  
 
This finding has some important policy implications for developing countries. One 
important implication of our results is that while, on average, developing countries 
consistently pursued deficit spending policy during our study period (see Table 5.1), 
such fiscal policy did not necessarily promote or deter economic growth in these 
countries. This implies that fiscal deficits per se may not necessarily be good or bad 
for economic growth in the context of developing countries. What fiscal deficits are 
used for in an economy may be more important. For instance, as many studies have 
suggested, fiscal deficits associated with promotion of private investment or 
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financing much needed public infrastructure in developing countries – such as 
schools, hospitals and transport infrastructure – may enhance economic growth, 
while deficits associated with wasteful spending will have little or no impact on 
economic growth. As we also discuss later in section 7.3 below, the impact of fiscal 
deficits on economic growth may also depend on how the deficits are financed. 
Clearly deficit financing that causes macroeconomic imbalance may well affect 
economic growth especially in the long term. For instance, where excessive foreign 
borrowing finances government budget deficits, the resulting debt financing 
obligations can create problems in the future, especially when deficit spending is 
not invested on productive activities that generate sufficiently high returns to meet 
the interest payments on the debt (Weiss, 1995). In this case, deficit spending will 
very likely cause debt problems in the long-term, which will in turn be harmful to 
economic growth.    
 
On the basis of the discussion above, one possible explanation as to why deficit 
spending policy appears not to have promoted economic growth in developing 
countries during the study period is that government budget deficits in these 
countries might have coincided with wasteful public sector spending, poor 
governance and the existence of large and ineffective bureaucracies or other 
counterproductive economic policies. Indeed, deficit spending in an economy 
characterised with these types of economic inefficiencies may have little or no 
direct impact on economic growth, or may even have a strong negative impact on 
growth especially in the long term. As pointed out by Nelson and Singh (1994), 
some economists and policymakers have argued that deficit spending could be an 
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effective fiscal policy tool to promote employment and economic growth in 
developing countries, given the existence of large amounts of unemployed and 
underemployed labour and other economic resources in these countries. However, 
for this to be achieved developing country governments need to ensure that deficit 
spending policy is associated with less wasteful public sector spending and that 
existing economic policies are conducive to economic growth. 
 
The finding in our study that fiscal deficits did not retard economic growth in 
developing countries during the study period also challenges the emphasis that has 
been placed on developing countries, particularly since the 1980s, to cut the levels 
of fiscal deficits based on the argument that deficits may have contributed to poor 
growth performance in these countries. The evidence at hand does not suggest that 
this was the case. One may even argue that too much emphasis on reducing deficits 
in developing countries can merely result in reducing investment spending on 
much-needed infrastructure and other development projects in these countries, 
something that could result in worse economic growth performance.  
 
Summing up the overall policy implications with respect to our results on the effect 
of fiscal deficits on economic growth in developing countries, the evidence at hand 
suggests that fiscal deficits per se did not harm or promote economic growth in 
these countries during the period 1970-2001.  What this means is that factors other 
than fiscal deficits per se may play a more important role in influencing economic 
growth in developing countries. We look at and discuss some of these factors in the 
next sections. 
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7.3 Deficit Financing  
 
Our results on the deficit financing variables reveal that, while neither means of 
deficit financing, i.e., domestic financing and foreign financing, have any 
contemporaneous significant effect on economic growth, their five-year lagged 
effect on growth was negative and statistically significant. This means that both 
domestic and foreign financing had a negative effect on economic growth in 
developing countries with a lag. This finding is important; for, it implies that while 
fiscal deficits per se may not have any significant effect on growth in developing 
countries, how the deficit is financed matters in explaining their economic growth 
impact.  As pointed out earlier in section 6.4, these contradictory results between 
the growth impact of total fiscal deficits and the ways the deficits are financed look 
somewhat surprising, but further investigation of the results suggest that this may 
be a data quality issue or the fact that we employ different sample sizes in our 
estimations considering the two issues66.  
 
The long-term negative effect of both domestic and foreign financing of the 
government budget deficit on economic growth could be associated with the 
potential macroeconomic imbalances associated with the various forms of deficit 
financing we discussed in Chapter Two (see section 2.5). Printing money to finance 
a deficit can cause inflation, drawing down foreign exchange reserves can provoke 
capital flight and therefore cause balance of payments problems, domestic 
                                                 
66 Recall that we employ a smaller sample (only 20 countries and 49 observations) in estimating the 
effects of the alternative ways of financing deficits on growth than the one we employ in estimating 
the impact of overall fiscal deficits on growth (23 countries and 55 observations).  
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borrowing may push up interest rates and crowd out private investment, and 
foreign borrowing may result in unsustainable levels of external debt. Indeed, all 
these potential macroeconomic effects of the alternative ways of financing deficits 
can cause detrimental effects on economic growth, especially in the long run. The 
potential macroeconomic consequences of domestic and external financing in the 
context of developing countries are discussed in more detail below:  
 
(i) Domestic Financing 
 
Domestic financing can be raised using the following three forms:  printing money 
(also known as monetisation of the deficit), drawing down foreign exchange 
reserves, and domestic borrowing. 
 
Printing money is undertaken by increasing the supply of base money (also known 
as high-powered money) from the central bank in order to cover a gap between 
total government expenditure and revenue. 67  In general, it is accepted that 
government can raise some revenue to finance a deficit by printing money without 
causing any inflation when, in response to the resulting real output growth (if any), 
the private sector also increases its demand for money.  However, if the monetary 
growth due to money printing is higher than the demand for money (i.e., the level 
of money the private sector wishes to hold) at the current price level some inflation 
will occur. 
 
                                                 
67 Note that the definition of the public sector in this case excluded the central bank. 
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The amount of non-inflationary revenue (also known as seignorage) from the 
money printing exercise to finance the budget deficit is determined by the real 
growth rate of the economy, the ratio of base money to national income, and the 
income elasticity of the demand for real balances (Fischer and Easterly, 1990; Weiss, 
1995; Agenor, 2004). Generally, assuming a given level for the income elasticity of 
the demand for real balances and a ratio of base money to national income, the 
amount of revenue from seignorage that the government can raise from money 
printing will be higher the higher the real growth rate of the economy, and vice 
versa. This means that countries with higher real economic growth rate will have 
more room to finance public sector deficits by using revenue from seignorage than 
those experiencing lower real economic growth rates. According to Fischer (1982), 
Fisher and Easterly (1990) and Weiss (1995), on average, the maximum rate of 
seignorage for developing countries has been estimated to be around 2.5 percent 
of GNP.  
 
Drawing down foreign exchange reserves can help countries to cover the budget 
deficit without causing inflation. However, as we discussed in Chapter Two, this 
source of deficit financing is very limited for developing countries since the foreign 
exchange reserves of most of these countries are generally too low to finance 
deficit spending for a long period of time (Weiss, 1995). Another limitation of this 
form of deficit financing is that the excessive use of international reserves can lead 
to speculative pressure on the foreign exchange rate and provoke capital flight 
when the private sector is worried that foreign exchange reserves are about to be 
exhausted. Speculative pressure on the exchange rate and capital flight could in 
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turn cause balance of payments problems, which will be detrimental to economic 
growth. 
 
Another non-inflationary form of domestic financing of the deficit available to 
developing countries is the issuance of domestic debt – i.e. domestic borrowing. As 
we saw in Chapter Two, this form of deficit financing can take two forms. In 
countries where domestic capital markets are relatively developed, governments 
can sell short-term and long-term bonds that are purchased by the private sector 
voluntarily. However, in those countries where capital markets are underdeveloped 
or not existent, governments may use some forms of compulsory borrowing from 
the domestic financial institutions and the private sector. For example, government 
may force the private sector to buy its bonds in order to raise some revenue to 
cover the deficit, or the reserve requirements level may be increased to force 
domestic financial institutions to increase their deposits with the central bank at a 
zero or very low interest rate (Weiss, 1995). Excessive reliance on domestic 
borrowing, however, poses the risk of the public sector competing with the private 
sector for the limited financial resources available in the economy, hence putting 
pressure on domestic interest rates and crowding out private investment – 
something which may very well hurt economic growth.  One can argue that this is 
very likely to happen in developing countries since these countries are generally 
characterised by low levels of domestic savings (Blejer and Ke-Young, 1989; Loayza 
et at., 2000).68 
                                                 
68 According to Blejer and Ke-Young (1989), some of the factors that cause low levels of domestic 
savings in developing countries are low rates of return to capital and the absence of well-functioning 
capital markets and institutions in most of these countries. 
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(ii) Foreign Financing 
 
Where domestic capital markets are thin and domestic borrowing possibilities are 
limited, foreign borrowing can be an alternative source of financing public sector 
deficits (Fischer and Easterly, 1990; Weiss, 1995). This usually involves borrowing 
from the international development institutions, foreign governments and foreign 
capital markets (IMF’S GFS manuals – various issues). However, as Weiss (1995) 
argues, this source of financing is most useful for economies that are creditworthy. 
It follows therefore that many developing countries find it difficult to access foreign 
borrowing to finance deficits given the general perception that most of these 
countries are not creditworthy due to past over-borrowing and the high levels of 
debt that many of these countries have accumulated (Fischer and Easterly, 1990). 
Even where developing countries have access to this source of finance, in most 
cases, they are likely to face high interest rate charges due to their perceived low 
creditworthiness, and this in turn can lead to heavy future debt obligations with 
negative implications for long-term economic growth. Heavy debt obligations mean 
that, in the long-term, countries will be forced to allocate significant amounts of 
financial resources for debt servicing that would otherwise be available to finance 
investment spending on much needed infrastructure such as education, health, and 
transport and communication – and this may very well hurt their long-term 
economic growth. As pointed out earlier, heavy reliance on foreign borrowing to 
finance fiscal deficits will be particularly costly when the borrowed funds are not 
invested wisely in development projects that generate a sufficiently high rate of 
return in foreign exchange to meet the debt and interest payment obligations. In 
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such cases, foreign borrowing will probably cause debt problems and hurt long-
term economic growth. Debt crisis problems and the resulting poor growth 
performance that many developing countries faced during the 1980s provide a 
good example of how too much reliance on external borrowing to finance the 
budget deficit and inefficiency in the use of the borrowed funds can be very costly 
to the economy (Weiss, 1995). 
 
To summarise the discussion on the policy implications related to deficit financing, 
empirical evidence shows that domestic and external financing of the budget deficit 
can both have a long-term negative effect on economic growth in developing 
countries. The transmission mechanism through which deficit financing can affect 
economic growth could be explained by the following macroeconomic imbalances 
associated with the alternative means of financing deficits. Monetisation of the 
deficits can be inflationary. Financing deficits using foreign exchange reserves can 
provoke capital flight and cause balance of payments problems. Domestic 
borrowing can put pressure on domestic interest rates and therefore crowd out the 
private sector, and excessive foreign borrowing can result in long-term debt 
problems. All these potential macroeconomic problems associated with the way 
fiscal deficits are financed can in turn hurt economic growth, especially in the long-
term. 
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7.4 Composition of Government Expenditure 
We have hypothesised in this study that what the deficit financing is used for in the 
economy matters in determining the effect of deficit spending policy on economic 
growth; fiscal deficits associated with “productive expenditure” will most likely 
promote economic growth in developing countries while fiscal deficits associated 
with “unproductive expenditure” will have little or no impact on economic growth. 
This raises the question, therefore, as to which components of government 
expenditure would be considered as productive expenditure and whether 
government expenditure associated with this type of spending has really been 
growth enhancing in these countries.   
 
As discussed earlier, a commonly held view by many observers is that economic 
expenditure associated with capital investment on the one hand, and sectoral 
expenditure associated with health, education and, transport and communications 
on the other are positively associated with economic growth (Aschauer, 1989; Barro, 
1991; Chu et al., 1995; Devarajan et al., 1996; Gupta et al., 1999). In fact, in light of 
this view, various international development institutions, donor agencies and NGOs 
have increasingly called for the developing countries to increase their expenditures 
in these areas (Gupta et al., 1999; Rajkumar, 2002). 
 
However, our empirical results, as reported in the preceding chapter, show that 
most of the above-mentioned standard candidates for productive government 
expenditure, i.e., capital expenditure on the one hand, and sectoral spending on 
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education and economic services on the other, had insignificant impact on 
economic growth in the sample of developing countries considered in this study. 
The coefficient estimates for all these variables, though positive, did not have a 
statistically significant effect on economic growth. The only categories that appear 
to have had a positive and significant impact on economic growth in our study are 
spending on health and general public services. Health expenditure had an 
immediate positive and significant impact on economic growth, while public service 
expenditure had a positive and significant impact on growth with a lag. 
 
These results have important implications for policy. One important policy 
implication of our results is that deficit spending policy is less likely to promote 
economic growth in developing countries if most of the standard candidates of 
productive government expenditure have little or no impact on economic growth. 
In fact, our weak results on the relationship between the standard candidates of 
productive expenditure and economic growth could explain why fiscal deficits 
appear to have had no significant positive impact on economic growth in 
developing countries during the period 1972-2001.  
 
Generally, it is difficult to draw policy conclusions that developing country 
governments should not allocate more resources towards the components of 
government expenditure that are normally considered productive - capital 
expenditure and sectoral spending on education, and transport and communication 
– despite our results that suggest weak impact of spending on these sectors on 
economic growth. However, these results do suggest that allocating more 
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budgetary resources to these components of government expenditure may not 
necessarily guarantee high economic growth in developing countries. The finding 
that there is little or no significant relationship between the components of 
government expenditure which are normally considered productive and economic 
growth could be an indication that our study does not capture the true relationship 
between expenditure and growth due to the leakages in government spending 
when funds are not used properly on the intended productive activities. Note that, 
a unit’s worth of government spending will not necessarily equal a unit’s worth of 
public investment or service provision when there are some forms of leakages in 
government expenditure.   
 
Ablo and Reinikka (1998) provide a good example of this scenario in their study that 
surveyed public spending in Uganda. As part of their study, they surveyed spending 
allocated for 250 primary schools and found that on average each of these schools 
received only 13 percent of their budgetary allocations for non-wage expenditure, 
with the remaining amount found to have disappeared or been used for purposes 
that were not related to primary school education. Clearly, using government 
spending figures on a case like this – as measured by government budgetary 
documents – to examine the link between government spending and development 
outcome will be misleading and will not capture the true relationship between the 
two. 
  
The finding in our study that most of the standard candidates for productive 
expenditure seem not to have been associated with high economic growth in 
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developing countries could also be an indication of inefficiencies in public spending 
in some developing countries due to poor quality of governance – measured by the 
level of corruption, quality of institutions, government effectiveness, among others 
(Kaufmann et al., 1999). A number of studies (such as Mauro, 1995, 1996, 1997, 
1998; Ablo and Reinikka, 1998; Kaufmann et al., 1999; Rajkumaar and Swaroop, 
2002; and, Ndikumana and Baliamoune-Lutz, 2008) have shown that quality of 
governance matters for development outcomes, including economic growth.  
 
For example, using cross-section data for more than 150 countries, Kaufmann et al. 
(1999) provide empirical evidence showing that there is a strong positive causal 
relationship from quality of governance to development outcomes, including 
economic growth. This means that public sector spending programmes in countries 
with poor governance will most likely result in poor development outcomes, and 
vice versa.   
 
Rajkumar and Swaroop (2002) have a similar point of view with regard to the 
relationship between quality of governance and development outcomes. They find 
that development outcomes of public spending will be generally poor in countries 
with high levels of corruption and inefficient bureaucracy. According to Rajkumar 
and Swaroop, merely allocating public funds to productive sectors like education 
and health may not lead to desirable development outcomes in countries with poor 
governance. These findings are particularly relevant for developing countries, 
where the state of governance is generally poor. 
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Ndikumana and Baliamoune-Lutz (2008) also point out that corruption undermines 
public investments and economic growth. They argue that corruption affects the 
quantity of productive public investment negatively by displacing funds from 
productive activities towards unproductive activities. They also argue that 
corruption causes inefficiency in public investments since it gives incentives to 
corrupt public officials to allocate funds to projects that generate higher private 
benefits – material or political – instead of projects that generate higher social 
benefits. Indeed, in this situation the development outcomes of government 
spending will be less than optimal. A number of empirical studies report findings in 
support of Ndikumana and Baliamoune-Lutz (2008) that corruption has a 
detrimental effect on economic growth. For example, studies by Mauro (1995, 1996, 
1997 and 1998); Tanzi and Davood (2000); Tanzi (2002); Gyimah-Brempong (2002); 
and Ndikumana (2006) all find that, in general, countries with high levels of 
corruption tend to grow more slowly, and vice versa.  
 
Unfortunately, as discussed earlier in Chapter Four (section 4.3), we have failed to 
include the governance variable in our empirical model due to the lack of data on 
this variable for the large part of our sample period for developing countries. 
However, based on the findings from the studies reviewed above, we argue that 
poor governance will most likely weaken the theoretically expected positive and 
significant impact of the standard candidates for productive expenditure. Thus, 
since many developing countries are characterised by poor governance 
performance it is not surprising to find that most of the components of government 
expenditure in these countries are not associated with growth. Government 
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expenditure in these countries will not necessarily result in expected development 
outcomes – rather, it will result in wasteful allocation. This calls for institutional 
reforms to improve the quality of governance if government expenditure is to 
effectively lead to expected development outcomes – including economic growth – 
in developing countries.  
 
Another possible explanation of our poor results for the growth effects of most 
components on government expenditure is that government spending in 
developing countries merely resulted in crowding out private sector spending 
during the study period. If this were the case, then one would argue that the likely 
effect of addition public sector spending, or increased deficit spending, on 
economic growth would be minimal.  
 
 
7.5 Policy Implications of the Results for Other Variables  
The above sections have discussed some policy implications of the results on the 
variables that are of particular interest in our study.  This section in turn is devoted 
to the discussion of some policy implications of the results on other variables which 
we considered in our empirical model. These include the control variables – initial 
income, investment, degree of financial deepening, openness, population growth 
and inflation – and other variables that entered our empirical model under the 
consideration of the government budget constraint. 
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(i) Initial Income 
The coefficient of the initial income variable (GDP-1) is consistently negative and 
statistically significant in all of our preferred models. This implies that the group of 
countries considered in our study experienced the so-called “conditional 
convergence” during the period 1972-2001.  However, these results have no great 
policy relevance – for, what is important for economies is not conditional 
convergence - the tendency for economies to grow faster the further they are from 
their own steady state level of output - but rather absolute convergence – the need 
for poor economies to grow faster regardless of their eventual steady state level of 
output.  
 
(ii) Investment 
In accordance with the existing large body of both theoretical and empirical 
literature on investment and economic growth (See for example Aschauer, 1989; 
Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992b; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992), our 
study finds consistent evidence of a positive and strongly significant impact of 
investment on economic growth. This has a clear policy implication that investment 
is indeed an important engine of economic growth in developing countries. 
Consequently, governments in developing countries should take necessary 
measures to promote the level of investment in order to influence growth.  
 
There are two ways developing country governments can increase the level of 
investment. First, by increasing the level of public investment in much needed 
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infrastructure - such as education, health, and transport and communication. This 
can promote long-term economic growth directly by increasing the productive 
capacity of the economy or indirectly by increasing the productivity of private 
capital (Khan and Kumar, 1997). As Khan and Kumar (1997) further argues, some 
components of public investment may also be complementary to private 
investment, and in doing so, be beneficial to economic growth. However, it is worth 
noting that increasing public investment in infrastructure may not necessarily have 
a beneficial impact on private investment and growth if it crowds-out (substitutes) 
private investment rather than complementing it or when it is associated with 
inefficiency and wastage of resources as was discussed earlier. 
 
Second and perhaps the more effective way developing country governments can 
increase aggregate investment is by taking measures to promote the level of private 
investment. According to the recent investment literature, these measures can 
include implementation of economic policies designed to achieve a stable 
macroeconomic environment, good governance, provision of satisfactory legal and 
institutional arrangements for the protection of property rights, development of 
infrastructure, improving access to credit by domestic investors, creation of an 
environment conducive to a low cost of doing business, and adequate political 
stability (Schmidt-Hebbel et al., 1994; Khan and Sumar, 1997). As a number of 
studies have shown (for example, Landau, 1983; Khan and Reinhart, 1990; Serven 
and Solimano, 1990; Coutinho and Gallo, 1991; Nelson and Singh, 1994; Khan and 
Kumar, 1997), this component of investment (private investment) can have even a 
larger positive impact on economic growth than public investment.  
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(iii) Financial Deepening 
The degree of financial deepening is found to have a short-run positive and 
significant impact on economic growth in the sample of developing countries 
considered in this study. This finding has an important policy implication that 
financial deepening can play an important role in promoting economic growth in 
developing countries. Thus, as part of the efforts to enhance economic growth, 
policy-makers in developing countries should continue to implement and enhance 
financial sector reforms aiming at the creation and promotion of the deep and 
broad financial sector many developing-country governments have been pursuing 
over the past two or three decades. These reforms include measures such efforts to 
improve the growth of the real money supply, increasing the growth of banking 
sector, privatisation and liberalisation of the financial sector, creation and 
promotion of modern financial institutions, increasing the number of financial 
institutions and diversification of services, launching more financial products, 
increasing access to credit by the private sector and consumers, stock market 
developments, and improvement of financial intermediation (Thornton, 1996; 
Darrat, 1999; Ndebbio, 2004; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2011; Ghildiyal et al., 2015). 
By developing a deep and well-functioning financial sector, countries can have 
more potential to enhance economic efficiency, create and expand liquidity, and 
promote investment, employment and economic growth. However, the recent 
financial crises (e.g., 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and 2007-2008 Global Financial 
Crisis) should offer some important lessons to countries that some of the ways of 
achieving financial deepening and broadening, particularly privatisation and 
259 
 
liberalisation, should be matched with improvement in financial sector regulation in 
order to ensure financial and economic stability. 
 
(iv) Openness 
Although trade openness has become an important policy variable for developing 
countries over the past few decades, our study finds that its impact on economic 
growth in the sample of developing countries considered in our study is not entirely 
conclusive and very robust. While by no means these inconclusive and non-robust 
results on the openness-growth connection suggest that openness is not an 
important determinant of growth in developing countries, the results may serve as 
an indication that may be developing countries have not yet really benefited much 
from the trade openness measures69 most of these countries have pursued in the 
last few decades.  As argued earlier in Chapter Six, our results may also be an 
indication of the economic growth consequences of the protectionist trade policies 
most of the developing countries followed during the large part of our sample 
period, especially from the 1970s to mid-1980s or early-1990s (Ulasan, 2012) and 
the consequences of some of the structural issues in relation to developing country 
trade, such as heavy dependence on primary commodity exports which tend to face 
significant and regular price fluctuations and low-elasticity of demand (Prebisch, 
1950; Shafaeddin, 2005; Baldwin, 2008) and lack of complementary inputs needed 
in order to gain productivity growth through international trade with more 
                                                 
69 These include measures such as the liberalisation of trading system, reduction or removal of tariffs 
and non-tariffs barriers to trade, and signing of bilateral, regional and multilateral trade agreements 
with other countries around the world (Sakyi et al., 2012).  
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technologically advanced countries (Basu and Weil, 1998; Acemoglu, and Zilibotti, 
2001; Andersen and Babula, 2012).  
 
On this basis, therefore, it would appear that, for trade openness to enhance 
economic growth in developing countries, developing country governments also 
need to address these important structural issues as these countries continue to 
implement economic policy reforms in the areas of monetary policy, fiscal policy, 
and especially exchange rate and trade policy that aim to achieve greater openness 
to international trade.   
 
Indeed, trade openness per se may not necessarily lead to high economic growth in 
developing countries if these structural issues are not addressed. In this regard, we 
argue that developing countries need to diversify their exports to reduce their over-
dependence on primary commodity exports, which tend to face cyclical price 
collapses and low-elasticity of demand (Prebisch, 1950; Shafaeddin, 2005; Baldwin, 
2008); problems which makes expansion of their production unattractive and not 
very beneficial in terms of earnings from exports. Note also that, as Baldwin (2008) 
further argues, some developing countries have generally experienced 
deteriorating terms of trade due to the decline in the prices of primary products 
(the primary exports of the developing countries) relative to the prices of 
manufactured products (primary exports of the developed countries).70 This again 
shows the need for developing countries that still have heavy reliance on primary 
                                                 
70 Note however that this argument may not entirely hold now for the general trends in the world 
trade shows that manufacturers have been falling in prices recently, and some developing countries, 
especially many developing countries in Asia, are now exporters of manufacturers (WTO, 1996).   
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commodity exports whose prices are more volatile than those of manufactured 
goods to diversify their exports in order to enhance the economic benefits of 
greater openness in these countries. 
 
Developing countries also need to invest more in complementary inputs such as 
human capital and technology needed in order to be able to adapt goods or 
techniques invented in more technologically advanced countries.  As argued in 
Andersen and Babula (2008, p.10), with high levels of human capital and 
technological know-how, developing countries can obtain productivity gains 
through access to technological innovations in developed countries. That way, new 
technologies designed to achieve higher productivity in developed countries may 
also lead to productivity growth in developing countries, through international 
trade. 
 
Another issue that needs consideration is for developing countries to continue to 
engage the developed countries to reduce (and eventually remove) agricultural 
support policies that the rich countries provide to their agricultural producers, 
especially on the products that are of export interests to developing countries. As 
argued earlier in Chapter Six, several agricultural policy support measures such as 
tariffs that discriminate against agricultural imports and subsidies that encourage 
greater agricultural production offered in developed countries are often seen as 
detrimental to the developing countries’ exports.  
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(v) Population Growth 
Our results on population growth reveal that it had a positive and statistically 
significant impact on economic especially in the short run. The results therefore 
suggest that output grew in response to labour force growth in our sample of 
developing countries during the study period, and attempts to curtail population 
growth would have been unnecessary or perhaps even detrimental to the economic 
growth process. As mentioned earlier in Chapter Six, these results support the 
revisionism view on the population-growth link, which establishes that population 
growth stimulates economic growth through at least the following three channels. 
First, population growth increases the size of the labour force available to produce 
and this can lead to economic growth. In addition, increase in the availability of 
labour as a result of population growth can help firms to produce based on the 
division of labour and specialisation, something which can result in productivity 
growth, and therefore output and output growth. Second, population growth 
increases the market size for goods and services, and this pushes producers to use 
available resources more efficiently and/or produce using more innovative ways in 
order to meet the increased market demand. Efficiency in the use of economic 
resources and innovation in turn leads to economic growth. Third, population 
growth is likely to put pressure on governments to develop more infrastructure, 
and this increase in infrastructure can boost economic growth and development 
(Boserup, 1965, Simon, 1987, Darrat and Al-Yousif, 1999). Indeed, if this is true for 
developing countries, then population growth can have significant positive effect on 
economic growth.  
263 
 
Nevertheless, our results and policy implications on population growth should be 
taken with caution in that they are based on the relationship between population 
growth and overall economic growth rather than per capita economic growth. One 
would argue that what is more important in the population-economic growth link is 
the impact of population growth on per capita economic growth. Clearly, if the 
population growth rate is higher than overall economic growth then per capita 
income will fall and lead to a decrease in the standard of living. In addition, 
population growth can impede per capita economic growth through what is known 
in the literature as “capital dilution”. This means that, assuming the amount of 
capital in an economy is constant, an increase in the population will lower the 
capital-labour ratio (the capital per worker), and this will affect per capita economic 
growth.  
 
Another important issue to consider in terms of policy is the impact of population 
growth on development goals other than economic growth. For instance, many 
economists and policy makers are concerned that high population growth is 
associated with non-income development challenges such as environmental 
degradation and pressure on the provision and quality of public services like 
education and health (Temple, 1999; Todaro, 2007; Meier, 2007).  These challenges 
are particularly relevant in developing countries in terms of policy on population 
growth. 
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(vi) Inflation 
Contrary to the standard view, our empirical results suggest that inflation had a 
positive impact on economic growth in the sample of developing countries we 
considered in this study, especially in the long run. This finding has important policy 
implications for policymakers and development partners in developing countries. 
One important implication is that moderate inflation appears to be helpful rather 
than harmful to economic growth in developing countries. Another implication is 
that, contrary to the recent policy advice from development partners and 
international lending agencies especially the IMF, our results suggest that attempts 
to reduce inflation to a very low level71 are likely to negatively affect economic 
growth in developing countries. 
 
However, while our results are very much in line with the structuralist view on the 
relationship between inflation and economic growth, we argue that cautious 
approach to inflation is still needed since persistent higher inflation may trigger 
inflationary spirals beyond a safe level which is difficult to contain. In addition, 
countries should not be complacent and allow inflation rate which is beyond the 
‘threshold level of inflation’ as discussed earlier in Chapter Six72. Clearly, while some 
inflation can be good for investment and economic growth (Barro, 1995; Bruno, 
1995; Bruno and Easterly, 1998), economic policies and measures to maintain 
appropriate low to moderate and stable inflation can help developing countries to 
                                                 
71 Note that the inflation-targeting policies as they have been recently being practised in developing 
countries targets to maintain inflation within a 3 – 5 percent band (Pollin and Zhu, 2005) 
72 Hence, the challenge for developing countries is to determine this ‘threshold level of inflation’ 
appropriate for their economies. 
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be competitive and achieve macroeconomic stability, both of which are crucial for 
growth.  
 
(vii) Other Variables 
Regarding the variables that entered our empirical model under the consideration 
of the government budget constraint, the results for tax revenue were somewhat 
mixed and inconclusive. As discussed in the previous chapter, the estimated 
coefficient of this variable, although consistently positive in sign in both the current 
and the lag periods, it was statistically significant in three out of four cases in the 
current period, while in the lag form it was significant in two cases only. Thus, given 
these mixed results of this study, we are reluctant to draw any definitive policy 
implications with regard to impact of taxation on economic growth in developing 
countries.  
 
Finally, our results suggest that grants did not have any statistically significant effect 
on growth. These results have at least the following two implications. First, on 
average, the sample of developing countries we have considered in this study were 
not able to use development aid effectively to promote growth over the period 
1972-2002. We argue that this failure to use aid effectively to foster economic 
growth in the studied sample of developing countries during this period could be 
due to the possibility that international development aid in most developing 
countries may have coincided with wasteful government spending, poor 
governance and other counterproductive economic policies as Nelson and Singh 
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(1994) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) point out.  Second, it should be stressed that 
our results, which relate to the past, do not imply that international development 
aid cannot be beneficial in promoting growth in the future. Rather they do suggest 
that for international development aid to be effective in fostering economic growth 
in the future, there needs to be re-thinking on how aid is used more effectively and 
in good policy environment such that it enhances economic growth. This point 
supports efforts which are under way at both national and international levels to 
improve aid effectiveness (DFID and HM Treasury, 2002; CIDA, 2002; World Bank, 
2002; Rajan and Subramanian, 2005 – among others). 
 
  
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the policy implications of our empirical results on the 
impact of fiscal deficits and other public policy variables on economic growth in 
developing countries. Our results reveal that fiscal deficits per se, the standard 
candidates of productive government expenditure and grants have exercised little 
or no impact on economic growth in developing countries. We suspect that these 
results could be explained by the conventional view that budget deficits, grants and 
government expenditure in general have coincided with wasteful public sector 
spending, poor governance and other counterproductive economic policies in many 
developing countries. Thus, we argue that governments need to cut wasteful 
spending, improve governance and pursue necessary economic policy reform in 
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order to ensure that deficit spending, grants and government expenditure are used 
effectively to promote economic growth. 
 
Deficit financing, on the other hand, seems to have a negative impact on economic 
growth with a lag. What this implies is that while deficits per se may not be good or 
bad for economic growth in the context of developing countries, how these deficits 
are covered could have an indirect detrimental impact on economic growth. This 
may be associated with the likely macroeconomic consequences of excessive 
financing of fiscal deficits. Printing money to finance a deficit can cause inflation; 
excessive use of foreign exchange reserves to finance the deficit can provoke 
capital flight and cause balance of payments problems; too much domestic 
borrowing may result in crowding out of the private sector; and, excessive 
borrowing from abroad may result in unsustainable levels of external debt.  
 
With regard to the control variables, our empirical results have provided evidence 
that investment and financial deepening are positively and significantly associated 
with economic growth in developing countries. These results suggest that 
investment and financial deepening are key determinants of economic growth in 
developing countries. Policy-makers in these countries therefore need to formulate 
and implement economic policies aiming at promoting investment and financial 
deepening in order to promote economic growth. The degree of openness variable 
also enters the model with the expected positive sign, although the evidence is not 
entirely conclusive. Inflation appears to be positively associated with economic 
growth, results which are contrary to the conventional wisdom. Population growth 
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has a positive and significant impact on economic growth, a finding that suggests 
that labour force growth promoted economic growth in developing countries 
during the study period (1972-2001). Grants appear to have no statistically 
significant impact on economic growth. Finally, the results on the tax revenue 
variable are mixed and provide inconclusive evidence. 
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Chapter Eight 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a summary and conclusion of this study. To do this, the 
chapter proceeds as follows. Section 8.2 presents the overall summary of the study. 
Section 8.3 summarises the main findings of the study and their policy implications. 
Section 8.4 discusses this study’s contributions to knowledge. Section 8.5 discusses 
problems and limitations faced in the process of carrying out this study. Finally, 
Section 8.6 outlines potential areas for future research. 
 
 
8.2 Summary of the Study 
This study has examined the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in 
developing countries. The study was motivated by the ongoing debate on the 
effects of public sector deficits on economic performance. Since the Keynesian 
revolution, many economists and policy makers have argued that deficit spending 
policy could be one of the effective measures to fight the problems of 
unemployment and poor economic growth in industrialised countries during 
economic downturns. In the context of developing countries too, supporters of this 
viewpoint have argued that deficit spending would be a useful economic policy tool 
to promote economic growth in these countries, given the large amount of 
unemployed and underemployed labour and other economic resources that exist in 
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most of these countries. On the other hand, however, other economists and policy 
makers argue that deficit spending has little or no effect on employment and 
economic growth, and that this policy primarily results in the re-distribution of 
resources from the private sector to the public sector. Proponents of this viewpoint 
also warn that fiscal deficits can cause some macroeconomic imbalances and that 
these imbalances can in turn lead to negative consequences to growth and 
employment, especially in the long term.  In fact, this point of view has been 
associated with the macroeconomic reforms many developed and developing 
countries have pursued over the past few decades. In developing countries, in 
particular, as part of these reforms, governments have been advised to cut the 
levels of deficits as one of the measures to address the macroeconomic problems 
many economies have experienced over the past few decades. Despite this ongoing 
debate, however, there is still a lack of thorough empirical investigation on the 
effect of fiscal deficits on economic performance, especially in the context of 
developing countries. Hence the motivation of this study.  
 
The study has looked specifically into the effect of fiscal deficits on economic 
growth in developing countries, using panel data from a sample of thirty-one 
countries for the period 1972-2001. The specific objectives of the study were three- 
fold: one, to empirically examine the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in 
developing countries; two, to examine whether there are any significant regional 
differences in terms of the relationship between fiscal deficits and economic 
growth in developing countries; and, three, to discuss the policy implications of the 
findings in relation to the first two objectives. 
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To address these research objectives, we started by critically reviewing the existing 
literature on fiscal deficits and its impact on economic growth in Chapters Two and 
Three. We then discussed the methodological framework used in this study to 
examine the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in developing countries in 
Chapter Four.  This was followed by descriptive analysis of the trends in fiscal 
deficits, economic growth and control variables included in the empirical model 
used in this study to estimate the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in 
Chapter Five. In doing this, the chapter also examined whether there exist any 
significant regional differences in relation to the trends in fiscal deficits, economic 
growth and other economic variables within developing countries. Thereafter, 
Chapter Six presented empirical evidence on the impact of fiscal deficits on 
economic growth in developing countries, using data from a panel of thirty-one 
countries, and this was followed by discussion of some policy implications of the 
empirical results and key findings in Chapter Seven. 
 
In the literature review, we considered both theoretical literature and empirical 
literature. Theoretical literature shows that there are three main perspectives 
regarding the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. The first is the well-
known Keynesian perspective in which it is generally believed that well timed and 
used fiscal deficits can lead to higher levels of output, and therefore economic 
growth. The second is the Neo-classical perspective in which it is argued that deficit 
spending has little or no impact on growth, and that it primarily results in crowding 
out of private sector. Support for this viewpoint has also produced a growing 
concern that deficit spending can cause macroeconomic problems such as inflation, 
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high interest rates and unsustainable levels of public debt – all of which can in turn 
hurt economic growth, especially in the long term. The third perspective is 
associated with the Ricardian analysis that deficits are irrelevant in the 
determination of macroeconomic performance, including economic growth. 
According to this viewpoint, fiscal deficits will have no real effect on aggregate 
demand, and therefore output and economic growth. Based on a critical 
examination of these viewpoints, however, we argue that the Ricardian perspective 
is based on unrealistic assumptions, especially in the context of developing 
countries, and therefore does not provide an acceptable approximation to reality in 
terms of the effect of fiscal deficits on economic growth. On this basis, therefore, 
we also argue that it is the Keynesian and Neo-classical perspectives that offer the 
most realistic starting point in the analysis of the deficit-economic growth 
connection, but with the two perspectives representing two different aspects of 
fiscal policy of short run and long run, respectively. Further analysis of the literature, 
however, shows that even the Keynesian and Neo-classical analyses of fiscal policy 
expansion mainly explains the economy’s transitional growth rate while the steady-
state growth rate remains unaffected – that is, it affects only the level of output 
and output growth in the short-run rather than the long-run growth rate. According 
to the literature, the impact of expansionary fiscal policy on the long-run growth 
rate of the economy can be explained using the endogenous growth models. Hence 
we argue that the Keynesian and Neo-classical perspectives together with the 
endogenous growth models provide the most relevant starting point for theoretical 
analysis of the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth. 
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Empirical literature we reviewed shows mixed results. Some studies find that fiscal 
deficits have a positive and statistically significant effect on economic growth. 
Others find a negative and statistically significant relationship between fiscal 
deficits and economic growth. Yet other studies find that fiscal deficits have either a 
positive or a negative but statistically insignificant effect on economic growth. 
Assessment of the reviewed empirical studies suggest that these mixed results 
could be explained by various factors such as diversity in econometric specifications 
and estimation techniques used, differences in the measurements of variables 
considered in the studies, and the nature of the economies or sample countries 
considered in these studies.  
 
Based on the critical review of both theoretical and empirical literature, we 
developed the following four key hypotheses regarding the impact of fiscal deficits 
on economic growth.  First, fiscal deficits have a significant positive or negative 
impact on economic growth. Second, the impact of fiscal deficits on economic 
growth depends on the size of fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP – that is, the 
relationship between the two is non-linear. Third, the impact of fiscal deficits on 
economic growth depends on how the deficits are financed. Finally, the impact of 
fiscal deficits on economic growth depends on what deficit financing is used for – in 
other words, it depends on the composition of government expenditure. 
 
Based on the review of literature, we also formulated a regression model that is 
used in this study to test the above-mentioned hypotheses on the impact of fiscal 
deficits on economic growth using data from a sample of thirty-one developing 
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countries over the period 1972-2001. The model is based on the theoretical 
framework we build following the review of literature on deficit-growth connection 
and the endogenous growth model along the lines of the model of government and 
economic growth due to Barro (1990), Sala-i-Martin (1990), and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1992, 1995, 2004). In particular, the regression model expresses real GDP 
growth as a function of a vector consisting of the elements of government budget 
constraint (revenue, expenditure, and the deficit) and a vector consisting of a set of 
control variables that are usually included in the growth empirics. These control 
variables are an initial income variable, population growth rate (used as a proxy for 
the growth of labour supply), the level of investment, inflation rate, money supply 
(used as a proxy for financial deepening), and an indicator of the degree of 
openness. 
 
Four versions of this model were estimated in order to test our key hypotheses. In 
the first version, we estimated the original model to examine the effect of fiscal 
deficits per se on economic growth. In the second version, we replaced the deficit 
variable by its sources of finance, namely domestic finance and external finance, to 
examine whether the impact of fiscal deficits on growth depends on how deficits 
are financed. In the third version, we disaggregated the total expenditure variable 
into two categories, capital expenditure and current expenditure, to check whether 
the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth depends on the composition of 
government expenditure. Finally, in the fourth version, we disaggregated the total 
expenditure variable based on sectoral classification of government expenditure to 
check whether economic growth depends on the sectoral classification of 
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government expenditure. Our argument in relation to the composition of 
government expenditure is that deficit spending on the components of government 
expenditure found to be ‘productive’ would be growth enhancing, while spending 
associated with the components of government expenditure found to be 
‘unproductive’ would have little or no impact on economic growth. 
 
The growth model was estimated using the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM 
estimation technique. Many existing empirical studies on the topic have employed 
other estimation techniques, particularly ordinary least square (OLS) technique, 
fixed-effects technique and Random-effects technique. However, evidence shows 
that these techniques produce biased estimates when used to estimate dynamic 
models like ours.  In addition, it is difficult to deal with the endogeneity problem 
which is associated with growth models like ours when these estimation techniques 
are used.  Thus, we employ the Arellano and Bond GMM estimator to control for 
these problems. 
 
 
8.3 Main Findings and Policy Implications 
 
The study’s main findings and their policy implications are summarised below: 
 
 Fiscal deficits per se did not have any significant impact on economic growth 
in developing countries during the study period (1972-2001). This implies 
that fiscal deficits per se were not necessarily good or bad for economic 
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growth in developing countries. Another implication is that, as some studies 
have suggested, deficit spending policy in developing countries might have 
coincided with wasteful government spending, poor governance and the 
existence of a large and ineffective bureaucracy, and other unproductive 
economic policies. 
 
 Both domestic and external financing of the deficits had a negative impact 
on economic growth with a lag. This finding suggests that deficit financing in 
developing countries could be associated with macroeconomic problems 
which are likely to affect economic growth, especially in the long run. The 
literature shows that various ways of deficit financing could be potentially 
harmful to the economy; printing money to finance deficits could cause 
inflation, drawing down foreign exchange reserves could provoke capital 
flight and therefore cause balance of payments problems, domestic 
borrowing could push up interest rates and crowd-out private investment, 
and foreign borrowing could result in unsustainable levels of external debt. 
All these macroeconomic problems could be detrimental to economic 
growth, especially in the long run. 
 
 Most of the components of government expenditure (including the standard 
candidates for ‘productive’ expenditure - such as capital expenditure and 
sectoral spending on education and economic services (which includes 
spending on transport and communication) - had little or no impact on 
economic growth in developing countries. The coefficient estimates for all 
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these variables, though positive, were not statistically different from zero. 
This has an important policy implication that deficit financing associated 
with spending on these components of government expenditure will not 
have any significant positive effect on economic growth. These weak results 
on most of the components of government expenditure could explain why 
we find that fiscal deficits per se did not have any significant impact on 
economic growth in developing countries. 
 
 The lagged dependent variable is found to have a negative and statistically 
significant impact on economic growth, which implies that the group of 
countries of countries considered in this study experienced the so-called 
conditional convergence during the period 1972-2001.  
 
 The results on investment and financial deepening show that, as expected, 
these variables exerted a positive and significant effect on economic growth. 
These results imply that these variables are key determinants of economic 
growth in developing countries. 
 
 The results show some evidence that openness had a positive impact on 
economic growth, although the statistical evidence is not entirely conclusive 
and robust. The results suggest that may be developing countries have not 
yet really benefited much from the trade openness policy most of these 
countries have pursued in the last few decades. 
 
278 
 
 On the other variables we include in our empirical model, we find some 
evidence that inflation was positively associated with economic growth, 
results which are contrary to the conventional wisdom. These results 
therefore imply that moderate inflation that the sample of developing 
countries considered in this study experienced on average had helpful 
rather than harmful effect economic effect in these countries, and that 
attempts to reduce inflation in these countries to a very low level may very 
likely reduce economic growth. Population growth appears to have had a 
positive and significant impact on economic growth, a finding that suggests 
that labour force growth promoted economic growth in developing 
countries during the study period (1972-2001). The results on the tax 
revenue variable are mixed and therefore provide no conclusive evidence or 
definitive inference on the effect of taxation on economic growth. Finally, 
grants appear to have had no expected positive significant impact on 
economic growth in the considered sample of developing countries. 
 
 
8.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
This study has contributed to knowledge on the relationship between fiscal deficits 
and economic growth in various ways. Some of the key contributions are 
summarised below: 
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First, it fills an important gap in the empirical literature on the relationship between 
fiscal deficits and economic growth in the developing countries. So far, most of the 
empirical studies on fiscal deficits and economic growth have been confined to 
developed countries, and there is a scarcity of such studies in the context of 
developing countries. Our study, therefore, fills this gap in the literature. In doing so, 
the study also offers important empirical findings which are useful for the public 
policy formulation in relation to fiscal policy in developing countries. 
 
Second, while most of the existing empirical studies on the impact of fiscal deficits 
on economic growth consider the growth impact of fiscal deficits per se, this study 
goes further and looks into how the alternative ways of deficit financing and the 
composition of government expenditure may play an important role in determining 
the impact of deficits on economic growth. 
 
Third, most of the empirical studies on the topic consider only the 
contemporaneous effects of fiscal deficits on economic growth. This study 
considers both the contemporaneous and lagged effects on growth of fiscal deficits 
and other variables for which theory and intuition suggest that they are likely to 
influence economic growth with a lag. Our approach is more appropriate since 
fiscal policy variables and other variables which are normally included in the growth 
models, like the one we used in our study, are expected to influence economic 
growth with some time lag. 
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Fourth, a number of earlier empirical studies on fiscal deficits and economic growth, 
especially those published before the mid-1990s, fail to consider the implications of 
the government budget constraint carefully in their estimations. These studies are 
likely to suffer from substantial biases in the coefficient estimates due to model 
misspecification. Our study treats the government budget constraint carefully, and 
in doing so, it avoids the model specification problems and therefore possible bias 
in the results caused by failure to include the government budget constraint in the 
econometric model.  
 
Fifth, the study employs the GMM estimation technique, which is more appropriate 
for estimating dynamic growth models like the one we consider in this study. 
Survey of the literature shows that many existing empirical studies on fiscal deficits 
and economic growth employ techniques - such as, ordinary least square (OLS) 
technique, fixed-effects (FE) technique, random-effects (RE) technique, and others -  
which are likely to produce biased coefficient estimates for dynamic models.  In 
addition, the GMM estimation technique controls for the likely endogeneity 
problem associated with growth models like ours. This problem can be difficult to 
deal with when other estimation techniques are used. 
 
Finally, the study checks whether there exist any regional differences in relation to 
the deficit-economic growth connection in developing countries. This has not been 
considered in the existing panel studies on the topic despite the fact that, though 
there are many similarities, different regions of the developing world are not 
exactly homogenous in terms of economic characteristics and performance.  
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8.5 Problems and Limitations of the Study 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the main problem and limitation this study faced 
related to data availability. Because of either non-reporting or lack of data on many 
variables, particularly fiscal variables, we considered in the empirical model, the 
number of developing countries included in the study was restricted to thirty-one 
only. Despite this problem, we carefully tried to ensure that the sample is 
‘representative’ of developing countries by including countries from different 
income groups and regions of the developing world to allow drawing 
generalisations of the results. In terms of regions, for example, the sample includes 
9 countries from Asia and the Pacific, 9 countries from America and the Caribbean, 
5 countries from the Middle East and North Africa, and 8 countries from Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 
Poor data availability also restricted the scope of analysis in some parts. For 
example, despite our awareness of the importance of governance variable in 
modelling economic growth, we were forced to omit this variable from our 
empirical model due to the lack of data on this variable for the large part of our 
sample period for developing countries. Also, lack of disaggregated data on the 
sources of deficit financing limited our analysis of the growth effects of the 
alternative sources of deficit financing to two broad sources only, domestic 
financing and external financing. In addition, poor data availability forced us to 
consider the economic growth effects of only five components of sectoral spending, 
instead of the eight components we could categorise.  
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Another limitation was that, as discussed earlier in Chapter Four (Section 4.4), the 
methodology of construction and classification of fiscal variables in the primary 
source of fiscal data - IMF’s Government Finance Statistics -  changed in 2001 and 
data on fiscal variables based on the new methodology and classification are not 
reported or consistently available for most of the developing countries.  As a result, 
the sample period in our study covers the period from 1972 up to 2001 only, with 
the data for the most recent period (from 2002 to date) missing. Nevertheless, we 
believe the policy implications of the results are still relevant for the period after 
2001, given that the general trends of most of the variables included in our 
empirical model have broadly remained unchanged since 2001. 
 
Finally, poor quality of data also posed some limitations in the study. It is well 
documented in the literature that the quality of data from the primary sources of 
our data - World Bank’s World Development Indicators and IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics - is not optimal especially for most of the developing countries73. 
Thus, regression results estimated using these data might be unreliable in terms of 
the magnitudes of the coefficients, hence the need to exercise caution with 
interpreting the results especially when making comparisons and generalisations. 
To address this problem, our analysis focused much on the direction and 
significance of the results on the explanatory variables included in the empirical 
model - and less on the magnitudes of the coefficients.  
 
 
                                                 
73 However, it should be noted that these two are the best sources of statistical data available for 
economic analysis. 
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8.6 Areas for Future Research 
Finally, we close our discussion with the identification of some potential areas for 
future research. These areas are proposed based on the reflection of our research 
process, study’s problems and limitations, and some of the key findings. These are 
as outlined below: 
 
 One possible study would be to re-examine the issues we have considered 
in this study using the updated data set that include the most recent data 
and more countries, when this is possible. In particular, it would be valuable 
to use the most recent dataset on fiscal variables that is constructed based 
on the new methodology and classification of fiscal variables used in the 
IMF’s GFS since 2001.  
 
 Another possible area for future research would be to carry out regional 
studies or studies based on individual countries to check whether this 
study’s findings hold. Besides, one may argue that, although developing 
countries have a lot in common in terms of economic characteristics, there 
are some regional and country differences which may call for the need to 
conduct some regional or country specific studies in order to formulate 
more appropriate regional and/or country research informed economic 
policy. One may also argue that, simply formulating and implementing one-
size-fits-all policies for all developing countries based on findings and policy 
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implications drawn from studies considering a general set of developing 
countries like ours may be misleading. 
 
 In addition, since most of the studies investigating the impact of fiscal 
deficits on economic growth consider the fiscal deficits per se only, there is 
a need for thorough empirical investigation into the specific questions of 
how the alternative ways of deficit financing and what deficit financing is 
used for in the economy influences economic growth. Our study has 
attempted to address these questions, but poor data availability has limited 
our scope of investigation into these issues. For example, poor data 
availability on deficit financing forced us to consider the impact of two 
broad classifications of deficit financing – domestic financing and external 
financing – on economic growth. However, it would be useful to examine 
the impact of disaggregated modes of deficit financing – printing money, 
domestic borrowing, foreign borrowing and running down foreign exchange 
reserves – on economic growth, when this is possible.  Note also that poor 
data availability and quality forced us to consider the impact of five 
components of sectoral spending only, instead of considering all identified 
eight components. Thus, it would also be useful to re-examine the economic 
growth impact of all components of sectoral spending, when it is possible to 
get more consistent and reliable data on all components of sectoral 
spending. 
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 Furthermore, given our weak results on the impact of fiscal policy variables 
– i.e., fiscal deficits, components of government expenditure and grants - on 
economic growth, it would be useful to investigate why this is the case, and 
to what extent the role of governance and public sector efficiency could 
explain this weak relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth. 
 
 In line with the previous point, it would also be useful to re-examine the 
impact of fiscal policy variables - particularly fiscal deficits and government 
expenditure – on economic growth using a modified version of our empirical 
model that includes the governance variable(s) on the right-hand side of the 
model.  This could help to check the validity of our argument that our weak 
results on the impact of fiscal policy variables on economic growth could be 
explained by poor governance, which is a problem facing most of the 
developing countries. Note that, as discussed earlier, we could not include a 
governance variable in our empirical model due to poor data availability on 
governance indicators.  However, it would be worth examining how adding 
a governance variable - as measured by indicators such as government 
effectiveness, voice and accountability, political stability or instability, rule 
of law and quality of institutions, corruption, quality of regulation - in the 
empirical model would influence the results on the effect of fiscal policy 
variables on economic growth.  
 
 Finally, in the light of our empirical results on the control variables, it would 
be worth investigating further into the unexpected results we find of a 
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positive impact of inflation and tax revenue on economic growth in 
developing countries. Note that both economic theory and intuition 
suggests that these variables should have a negative impact on economic 
growth especially in the economies with high rates of inflation and tax rates 
like the ones we have considered in this study. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Philosophical Approach of the Study 
There are various philosophical approaches available for social scientists to choose 
from, depending on the ontological assumptions (i.e., assumptions that a particular 
approach to social science inquiry makes about the nature of social reality), and the 
epistemological assumptions - i.e., assumptions made about the ways in which it is 
possible to gain knowledge of this reality (Blaikie, 1993; May 1997).74 
 
One influential philosophy in the practise of social science research corresponds to 
falsificationism, which is associated with British Philosopher Sir Karl Popper (Blaikie, 
1993). This philosophy establishes that science progresses when a theory is proved 
wrong and a new theory which explains the phenomenon in a better way is 
developed (Chalmers, 1982). This philosophy, therefore, requires social scientists to 
attempt to disprove a theory and establish some evidence that contradicts it rather 
than simply attempting to prove it.  Once the theory has been proved wrong 
(rejected) it is then falsified and stays that way. According to this philosophy, when 
this happens, scientists should not respond by using immunising stratagems, which 
are ad hoc theory adjustments designed to save theories from refutations, but 
rather they should see this as evidence of progress (Popper, 1959; Grunbaum, 
1976; Chalmers, 1982; Blaug, 1992; Blaikie, 1993). 
 
Popper’s falsificationist approach sets out the following two requirements for 
scientific research (Popper, 1959, 1995; Blaikie, 1993). First, for any theory to be 
regarded as scientific it must be possible to falsify it – that is, it should be possible 
to use evidence to challenge it. According to this approach, a theory that is not 
capable of being tested should not be considered scientific, and a good theory is 
falsifiable because it makes definite claims about the world and the more precisely 
                                                 
74 See Blaikie (1993, Chapters 4 and 7) for the review and critique of these approaches and the 
discussion on how to choose between them and May (2007, Chapter 1) for the survey of the main 
philosophical approached used in social sciences.  
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a theory is tested the more falsifiable it becomes (Blaikie, 1993, p. 145).  Secondly, 
tests to theories should be as demanding as possible, so that a theory that survives 
such tests must be more acceptable than those subjected to weaker tests. 
 
The falsificationism approach follows the deductive strategy in research (also 
referred to as the hypothetical deductive, or the method of conjecture and 
refutation). This strategy begins with a question or a problem that needs to be 
understood or explained, and then falsifiable hypotheses are proposed and then 
tested. In the words of Blaikie (1993) 
 
“Science starts with problems, problems associated with the explanation of 
the behaviour of some aspect of the world or universe. Falsifiable hypotheses 
are then proposed by scientists as solutions to the problem. The conjectured 
hypotheses are then criticised and tested. Some will be quickly eliminated. 
Others might prove more successful. These must be subject to even more 
stringent criticism and testing. When a hypothesis that has successfully 
withstood a wide range of rigorous tests is eventually falsified, a new 
problem, hopefully far removed from the original solved problem, has 
emerged. This problem calls for the invention of a new hypothesis, followed 
by new criticism and testing. And so the process continues indefinitely. It can 
never be said of a theory that it is true, however well it has withstood 
rigorous tests, but it can hopefully be said that a current theory is superior to 
its predecessors in the sense that it is able to withstand tests that falsified 
those predecessors.” (Blaikie, 1993: p. 144: Citing Chalmers 1982: p. 45) 
 
It follows from the above discussion that Popper’s research strategy can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
1. Research should start by putting forward a tentative idea, a conjecture, or a 
hypothesis or a set of hypotheses that form a theory. 
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2. With the help of previously accepted hypotheses, or by specific conditions 
under which these hypotheses are expected to hold, a conclusion or a 
number of conclusions should be deduced. 
 
3. Deduced conclusion or conclusions and the logic of the argument that 
produced the conclusion or conclusions should then be examined. These can 
be compared with existing theories to see if they would constitute an 
advance in understanding of the phenomenon under examination. If, 
satisfied with this examination, then……. 
 
4. ……. Proceed with testing of the conclusion or conclusions by collecting 
appropriate data and then conducting the necessary experiments. 
 
5. If the test fails (i.e., if the data are not consistent with the conclusions), the 
‘theory’ should be regarded as false; that is, the original conjecture should 
be seen as not match up with reality and must therefore be rejected. 
 
6. If, however, the conclusion passes the test (i.e., the data are consistent with 
the theory), the ‘theory’ is temporary supported: it is ‘corroborated’, not 
‘proved to be true’. (Blaikie, 1993: p. 145: Citing Popper, 1959: pp. 32-33) 
 
 
While Popper’s view of scientific research has gained acceptance from many social 
science researchers, there are features of it with which some researchers are 
dissatisfied and which makes it rarely practised.  Economics as an area of social 
science research is one of the social sciences areas this methodology has influenced, 
but where it has rarely been practised. This is discussed in Blaug’s (1992) study on 
“the methodology of economics, or how economists explain”, in which he 
concludes that while methodological writings of different economists reveal the 
influence of falsificationism, modern economists rarely practise it.  Blaug further 
argues that the prevailing economic methodology can be described as ‘innocuous 
falsificationism’ as it is not only highly protective of economic theory, but also ultra-
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permissive with some limits. Most models will do this, provided they are rigorously 
formulated and constructed, and promising in their relevance to the real world 
situation (Blaug, 1992: pp. 110-111) 
 
Indeed, if Popper’s falsificationism methodology were strictly followed, then it 
would not take long before most of the social science theories are falsified. Popper 
himself seemed to recognise this limitation. While in his early work he regarded a 
single refutation as being sufficient for the demise of a theory, he later allowed 
theories to be modified in order for them to survive tests (Blaikie, 1995). This did 
not mean introducing ad hoc modifications that had no testable consequences, 
such as an extra condition that arbitrarily restricted the scope of the theory, but it 
did allow necessary and testable conditions to be introduced. 
 
Popper’s view of science has come to be known as naïve falsificationism. Lakatos 
(1970) attempted to improve Popper’s methodology by introducing what he called 
sophisticated falsificationism.  He moved the emphasis away from establishing the 
level of falsifiability of a single theory to the comparison of the degree of 
falsifiability of competing theories. His approach establishes that, for a new theory 
to be acceptable it needs to be more falsifiable than its predecessor and preferably 
be able to predict new kinds of phenomenon. Thus, as science progresses, theories 
should become increasingly more falsifiable by making greater claims than their 
predecessors make. In the words of Blaikie (1992):   
 
“Sophisticated falsificationism differs from naïve falsificationism both in its 
rules of acceptance (or ‘demarcation criterion’) and its rules of falsification 
or elimination. For the naïve falsificationist any theory which can be 
interpreted as experimentally falsifiable is ‘acceptable’ or ‘scientific’. For the 
sophisticated falsificationist a theory is ‘acceptable’ or ‘scientific’ only if it 
has corroborated excess empirical content over its predecessor (or rival), 
that is, only if it leads to the discovery of novel facts.” (Blaikie, 1992: p. 147: 
cited from Lakatos, 1970: p. 116)  
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Sophisticated falsificationism establishes that for a theory to be replaced, the new 
theory must provide additional information, i.e. it must be able to predict facts that 
the existing theory would regard as improbable or not allowed; it must be able to 
explain what the existing theory can explain, and there must be some corroboration 
for this additional information.  
 
Sophisticated falsificationism allows for confirmationism as well as falsificationism 
approaches, with the distinction between the two resting partially on the degree to 
which theories are severely tested to yield risky implications liable to refutation and 
partially on whether refutations are taken seriously as possible reflections of 
fundamental errors. 
 
The methodology of confirmationism offers an approach that most present-day 
economists favour. This is revealed in the study cited above by Blaug (1992) on ‘the 
methodology of economics or how economists explain’ in which he argues that 
modern economists believe that “the theories should be testable; that a useful 
means of testing is to compare the predictions of a theory with reality; that 
predictive adequacy is often the most important characteristic a theory can 
possess; and that the relative ordering of theories should be determined by the 
strength of confirmation, or corroboration, of those being compared” (Blaug, 1992: 
xiv). According to Blaug (1992), these principles define the methodology of 
confirmationism rather than falsificationism.  
 
In light of the above, therefore, our study follows the methodology of 
confirmationism in examining the impact of fiscal deficits on economic growth in 
developing countries, as it does not intend to falsify the existing theoretical 
predictions on the relationship between deficit spending and growth. If the results 
are in favour of the predictions, then there will be a confirmation or corroboration 
of the theory; and if not, instead of falsifying the theory, the study will look at the 
possible causes of the results that contradict the theory.  
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The study begins with setting a theoretical model based on the deductions from 
existing theories on the deficit-growth connection. This model and its theoretical 
predictions are then tested quantitatively using regression analysis.  
 
The analysis of quantitative data is methodologically classified as quantitative 
research. This approach to research has been partly linked to positivism and partly 
to a general commitment to the practices of natural sciences.  This is well discussed 
in Von Mises (1970) in which it is argued that some social science researchers are 
intent upon quantification of economics and their motto is the positivistic approach 
that scientific inquiry should deal with measurement. Von Mises further argues that 
these social science researchers try to compute the arithmetical relations among 
various data and thus to determine what they call, in similarity to natural sciences, 
correlations and functions. Given this description of quantitative research, 
therefore, we would classify our study as indeed a quantitative one as it seeks to 
establish a quantitative relationship between fiscal deficits and economic growth. 
However, as mentioned above, we emphasise that if our empirical results are in 
favour of the theoretical model and its predictions, then the study will confirm or 
corroborate the theory. On the other hand, however, if the results are not in line 
with theory then, instead of the study falsifying the theory, the study will look at 
the possible causes for the results that contradict it.  
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Appendix B: Theoretical Aggregation of Functional Classification of Taxes and  
                          Government Expenditure by Kneller et al. (1999) 
 
Theoretical Classification Functional Classification 
Distortionary taxation 
 
 
 
 
Non-distortionary taxation 
Other revenues 
 
 
Productive expenditures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unproductive expenditure 
 
 
 
Other expenditures 
Taxation on income and profit 
Social security contributions  
Taxation on payroll and manpower 
Taxation on property 
 
Taxation on domestic goods and services 
Taxation on international trade 
Non-tax revenues 
Other tax revenues 
 
General public services expenditure 
Defence expenditure 
Education expenditure 
Health expenditure 
Housing expenditure 
Transport and communication expenditure 
 
Social security and welfare expenditure 
Expenditure on recreation 
Expenditure on economic services 
 
Other expenditure (unclassified) 
Source: Kneller, R. et al. (1999) Fiscal Policy and Growth: Evidence from OECD 
Countries, Journal of Public Economics 74, pp. 171-190 
* Note: Function classification used here refer to the classification given in IMF’s 
Government Financial Statistics – various issues. 
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Appendix C: Theoretical Functional Classification of Fiscal Policy Instruments by 
                          Benos (2009) 
 
 
Theoretical Classification Functional Classification 
Distortionary taxation 
 
 
 
 
Non-distortionary taxation 
 
 
 
Productive expenditures/ 
unproductive government 
expenditure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Current taxes on income, wealth 
Capital taxes 
Actual social contributions 
 
 
Taxation on production and imports 
 
 
 
Expenditure on education 
Expenditure on health 
Expenditure on housing-community amenities 
Expenditure on environmental protection  
Education on social protection 
Expenditure on social protection  
Expenditure on economic affairs 
Expenditure on general public services 
Expenditure on public order-safety 
Expenditure on defence 
Expenditure on recreation-culture and religion 
 
Source: Benos, N. (2009) Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth: Evidence from EU 
Countries, - Available from: <http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/19174/1/MPRA_paper_19174.pdf> [Accessed on 14th November 
2011] 
* Note: Function classification used here refer to the classification given in IMF’s 
Government Financial Statistics – various issues. 
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Appendix D: Hypothesis Underlying the Formulations of the St. Louis Model 
                          Estimated by Andersen and Jordan (1968) 
 
The specific hypothesis underlying the formulations of the St. Louis Model 
estimated by Andersen and Jordan (1968) is expressed in the following 
mathematical relation (Andersen and Jordan, 1968, p.24): 
 
 Y = f(E, R, M, Z)………………………………………………………………………………………(i) 
Where: Y = total spending 
              E = a variable summarising government fiscal actions 
              R = a variable summarising government taxing actions 
              M = a variable summarising monetary actions 
              Z = a variable summarising all other factors that influence total spending 
 
As discussed in Andersen and Jordan (1968), the time series data for E, R and M 
were considered in the model based on the argument that these are the indicators 
which are frequently used as measures of fiscal and monetary policy actions 
(Andersen and Jordan, 1968) 
 
Expressing equation (i) in terms of the changes of each variable gives: 
 
 ∆Y = f(∆E, ∆R, ∆M, ∆Z)…………………………………………………………………………. (ii) 
 
Estimating equation (ii) based on econometric analysis yields: 
 ∆Y = α1∆E + α2∆R + α3∆M + α4∆Z…………………………………………………………. (iii) 
Where: α1, α2, α3 and α4 are parameter estimates of the observed values of ∆Y on 
the observed values of ∆E, ∆R, ∆M and ∆Z, respectively. 
 
It is worth noting that there is no constant term in equation (iii) since the effect of 
all “all other factors” influencing total spending are summarised/captured by α4∆Z. 
However, a constant is reported in the empirical results reported for each 
estimated equation in Andersen and Jordan (1968); where these constant terms are 
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an estimate of α4 times the average autonomous non-monetary and non-fiscal 
factors summarized in Z. 
 
As pointed out by Andersen and Jordan (1968, p.24), it is possible in a complex 
market economy for monetary and fiscal actions to exert an indirect influence (in 
addition to a direct influence) on ∆Y. This indirect influence would operate through 
∆Z. To illustrate this, for example, one form of the relation between monetary and 
fiscal actions ∆Z would be expressed as: 
 
∆Z = bo + b1∆E + b2∆R + b3∆M + α4∆Z……………………………………………….…. (IV) 
 
The empirical values of α1, α2, and α3 which were estimated/reported in Andersen 
and Jordan (1968) represent both the direct and indirect influence of monetary and 
fiscal policy actions on total spending. Using ∆E as an example, the expression (a1 + 
b1a4) would an estimate of α1, the total influence of ∆E on ∆Y. Of this total 
influence, the direct influence is a1 and the indirect influence is b1a4.        
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Appendix E: Changes in the Methodology of Construction and Classification of 
                       Fiscal Variables in the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Since 2001 
 
 
The methodology used for construction and classification of fiscal variables in the 
IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (IMF’s GFS) changed significantly in 2001 
following modernisation and expansion of the methodology used in compiling 
government finance statistics. This methodology replaced (or improved on) the 
methodology used in compiling government finance statistics in accordance with 
the guidelines given in the 1986 Government Finance Statistics Manual. Major 
changes in the revised GFS system, as described in the 2001 GFS manual, were 
made in the coverage of units and economic events to be recorded, time/basis of 
recording economic events, definitions and classifications of revenue and expense 
and valuation (IMF’s GFS Manual, 2001, pp.156-159). These changes and 
differences from the 1986 GFS system are explained below: 
 
 Coverage of units and economic events 
 
The focus of the coverage of units in the revised GFS system (2001 GFS system) is 
the general government sector as defined in the System of National Accounts 1993 
(1993 SNA)75, which is defined on the basis of institutional units76. This is different 
from the coverage of the 1986 GFS system, which is defined on a functional basis 
(rather than institutional units) and includes all relevant transactions (i.e. 
transactions that represent the fulfilment of fiscal policy) of all units carrying out a 
function of government. One important implication of these changes on the 
coverage of units is that, while transactions relating to the governmental functions 
                                                 
75 Defined and used as the international standard for compilation of national accounts statistics and 
for the international reporting of comparable national accounting data. This was adopted by the 
United Nations Statistical Commission in 1993, and it has since then been published jointly by the 
United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, and the Commission of the European Communities 
(http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna1993.asp.)   
76 Where, according to 2001 GFS Manual, institutional units are defined as economic entities that are 
capable, in their own right, of owning assets, incurring liabilities, and engaging in economic activities 
and in transactions with other entities (IMF’s GFS Manual, 2001, p.8) 
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carried out within a country by supranational organisations77 were included in 
compilation of statistics of each country in the 1986 GFS system, these transactions 
are now excluded in the revised GFS system. It should be noted that, despite the 
fact that supranational organisations fulfil some of the fiscal roles/functions of 
government within each member country, they are usually considered as non-
resident institutional units. On this basis, therefore, they are not included in the 
revised GFS system for any country. 
 
In addition, the coverage of economic events in the revised GFS system is broader 
than the coverage of events used in the 1986 GFS system. This follows a switch 
from cash basis to accrual basis of recording transactions and other economic flows 
under the revised system (see discussion in the next section), which means that all 
economic events that affect revenue, expenses, assets or liabilities rather than just 
those represented by cash transactions are included in recording transactions and 
other flows.  
 
 Time/basis of recording economic events 
 
In the revised GFS system, transactions and other economic flows are recorded on 
accrual basis. As a result, transactions and flows are recorded when economic value 
is created, transformed, exchanged, transferred or extinguished (IMF’s GFS 2001, 
p.156). This is different from the approach followed in the 1986 GFS system in 
which transactions are recorded on cash basis – i.e. when cash is received or paid. 
Given these changes, transactions and economic flows are recorded at earlier time 
under the revised GFS system than under the 1986 GFS system. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 Defined in IMF’s GFS Manuals as “international organisations that have been endowed with the 
authority to raise taxes or other compulsory transfers within the territories of the countries that are 
members of the authority” (IMF’s GFS Manual, 2001, p.156). 
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 Definitions and classifications 
 
There are also changes in the definitions and classifications of revenue and 
expenditure in the revised GFS system. Revenue in the revised GFS system in an 
increase in net worth resulting from a transaction. As pointed out in the IMF’s GFS 
2001 manual (p.157), this implies that revenue includes grants but excludes 
proceeds from disposals of non-financial assets. Contrary to this definition of 
revenue under the revised GFS system, in the 1986 GFS system, revenue is 
considered as the set of all non-repayable government receipts other than grants, 
which means that revenue includes any proceeds from disposals of non-financial 
assets but excludes grants. 
 
Similarly, expense in the revised GFS system is a decrease in net worth resulting 
from a transaction. It follows therefore that, since purchases of non-financial assets 
do not affect net worth, they are not considered as expense transactions. Note also 
that the term ‘expense’ in the revised GFS system replaces the term ‘expenditure’ 
used in the 1986 GFS system, for it is more closely associated with the accrual basis 
of recording transactions in the revised system and indicates that transactions in 
non-financial assets are excluded. In the 1986 GFS system, expenditure is defined as 
the set of all non-repayable payments and includes purchases of non-financial 
assets. 
 
In terms of the classifications, revenues are substantially different in two GFS 
systems. Revenue in the revised GFS system is classified into taxes, social insurance 
contributions, grants and other revenue. In contrast, in the 1986 GFS system, 
revenue is classified as tax, nontax, or capital revenue - with grants forming a 
separate non-revenue category of government receipts.  
 
Expense/expenditure is classified in two ways – by function and by economic type of 
transactions – in both the revised GFS system and the 1986 GFS system. The 
classification by function in both systems follow the classification of Functions of 
Government (COFOG) used by the United Nations, but this classification has 
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recently been revised. The revised GFS system incorporates the revised COFOG 
while the 1986 GFS system follows the old COFOG. The classification of expense by 
economic type in the revised GFS system is broadly similar to the classification used 
in the 1986 GFS system, but with the following few exceptions: 
 
- Purchases of non-financial assets are not considered as an expense in the 
revised GFS system. 
- Consumption of fixed capital is considered as an expense in the revised GFS 
systems, while as a non-cash expense, this was excluded from the 1986 GFs 
system. 
- Transfer payments are classified by type of payment in the revised GFS system, 
while in the 1986 GFS system these are classified by the sector receiving the 
payment.78 
 
 Valuation 
 
In the revised GFS system, assets and liabilities are valued at current market prices, 
but with a provision of recording the nominal value of debt securities as a 
memorandum item. In the 1986 GFS system, debt securities are valued at the 
amount the government is supposed to pay when the debt matures. By implication, 
therefore, the valuation of debt securities the government is obligated to pay in the 
1986 GFs system is most likely to differ from both the nominal value and the 
current market value of these debt securities. 
 
 Other Changes 
 
Several other changes in the revised GFS system include: 
 
- Complete balance sheets (which include all stocks of financial assets, non-
financial assets, liabilities and net worth) are included in the revised GFS 
                                                 
78 According to the IMF’s GFS, the major types of transfer payments are subsidies, grants and social benefits (IMF’s GFS 
Manual, 2001). 
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system, while in the 1986 GFS system only stocks of certain liabilities are 
included. 
 
- Several new balancing items are introduced in the revised GFS system in the 
view that analysis of the government (or public) sector must include a variety 
of considerations and that no single measure is sufficient for all different 
purposes. In the 1986 GFS system, on the other hand, only one balancing item 
- the overall deficit/ surplus - is used.  
 
- Transactions involving the purchase or sale of financial assets are treated as 
financial transactions and net lending/borrowing is one of the balancing items 
in the revised GFS system. 
 
 
Following these methodological changes in compiling government finance statistics, 
many developing countries like the ones we have considered in our study - were 
not able, at least initially, to publish fiscal data using the revised GFS system, hence 
making it difficult to find consistent data for these countries for the period after 
2001. This is not surprising, for even the IMF recognised that it would take some 
time before many countries are able to implement the revised GFS system as is 
pointed out in the 2001 Government Finance Statistics Manual: 
 
“It is recognised that the implementation of the fully integrated GFS system 
presented in this manual will take some time and will need to progress at a 
pace determined by the differing needs and circumstances of the country 
involved. In particular, many countries will need to revise their underlying 
accounting systems to reflect the accrual accounting principles and revised 
classifications of the GFS system.” (IMF’s GFS Manual, 2001, p. 5) 
 
In fact, following delays by many developing countries to report government 
finance statistics in accordance with the guidelines of compiling government 
finance statistics given in the revised GFS system (2001 GFS), in September 2011, 
the IMF’s Statistics Department introduced a new approach of assisting developing 
countries to be able to implement the integrated 2001 GFS system. This new 
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approach is presented in recently published Government Finance Statistics 
Compilation Guide for Developing Countries (IMF, 2011). This guide recommends 
the following four stages of adopting the 2001 GFS system by developing countries 
(IMF, 2001, pp.186 – 187): 
 
Stage one – introduction of the presentation tables and summary 
statements, and classification in accordance with 2001 GFS system of 
existing budget execution data only. This is referred to as the adoption of the 
2001 GFS system. 
 
Stage two – expansion of the institutional and transactional coverage of 
government finance statistics to include all general government units, on a 
cash basis. 
 
Stage three – expansion of the coverage of the government finance statistics 
to include selected non-cash items. This is referred to as compiling 
government finance statistics on a modified cash basis; and 
 
Stage four – expansion of the coverage of government finance statistics to 
cover all flows and stocks associated with general government units – i.e. 
compilation of GFS on both a cash basis and an accrual basis for the whole 
government sector and its subsectors.  
 
 
Clearly, this shows that it will take some time before most of the developing 
countries are able to adopt and implement the fully integrated 2001 GFS system. 
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Appendix F: Sample Countries 
 
Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Syria Arab Republic, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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Appendix G: Data Summary 
Variable Mnemonic Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
GDP growth  GDP 184 4.29 2.76 -3.34   11.40 
Population growth  POP 186 2.22 0.696 0.19   3.82 
Degree of openness   OPEN 183 4.018 0.52 2.37 5.35 
Rate of Inflation   INFL 179 2.39 0.85 -0.59 4.57 
Total investment  INV 181 3.05 0.28 2.26 3.86 
Money Supply  M2 182 3.48 0.47 2.23 4.52 
Total Fiscal Deficit  DFCT 183 3.48 3.58  -4.40   14.32 
Domestic Financing  DFIN 172   2.42 2.94 -3.13 11.23 
External Financing  EXTFIN 172 1.42 1.88 -2.24 7.56 
Total Government expenditure  GOVEXP 181 3.13 0.37 2.09 3.91 
Government Current expenditure) CURREXP 176 2.89   0.39 1.91 3.60 
Government Capital Expenditure  CAPEXP 175 1.49  0.67 -0.29 2.88 
Expenditure on Public Service  PSEXP 164 0.84 0.75 -0.67 2.44 
Defence expenditure  DEFEXP 147 .63 .78 -1.52 2.18 
Spending on Education EDUEXP 164 1.15 0.65 -1.40 2.16 
Spending on Health HLTHEXP 164 0.23 .74 -1.49 1.61 
Spending on Economic Services ECONEXP   163 1.51 0.62 -0.11   2.82 
Total tax Revenue  TAX 182 16.37 5.77 5.02   32.61 
Grants GRANTS 139 -.976 1.98 -7.33 3.34 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators CD-ROM and IMF’s Government Finance Statistics 
CD-ROM and   Yearbooks (Various issues) 
 
Note:     - All figures are calculated based on five-year averages 
- All the variables are in natural logarithm except GDP, GDP-1, DFCT, DFIN, EXTFIN and TAX 
- All the original figures on fiscal variables, investment and money supply are expressed as a percentage of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
